Time is generally on the side of wider agreement between parties, as long as infrastructure continues to grow, and militarism recedes. As trade in the mountains becomes easier, the making and keeping of agreements become more advantageous to all parties, and peaceful relationships spread. The danger is when improved infrastructure is employed in punitive and rapacious military expeditions. The response is then for local people to destroy it, setting back peaceful interaction at the same time. A long-term problem persists when factions of traders cultivate a mutually profitable relationship with a military-administrative complex to gain advantage over other traders.
Well, I have stumbled quickly on from the problems of isolated small communities to the story of imperialism!
The initial comment I sent wasn’t shown. As I’ve had similar problems previously, I deleted some details including the name of a cleric, a slightly flippant secondhand account of how a murder took place, and resubmitted. It also included a link to a priest who was sentenced to death for murder. These are contemporary events, but yes, I’ve lived in Indonesia too long and I’m old enough to remember the bad old days of the New Order, which many Panglossians from ANU thought were the good days, the best days.
I won’t name the Catholic student leaders involved in the ’65 massacres on Flores.
The blasphemy cases involving alleged communion host desecration occurred in the 90s. Those events are very well known by everyone on Flores, the Church, and NTT. The naked man fleeing for his life, who was killed, was a member of TNI. He was killed because of his ethnicity first, and presumed religion. Generic resentment towards Javanese and TNI had begun after the tsunami and earthquake, a turning point in the history of the Island which was allegedly used by Islamist elements in Java to destroy the historic dependency and client relationship between the Island and the Mission. The same selebaran2 gelap spread by provocateurs during this period later appeared in Maluku and Kalimantan during the conflicts. There remain many unresolved question pertaining to that period for historians interested enough to delve.
‘No facts, just a story that happened 20 years ago. Nothing to back it up. Was the Church involved? Where they doing it in the name of Catholicism?’
This is a simple comment box. I gave some introductory facts. The link between Catholicism, PDI then PDIP is well known to all in NTT and Jakarta. Resistance to Suharto and the New Order, and breaking that resistance preemptively, were other factors.
The alleged blasphemy events also spread – or were spead – to the former Province of Timtim, occurring in Suai and Aileu, where Belo made use of them for propaganda.
Lest readers think I’m being too harsh on the Church, to it’s great credit, the Catholic Church stayed out of the conflict in Ambon. This placed enormous strains in students from Kei, who followed their Mandonese Bishop to his favourite gentleman’s club in Jakarta, obtained receipts and collated a compromising dossier to try and force a change. If you want evidence of the complicity of Protestant clerics in the violence on Ambon, you don’t have to dig deep. I would remind you that the ethno-religious violence was in pursuit of electoral success, designed to change the demographics. Muslims too had their war aims but, again, this is a simple comment box and both sides decided to use Kalla’s faux reconciliation process to cover the truth rather than expose and confront it, risking reputations and careers.
As I see it, the writers of these pieces are NOT in Thailand and therefore run absolutely zero risk of anything other than not likely being allowed back without being arrested at any time in the future.
If the family members and relatives that they do and have put at risk have been consulted, been given assurances that they can ask the writer to desist if they feel the threat to them is not worth the candle, then it is these family members who are courageous, and the writers themselves who are simply lucky to have such brave relatives.
From my perspective, there is nothing courageous about causing others to be at risk and nothing courageous about sitting at a screen in another country posting rumors and speculation either here or in the international media that eats this sort of thing up.
More nuance and less Dr Evil wouldn’t interest anyone in the international media. Nervy to suggest otherwise, but hardly brave.
Maybe the writer wishes to comment on yesterday’s conviction and how this is the result of Ahok’s poor treatment of the lower classes?
Yes the conviction is an indication of the quality of the judiciary ( Refer to JIS, Jessica cases for further high profile examples and there are many more documented). However there appears to be a strong divergence in people, with one group feeling that Ahok was guilty and the other not, straight down religious lines and across racial lines. It cuts across education and social class. Not 100% accurate but it seems close.
And the issues of corruption and rent seeking are in there.
“And the last time I sent this comment I named one, this time I won’t”
You never named any Priest in any of your comments, not by name. Just some Catholic Youth leaders The fact that you had to go as far back as the 1990s shows something. The closest you come if saying a Catholic priest setup a deviant branch and a newspapers and asked for donations from minors.
The Catholic Youth leaders of 1965 raiding brothel / bars you seem to imply that it was religious motivated, because they killed one person based on religion. No facts, just a story that happened 20 years ago. Nothing to back it up. Was the Church involved? Where they doing it in the name of Catholicism?
It looks like you have been in Indonesia way to long, when you start using different standards for different people. Catholic Church turning a blind eye to the activities of NTT gangs in Jakarta. Well if that is the case what makes them any different from 99% of the Muslim imam in Indonesia would be guilty.
Boston until about 1920s had mayors who weren’t largely Catholic, ever heard of the term the Boston Brahmin. The last non-Catholic mayor was Malcolm Nichols in 1920s.
Echoing the propaganda of the ruinous socialist era (1962-1988) is a cop-out. Uber-nationalist Burmese should confront reality for once – and stop living in the past.
Since independence in 1948, the rustic nationalists never tire of flogging the dead horse of *British imperialism*. And the Indian, Chinese and Karen horses . . .
Although Burmese citizens by birth, the resident Indian and Chinese were discriminated against, even harassed, at every turn. The communities were descendants of early foreign traders who married local women, including Burman, Shan, Mon, Karen . . .
Before the disastrous 1962 military coup, these groups had made a contribution to Burma’s economic development out of all proportion to their numbers. And they possessed the potential for even greater contribution, spurred by innovation, enterprise and hard work.
This potential they have not been permitted to realise: in March 1964, the socialist dictatorship under Gen Ne Win confiscated all businesses and trades — Soviet-style.
Soon after, several million Burmese would flee the Burmese Gulag. The 1988 nationwide uprising was about rice, cooking oil and salt.
Don’t know much about Boston politics. However, the state of Massachusetts, of which Boston is the largest city therein (60% of the state population) and the rest of the state is probably more religious than the secular Boston, elected Mitt Romney, a Mormon, as Governor. London elected a Muslim as its mayor. So your analogy is overstated.
As a native Indonesian, I would say Indonesia is still far from the ‘horror’ scenario of becoming at least Islamic country. I’ve been informed that even at the grassroots’ level, there were evidence that people have their own wisdoms and ways to reject the wider (and further) spread of (I call it myself) foreign Islamization (foreign to Indonesian, it can be coming from Saudi Arabia or elsewhere). You should clearly understand how this systematic penetration of foreign Islamization works to judge how far it spreads and influences Indonesia. The intensity of spread and influence are also different in different regions of Indonesia (West Java has always been known as fertile soil for this kind of penetration, while it may be different in the context of East Java, where the basis of traditional Islamic organizations (like NU) has deeper roots). You should also research how the so called moderate Muslims make their efforts to counter this penetration, in real action. You should also understand how this penetration works, in different kind of platforms (universities, small mosque/langgar in kampung/village, mosque in the upper middle class housings etc). For example, the father of my friend, which happens a head of local mosque organizers, has managed to stop the penetration as he was approached by the penetrators asking for a time slot to convey their ceramah (speech) in the mosque. Understanding the dynamics, and the role of power and knowledge of actors who try to penetrate and those who are targeted are really important. It will be a good research and shall give Indonesia a fair judgment; as an Indonesian, I feel that this macro and meso narrative has potential to be seen differently by those penetrators, if you know what I mean, they always have a way to play the narrative of power asymmetry between west and Islamic world, and the term that you use, for example Islamic hardliners (from my perspective, this term is not productive to use in the eyes of ordinary Indonesian, they may see it different way, I can understand and I am open minded, but you should also hear the voices those feel offended by the term, even though they are not the representation of this label of hardliner). And please also consider what Krisna Murti wrote, he has his points. Please consider to understand the differences between moderate and ‘hardliner’ in terms of the Islamic teaching itself. The meaning of the teaching and how it is manifested in behavior. And also you should also test your interpretation about hardliner and moderate separated from the event of Pilkada Jakarta or other political events, so you can get better understanding how politicians sort of use the religious narrative in their political plots, how we, as individual Indonesian reacts to this, regardless of our ethnicity and religion.
Chris your comment on Boston is spot on, nor would Bali and some other eastern provinces elect a Muslim Governor, nor would PDIP allow one to throw his/her hat in the ring. Nor would Bali have elected Ahok.
In reference to the Wilson’s economic theories, caution is warranted for any neo Marxist analysis that emanates from Murdoch Uni where a whole generation was influenced by Robison.
Widodo will find it difficult to ban HTI. Look how he failed to take down extremist websites. It smacks of revenge and the military will almost certainly use it as a precedent for separatist movements that fail to respect Pancasila.
‘But my point still stands that has the Church or any other religion used violent intimidation in non-Muslim dominant areas for electoral gain’
Definitely. The recent events in Jakarta are not unique. I refer you to the ‘blasphemy’ cases in NTT during the 90s where communion hosts were allegedly desecrated. The reaction was violent and organised. Senior PDI leaders, some of whom were also responsible as Catholic student leaders for one of the biggest massacres in 1965, were involved, as were younger PDI activists, cutting their teeth so to speak. Rioters attacked bars and brothels – there were very few such places – forcing those inside to flee to the hills, some still naked. One was seen running and killed because of his ethnicity and presumed religion. Behind the activists was, let’s say a ‘faction’ within the Church.
‘The last time I heard there were no Catholic Priest going around Flores extorting money from bars and hotels’
And the last time I sent this comment I named one, this time I won’t. You could enquire about the priest who had his own paper Gita Nusantara, promoted his own alleged mystical prophethood and was paid by miners to ‘lobby’ for their operations. The Church doesn’t like to talk about these scandals but they happen. Nor does the Church do much to dissuade the Florinese ‘debt collecting’ gangs in Jakarta from their extortionate ways.
Netiwit has just been threatened, according to NationMultiMedia.com reports. Yet he has NOT committed LM. The great King Chulalongkorn abolished prostration before the Monarch. Netiwat has simply asked that Thais/ Siamese be given the choice to follow Chulongkorn’s command – I.e. stand as a sign of respect. Or prostrate, in the old, pre-Chulalongkorn practise.
Would Boston USA ever elect a non-Catholic mayor ? As the author says: “identity influences political behaviour, even in industrialised democracies”. This is a fascinating, informative article – eg. re. Masyumi, Sukarno, Rais, etc. But I find it hard to swallow alarmist lines that Indonesia
is going down some sort of extremist Islamist path. They’ve just banned Hizbut Tahrir – which Australia has not done ! Ahok pushed a too hard, too fast developments path – without adequate compensation to the poor and dispossessed. If Jokowi does n’t, he’ll probably hang on – for reasons outlined by the author.
It is telling that virtually all academics, save Leider—and still more journalists—fail to subject the claims of the so-called “Rohingya” to the same level of scrutiny as they do for other groups. Is this because the Rohingya are about as real as the Tasaday?
Pitiful how the wholly legitimate grievances of the Rakhine receive almost no attention.
You don’t mention the powerful Islamic propaganda campaign waged in mosques across Jakarta preaching hate against Chinese and non-Muslim leaders, and this continued even last at Friday’s sermons. My local mosque had banners warning Muslims not to vote for non-Muslims. Both rich and poor Muslims have been brainwashed by the Ulemas.
There was widespread intimidation at local RT neighborhood level that saw thousands of poorer Jakartans too scared to vote. My own driver and his whole family didn’t vote because they wanted to vote Ahok but were scared local leaders would find out. Two other local co-workers confirmed the same.
Muslims should stop fearing the Chinese, and maybe instead learn some lessons from them. The Chinese are rich because they work hard and educate their kids. If you send your kids to Islamic schools that aren’t equipped to educate them to be successful in the modern world, don’t scream economic unjustice. Instead take a look at your own worldview and see if your ideas suck, because they probably do and that’s why you are dirt-poor.
Oh and then the MUI goes the Chinese wanting hand-outs, while on the other hand preaching hate against them. I guess they have some misguided sicko-fantasy of collecting jizya. What parasites they have become!
I don’t think that Malaysia’s statistics are as unreliable as China’s, but I don’t think it is a model of credibility for the world to follow. I think there are grounds to question the credibility of statistics in this country. this must be done regularly to ensure credibility.
I have read the ongoing debate and I’d like to make the following observations:
I think that statistics are credible when they satisfy these criteria: a) accuracy, b) accessibility, c) transparency and d) consistency.
Next, and as a sub-set of issues, CPI forms a useful point. It doesn’t fully answer whether statistics in Malaysia are credible or not.
I find that Mr Nurhisham completely ignores the wider criteria as to whether statistics are credible or not. He fails to examine the issue, doesn’t come up with a set of criteria as to what determines credibility, but goes on to defend this position that the statistics are credible because his friends at IMF don’t question the credibility.
Another tactic Mr Nurhisham uses to mislead the discussion is to take the issue of CPI as being a proxy for all statistics in Malaysia. The sub-set of issues is taken to represent the entire set of issues. Mr Nurhisham knowingly commits this error of composition.
Finally, taking the question of CPI, there are three components that have to be looked at: a) does the DOSM CPI capture intuitive notions of the rate of increase of prices, b) does measured CPI diverge from perceived CPI, and c) does measured CPI correctly estimate the loss/gain in the cost of living.
Mr Nurhisam confuses all these issues, dealing with them as and when he likes, substituting one for the other as convenient. He mostly deals with measured and perceived CPI. This is totally insufficient to make any assessment of the credibility of statistics, or the credibility of Malaysia’s CPI.
One way of assessing the criterion of accuracy is to see whether the CPI corresponds to the felt cost of living (COL). Most in Malaysia would say, “NO, the CPI does not correctly reflect COL”. Mr Nurhisham quotes Lebow and Rudd’s paper which says that the CPI overstates the cost of living by 0.6%. I don’t know, but I don’t think any such study has been done in Malaysia. A casual survey would likely result in a much high divergence for Malaysia. Mr Hisham’s reference to that paper can only indicate that there would be discrepancies in calculated CPI versus the felt COL of individuals/households. Citing that paper doesn’t prove that the discrepancy is necessarily low in Malaysia. That’s a flaw in the argument. Neither is it proof that all CPIs must deviate from COL. In the stated paper the CPI overstates by 0.6%. Will Mr Hisham stick his neck out to say that it would diverge by less than 1% in the Malaysian case? So aside from demonstrating that Mr Hisham reads economics papers, the Lebow and Rudd paper proves nothing. It is a good diversion tactic, nonetheless.
And citing that paper to say that actual CPI always and everywhere divergent from perceived CPI is ignorance at its height. In the first place CPI is not the same as COL.
The size of the perception gap would depend on who you’re talking to and where, ie income and location, among other factors affect perception. In Malaysia, again, there’s no measurement of perceived CPI. There is just one figure that DOSM touts. No perceived CPI from BNM either.
Removing the most volatile items from the CPI to create a Core Index doesn’t solve any problem. It is an ostrich-like approach to measurement. Your Pain index is probably a better way to overcome the denial syndrome. I think the complain is precisely that: CPI doesn’t reflect the aggregate experience of a decreasing COL.
Another problem with CPI is that the official CPI claims that the price of Fish X went up by 5%, when individuals i, j and k experience a 15% increase in the price of Fish X. This can be said for many commodities. Discrepancies such as this are far too many for one not to question the methodology at a very micro level. This goes back to the question of whether DOSM accurately sets out to measure CPI. Is it selecting the right basket of goods, selecting the right sources of information, sample size, etc, etc, etc I don’t have enough time and knowledge of the methodology to question that. DOSM doesn’t place on the public domain its methodology. Mr Hisham will be quick to say that no other statistics gathering agency does so. That’s true; but that also makes it difficult to critique the outcome. Most people would think not from their experience. DOSM’s selection of commodities and prices doesn’t correspond to price increases people experience, except if they’re living in fishing villages. I don’t have access to information to come out with a critique, unless Mr Hisham can give me access to DOSM’s detailed methodology. I have enough theoretical knowledge of the construction of statistical indices to be able to do so, but I can’t without the micro information.
There is a difference between perceived inflation and perceived cost of living. People expect the measured CPI to reflect their experienced inflation and the experienced COL. In Malaysia presently, it is intuitively felt that these divergences are large. In other words, the CPI is a poor estimate of experienced inflation and COL. In the absence of measurements from alternative sources Mr Nurhisham can’t prove his point. Surely the CPI in Malaysia does not overstate COL by 0.6%!
Mr Nurhisham says that “perceived inflation is wrong.” It is ridiculous to say that. You can’t say that someone’s perception is wrong. Individual households have different baskets, they assigning different weights to different commodities than that done by DOSM. Just because I eat more seafood than DOSM assumes that I do, you can’t say that my experience is wrong. It is therefore incorrect to make that wild statement.
Citing the China example is another mistaken way of proving the point. You say that state figures in China go the other way from national figures. But then someone from the Communist Party of China would stoutly defend the scientific validity of their statistics, as Mr Hisham is trying to do. Our state agencies are in no position to question DOSM. They do so in private, as I’m sure people know. (It will be difficult for Mr Hisham to concede this point, given the position he occupies. I can understand that.) State agencies in Malaysia often cannot get the data they require from DOSM. But you can’t brush it away by saying, “it’s not just state agencies,” or that “it’s a problem of data sharing among different government agencies”. This is a question of accessibility and transparency, which if not fulfilled raise issues of credibility.
The point about FDI doesn’t prove anything. I agree that MIDA does not have all the data, but surely some agency can publish actual investments. Stating that there are difficulties in FDI measurement is not an excuse for not publishing this data. If you have the figures for the IIP report surely you have the numbers This reveals a weakness in transparency. It is, of course, unreasonable to expect a 6-digit SITC or HS code breakdown! There I agree with Mr Hisham.
The reference to the MIT project is again misleading at best, deceitful at worst. (This is much the same tactic as quoting the Rudd paper.) The MIT project is about the discrepancies between using online sources of information (what can be obtained from electronic sources) versus offline (what can be obtained from supermarkets, retail stores). I don’t know why the MIT project is cited. It puzzles me. I read some of the papers on their website and I don’t have a clue why Mr Hisham cited the MIT project. Is it to say that when DOSM gets its information from online sources than it differs from offline sources? But that’s not the point at all. So why is Mr Hisham bringing in irrelevant debates? It must be either to demonstrate his ‘scholarship’ or to mislead the debate.
I haven’t touched on consistency. I am led to understand that there have been instances where definitions have changed almost arbitrarily, making intertemporal comparisons strictly invalid.
As I understand, Mr Hisham has effectively argued the point that perceived inflation cannot coincide with measured CPI. That is obvious. The question is, what is the extent of divergence? Mr Hisham hasn’t answered that question. Without an alternative source of measurement your guess is as good as mine. But there are reasons to doubt if this divergence is within a narrow level (say 1% or less, as in the study he ‘supposedly’ quoted).
To conclude, Mr Nurhisham has not convincingly argued the point on the credibility of Malaysia’s statistics. That’s a much broader issue (accessibility of figures, transparency, consistency) and one that he has avoided, maybe because it’s a big issue, maybe because he doesn’t have enough information. maybe because he isn’t interested in the philosophical issues connected with problems of measurement.
Neither has Mr Hisham convincingly argued that the CPI figures in Malaysia are credible – for that he’d have to defend their reference period, the choice of commodities (tilapia or bawal), choice of markets (supermarkets, fishing villages, kampung kedai runcit), sample size, distribution of respondents, etc, etc. This will be a big study, which one can’t expect him to do. There are other ways in which one can detect a divergence, but they aren’t mentioned. Neither are there local studies cited to prove the point.
Instead Mr Hisham damages his credibility by citing irrelevant papers that he probably thought nobody would read. These shady tactics are precisely what damage the credibility of anything that comes from government sources.
In any case, the discussion has raised more questions than answers – and that’s a good first start to questioning statistics. We are reminded that statistical measures are not beyond question for any country, Malaysia included.
I would remind readers to familiarise themselves with the blasphemy cases across NTT in the 90s when Communion Hosts were allegedly desecrated, the violent, organised reactions, and the role leading Church and PDI figures [who subsequently became PDIP leaders] played in the violence. Religion is superstition. It has always been, and sadly continues to be, used by ambitious individuals to mobilise the masses.
Perhaps the blasphemy case also had impact to those data, although I’m not sure how big. What if he goes to jail? Why did he say those bad things about Al Qur’an? Did he call Ulamas/Ustadz liars? So on, so forth. Those can form opinion, and people make decisions based on that.
To generalise all Muslims to behave like PKS Hardline supporters/politic machine will not help anything, and will alienate the much longer standing and widely accepted moderate groups such as Nahdiyyin.. and ah yes, if we talk about Indonesian tolerance we can not just assume it will be reflected by narrow scoop of DKI politic stage. And did you really just say Ahok behaved in pasar ikan fish seller standard? So much for a revered elite politician. If we concern diversity that much, I honestly think all sides should work harder. Do people from upper class have diverse friends already or only engange with their elite secluded community? We perhaps should learn from grassroot level in which people can buy Tempe and tahu together with their neighbors peacefully every morning in kampung regardless of ethnicity or religious background they have. SMH @ arrogant middle class and elites with whatever elitist concept of diversity they have.
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Explaining the roots of KNU power struggles
Time is generally on the side of wider agreement between parties, as long as infrastructure continues to grow, and militarism recedes. As trade in the mountains becomes easier, the making and keeping of agreements become more advantageous to all parties, and peaceful relationships spread. The danger is when improved infrastructure is employed in punitive and rapacious military expeditions. The response is then for local people to destroy it, setting back peaceful interaction at the same time. A long-term problem persists when factions of traders cultivate a mutually profitable relationship with a military-administrative complex to gain advantage over other traders.
Well, I have stumbled quickly on from the problems of isolated small communities to the story of imperialism!
Jakarta: inequality and the poverty of elite pluralism
The initial comment I sent wasn’t shown. As I’ve had similar problems previously, I deleted some details including the name of a cleric, a slightly flippant secondhand account of how a murder took place, and resubmitted. It also included a link to a priest who was sentenced to death for murder. These are contemporary events, but yes, I’ve lived in Indonesia too long and I’m old enough to remember the bad old days of the New Order, which many Panglossians from ANU thought were the good days, the best days.
I won’t name the Catholic student leaders involved in the ’65 massacres on Flores.
The blasphemy cases involving alleged communion host desecration occurred in the 90s. Those events are very well known by everyone on Flores, the Church, and NTT. The naked man fleeing for his life, who was killed, was a member of TNI. He was killed because of his ethnicity first, and presumed religion. Generic resentment towards Javanese and TNI had begun after the tsunami and earthquake, a turning point in the history of the Island which was allegedly used by Islamist elements in Java to destroy the historic dependency and client relationship between the Island and the Mission. The same selebaran2 gelap spread by provocateurs during this period later appeared in Maluku and Kalimantan during the conflicts. There remain many unresolved question pertaining to that period for historians interested enough to delve.
‘No facts, just a story that happened 20 years ago. Nothing to back it up. Was the Church involved? Where they doing it in the name of Catholicism?’
This is a simple comment box. I gave some introductory facts. The link between Catholicism, PDI then PDIP is well known to all in NTT and Jakarta. Resistance to Suharto and the New Order, and breaking that resistance preemptively, were other factors.
The alleged blasphemy events also spread – or were spead – to the former Province of Timtim, occurring in Suai and Aileu, where Belo made use of them for propaganda.
Lest readers think I’m being too harsh on the Church, to it’s great credit, the Catholic Church stayed out of the conflict in Ambon. This placed enormous strains in students from Kei, who followed their Mandonese Bishop to his favourite gentleman’s club in Jakarta, obtained receipts and collated a compromising dossier to try and force a change. If you want evidence of the complicity of Protestant clerics in the violence on Ambon, you don’t have to dig deep. I would remind you that the ethno-religious violence was in pursuit of electoral success, designed to change the demographics. Muslims too had their war aims but, again, this is a simple comment box and both sides decided to use Kalla’s faux reconciliation process to cover the truth rather than expose and confront it, risking reputations and careers.
Kingdom of fear (and favour)
Thanks for the reply.
As I see it, the writers of these pieces are NOT in Thailand and therefore run absolutely zero risk of anything other than not likely being allowed back without being arrested at any time in the future.
If the family members and relatives that they do and have put at risk have been consulted, been given assurances that they can ask the writer to desist if they feel the threat to them is not worth the candle, then it is these family members who are courageous, and the writers themselves who are simply lucky to have such brave relatives.
From my perspective, there is nothing courageous about causing others to be at risk and nothing courageous about sitting at a screen in another country posting rumors and speculation either here or in the international media that eats this sort of thing up.
More nuance and less Dr Evil wouldn’t interest anyone in the international media. Nervy to suggest otherwise, but hardly brave.
Jakarta: inequality and the poverty of elite pluralism
Maybe the writer wishes to comment on yesterday’s conviction and how this is the result of Ahok’s poor treatment of the lower classes?
Yes the conviction is an indication of the quality of the judiciary ( Refer to JIS, Jessica cases for further high profile examples and there are many more documented). However there appears to be a strong divergence in people, with one group feeling that Ahok was guilty and the other not, straight down religious lines and across racial lines. It cuts across education and social class. Not 100% accurate but it seems close.
And the issues of corruption and rent seeking are in there.
Kingdom of fear (and favour)
The risk is extremely clear here in Thailand.
This is why people see bravery. For those who have any connection to Thailand and have things to fear.
I am a coward. So I am just commenting on this. And not saying a word on the topics discussed of course…..
This is five-15 years prison per comment.
Thailand is not NK, fwiw. But scary for this subject
Jakarta: inequality and the poverty of elite pluralism
“And the last time I sent this comment I named one, this time I won’t”
You never named any Priest in any of your comments, not by name. Just some Catholic Youth leaders The fact that you had to go as far back as the 1990s shows something. The closest you come if saying a Catholic priest setup a deviant branch and a newspapers and asked for donations from minors.
The Catholic Youth leaders of 1965 raiding brothel / bars you seem to imply that it was religious motivated, because they killed one person based on religion. No facts, just a story that happened 20 years ago. Nothing to back it up. Was the Church involved? Where they doing it in the name of Catholicism?
It looks like you have been in Indonesia way to long, when you start using different standards for different people. Catholic Church turning a blind eye to the activities of NTT gangs in Jakarta. Well if that is the case what makes them any different from 99% of the Muslim imam in Indonesia would be guilty.
Ahok is not Jokowi
Boston until about 1920s had mayors who weren’t largely Catholic, ever heard of the term the Boston Brahmin. The last non-Catholic mayor was Malcolm Nichols in 1920s.
How Myanmar’s ‘national races’ trumped citizenship
Echoing the propaganda of the ruinous socialist era (1962-1988) is a cop-out. Uber-nationalist Burmese should confront reality for once – and stop living in the past.
Since independence in 1948, the rustic nationalists never tire of flogging the dead horse of *British imperialism*. And the Indian, Chinese and Karen horses . . .
Although Burmese citizens by birth, the resident Indian and Chinese were discriminated against, even harassed, at every turn. The communities were descendants of early foreign traders who married local women, including Burman, Shan, Mon, Karen . . .
Before the disastrous 1962 military coup, these groups had made a contribution to Burma’s economic development out of all proportion to their numbers. And they possessed the potential for even greater contribution, spurred by innovation, enterprise and hard work.
This potential they have not been permitted to realise: in March 1964, the socialist dictatorship under Gen Ne Win confiscated all businesses and trades — Soviet-style.
Soon after, several million Burmese would flee the Burmese Gulag. The 1988 nationwide uprising was about rice, cooking oil and salt.
Time to throw away the crutch, Burmese Citizen.
Ahok is not Jokowi
Don’t know much about Boston politics. However, the state of Massachusetts, of which Boston is the largest city therein (60% of the state population) and the rest of the state is probably more religious than the secular Boston, elected Mitt Romney, a Mormon, as Governor. London elected a Muslim as its mayor. So your analogy is overstated.
Is hardline Islam really rising in Indonesia?
As a native Indonesian, I would say Indonesia is still far from the ‘horror’ scenario of becoming at least Islamic country. I’ve been informed that even at the grassroots’ level, there were evidence that people have their own wisdoms and ways to reject the wider (and further) spread of (I call it myself) foreign Islamization (foreign to Indonesian, it can be coming from Saudi Arabia or elsewhere). You should clearly understand how this systematic penetration of foreign Islamization works to judge how far it spreads and influences Indonesia. The intensity of spread and influence are also different in different regions of Indonesia (West Java has always been known as fertile soil for this kind of penetration, while it may be different in the context of East Java, where the basis of traditional Islamic organizations (like NU) has deeper roots). You should also research how the so called moderate Muslims make their efforts to counter this penetration, in real action. You should also understand how this penetration works, in different kind of platforms (universities, small mosque/langgar in kampung/village, mosque in the upper middle class housings etc). For example, the father of my friend, which happens a head of local mosque organizers, has managed to stop the penetration as he was approached by the penetrators asking for a time slot to convey their ceramah (speech) in the mosque. Understanding the dynamics, and the role of power and knowledge of actors who try to penetrate and those who are targeted are really important. It will be a good research and shall give Indonesia a fair judgment; as an Indonesian, I feel that this macro and meso narrative has potential to be seen differently by those penetrators, if you know what I mean, they always have a way to play the narrative of power asymmetry between west and Islamic world, and the term that you use, for example Islamic hardliners (from my perspective, this term is not productive to use in the eyes of ordinary Indonesian, they may see it different way, I can understand and I am open minded, but you should also hear the voices those feel offended by the term, even though they are not the representation of this label of hardliner). And please also consider what Krisna Murti wrote, he has his points. Please consider to understand the differences between moderate and ‘hardliner’ in terms of the Islamic teaching itself. The meaning of the teaching and how it is manifested in behavior. And also you should also test your interpretation about hardliner and moderate separated from the event of Pilkada Jakarta or other political events, so you can get better understanding how politicians sort of use the religious narrative in their political plots, how we, as individual Indonesian reacts to this, regardless of our ethnicity and religion.
Ahok is not Jokowi
Chris your comment on Boston is spot on, nor would Bali and some other eastern provinces elect a Muslim Governor, nor would PDIP allow one to throw his/her hat in the ring. Nor would Bali have elected Ahok.
In reference to the Wilson’s economic theories, caution is warranted for any neo Marxist analysis that emanates from Murdoch Uni where a whole generation was influenced by Robison.
Widodo will find it difficult to ban HTI. Look how he failed to take down extremist websites. It smacks of revenge and the military will almost certainly use it as a precedent for separatist movements that fail to respect Pancasila.
Jakarta: inequality and the poverty of elite pluralism
‘But my point still stands that has the Church or any other religion used violent intimidation in non-Muslim dominant areas for electoral gain’
Definitely. The recent events in Jakarta are not unique. I refer you to the ‘blasphemy’ cases in NTT during the 90s where communion hosts were allegedly desecrated. The reaction was violent and organised. Senior PDI leaders, some of whom were also responsible as Catholic student leaders for one of the biggest massacres in 1965, were involved, as were younger PDI activists, cutting their teeth so to speak. Rioters attacked bars and brothels – there were very few such places – forcing those inside to flee to the hills, some still naked. One was seen running and killed because of his ethnicity and presumed religion. Behind the activists was, let’s say a ‘faction’ within the Church.
‘The last time I heard there were no Catholic Priest going around Flores extorting money from bars and hotels’
And the last time I sent this comment I named one, this time I won’t. You could enquire about the priest who had his own paper Gita Nusantara, promoted his own alleged mystical prophethood and was paid by miners to ‘lobby’ for their operations. The Church doesn’t like to talk about these scandals but they happen. Nor does the Church do much to dissuade the Florinese ‘debt collecting’ gangs in Jakarta from their extortionate ways.
Despotic urbanism in Thailand
Netiwit has just been threatened, according to NationMultiMedia.com reports. Yet he has NOT committed LM. The great King Chulalongkorn abolished prostration before the Monarch. Netiwat has simply asked that Thais/ Siamese be given the choice to follow Chulongkorn’s command – I.e. stand as a sign of respect. Or prostrate, in the old, pre-Chulalongkorn practise.
Ahok is not Jokowi
Would Boston USA ever elect a non-Catholic mayor ? As the author says: “identity influences political behaviour, even in industrialised democracies”. This is a fascinating, informative article – eg. re. Masyumi, Sukarno, Rais, etc. But I find it hard to swallow alarmist lines that Indonesia
is going down some sort of extremist Islamist path. They’ve just banned Hizbut Tahrir – which Australia has not done ! Ahok pushed a too hard, too fast developments path – without adequate compensation to the poor and dispossessed. If Jokowi does n’t, he’ll probably hang on – for reasons outlined by the author.
How Myanmar’s ‘national races’ trumped citizenship
It is telling that virtually all academics, save Leider—and still more journalists—fail to subject the claims of the so-called “Rohingya” to the same level of scrutiny as they do for other groups. Is this because the Rohingya are about as real as the Tasaday?
Pitiful how the wholly legitimate grievances of the Rakhine receive almost no attention.
Class dismissed? Economic fairness and identity politics in Indonesia
You don’t mention the powerful Islamic propaganda campaign waged in mosques across Jakarta preaching hate against Chinese and non-Muslim leaders, and this continued even last at Friday’s sermons. My local mosque had banners warning Muslims not to vote for non-Muslims. Both rich and poor Muslims have been brainwashed by the Ulemas.
There was widespread intimidation at local RT neighborhood level that saw thousands of poorer Jakartans too scared to vote. My own driver and his whole family didn’t vote because they wanted to vote Ahok but were scared local leaders would find out. Two other local co-workers confirmed the same.
Muslims should stop fearing the Chinese, and maybe instead learn some lessons from them. The Chinese are rich because they work hard and educate their kids. If you send your kids to Islamic schools that aren’t equipped to educate them to be successful in the modern world, don’t scream economic unjustice. Instead take a look at your own worldview and see if your ideas suck, because they probably do and that’s why you are dirt-poor.
Oh and then the MUI goes the Chinese wanting hand-outs, while on the other hand preaching hate against them. I guess they have some misguided sicko-fantasy of collecting jizya. What parasites they have become!
Playing Malaysia’s number game
I don’t think that Malaysia’s statistics are as unreliable as China’s, but I don’t think it is a model of credibility for the world to follow. I think there are grounds to question the credibility of statistics in this country. this must be done regularly to ensure credibility.
I have read the ongoing debate and I’d like to make the following observations:
I think that statistics are credible when they satisfy these criteria: a) accuracy, b) accessibility, c) transparency and d) consistency.
Next, and as a sub-set of issues, CPI forms a useful point. It doesn’t fully answer whether statistics in Malaysia are credible or not.
I find that Mr Nurhisham completely ignores the wider criteria as to whether statistics are credible or not. He fails to examine the issue, doesn’t come up with a set of criteria as to what determines credibility, but goes on to defend this position that the statistics are credible because his friends at IMF don’t question the credibility.
Another tactic Mr Nurhisham uses to mislead the discussion is to take the issue of CPI as being a proxy for all statistics in Malaysia. The sub-set of issues is taken to represent the entire set of issues. Mr Nurhisham knowingly commits this error of composition.
Finally, taking the question of CPI, there are three components that have to be looked at: a) does the DOSM CPI capture intuitive notions of the rate of increase of prices, b) does measured CPI diverge from perceived CPI, and c) does measured CPI correctly estimate the loss/gain in the cost of living.
Mr Nurhisam confuses all these issues, dealing with them as and when he likes, substituting one for the other as convenient. He mostly deals with measured and perceived CPI. This is totally insufficient to make any assessment of the credibility of statistics, or the credibility of Malaysia’s CPI.
One way of assessing the criterion of accuracy is to see whether the CPI corresponds to the felt cost of living (COL). Most in Malaysia would say, “NO, the CPI does not correctly reflect COL”. Mr Nurhisham quotes Lebow and Rudd’s paper which says that the CPI overstates the cost of living by 0.6%. I don’t know, but I don’t think any such study has been done in Malaysia. A casual survey would likely result in a much high divergence for Malaysia. Mr Hisham’s reference to that paper can only indicate that there would be discrepancies in calculated CPI versus the felt COL of individuals/households. Citing that paper doesn’t prove that the discrepancy is necessarily low in Malaysia. That’s a flaw in the argument. Neither is it proof that all CPIs must deviate from COL. In the stated paper the CPI overstates by 0.6%. Will Mr Hisham stick his neck out to say that it would diverge by less than 1% in the Malaysian case? So aside from demonstrating that Mr Hisham reads economics papers, the Lebow and Rudd paper proves nothing. It is a good diversion tactic, nonetheless.
And citing that paper to say that actual CPI always and everywhere divergent from perceived CPI is ignorance at its height. In the first place CPI is not the same as COL.
The size of the perception gap would depend on who you’re talking to and where, ie income and location, among other factors affect perception. In Malaysia, again, there’s no measurement of perceived CPI. There is just one figure that DOSM touts. No perceived CPI from BNM either.
Removing the most volatile items from the CPI to create a Core Index doesn’t solve any problem. It is an ostrich-like approach to measurement. Your Pain index is probably a better way to overcome the denial syndrome. I think the complain is precisely that: CPI doesn’t reflect the aggregate experience of a decreasing COL.
Another problem with CPI is that the official CPI claims that the price of Fish X went up by 5%, when individuals i, j and k experience a 15% increase in the price of Fish X. This can be said for many commodities. Discrepancies such as this are far too many for one not to question the methodology at a very micro level. This goes back to the question of whether DOSM accurately sets out to measure CPI. Is it selecting the right basket of goods, selecting the right sources of information, sample size, etc, etc, etc I don’t have enough time and knowledge of the methodology to question that. DOSM doesn’t place on the public domain its methodology. Mr Hisham will be quick to say that no other statistics gathering agency does so. That’s true; but that also makes it difficult to critique the outcome. Most people would think not from their experience. DOSM’s selection of commodities and prices doesn’t correspond to price increases people experience, except if they’re living in fishing villages. I don’t have access to information to come out with a critique, unless Mr Hisham can give me access to DOSM’s detailed methodology. I have enough theoretical knowledge of the construction of statistical indices to be able to do so, but I can’t without the micro information.
There is a difference between perceived inflation and perceived cost of living. People expect the measured CPI to reflect their experienced inflation and the experienced COL. In Malaysia presently, it is intuitively felt that these divergences are large. In other words, the CPI is a poor estimate of experienced inflation and COL. In the absence of measurements from alternative sources Mr Nurhisham can’t prove his point. Surely the CPI in Malaysia does not overstate COL by 0.6%!
Mr Nurhisham says that “perceived inflation is wrong.” It is ridiculous to say that. You can’t say that someone’s perception is wrong. Individual households have different baskets, they assigning different weights to different commodities than that done by DOSM. Just because I eat more seafood than DOSM assumes that I do, you can’t say that my experience is wrong. It is therefore incorrect to make that wild statement.
Citing the China example is another mistaken way of proving the point. You say that state figures in China go the other way from national figures. But then someone from the Communist Party of China would stoutly defend the scientific validity of their statistics, as Mr Hisham is trying to do. Our state agencies are in no position to question DOSM. They do so in private, as I’m sure people know. (It will be difficult for Mr Hisham to concede this point, given the position he occupies. I can understand that.) State agencies in Malaysia often cannot get the data they require from DOSM. But you can’t brush it away by saying, “it’s not just state agencies,” or that “it’s a problem of data sharing among different government agencies”. This is a question of accessibility and transparency, which if not fulfilled raise issues of credibility.
The point about FDI doesn’t prove anything. I agree that MIDA does not have all the data, but surely some agency can publish actual investments. Stating that there are difficulties in FDI measurement is not an excuse for not publishing this data. If you have the figures for the IIP report surely you have the numbers This reveals a weakness in transparency. It is, of course, unreasonable to expect a 6-digit SITC or HS code breakdown! There I agree with Mr Hisham.
The reference to the MIT project is again misleading at best, deceitful at worst. (This is much the same tactic as quoting the Rudd paper.) The MIT project is about the discrepancies between using online sources of information (what can be obtained from electronic sources) versus offline (what can be obtained from supermarkets, retail stores). I don’t know why the MIT project is cited. It puzzles me. I read some of the papers on their website and I don’t have a clue why Mr Hisham cited the MIT project. Is it to say that when DOSM gets its information from online sources than it differs from offline sources? But that’s not the point at all. So why is Mr Hisham bringing in irrelevant debates? It must be either to demonstrate his ‘scholarship’ or to mislead the debate.
I haven’t touched on consistency. I am led to understand that there have been instances where definitions have changed almost arbitrarily, making intertemporal comparisons strictly invalid.
As I understand, Mr Hisham has effectively argued the point that perceived inflation cannot coincide with measured CPI. That is obvious. The question is, what is the extent of divergence? Mr Hisham hasn’t answered that question. Without an alternative source of measurement your guess is as good as mine. But there are reasons to doubt if this divergence is within a narrow level (say 1% or less, as in the study he ‘supposedly’ quoted).
To conclude, Mr Nurhisham has not convincingly argued the point on the credibility of Malaysia’s statistics. That’s a much broader issue (accessibility of figures, transparency, consistency) and one that he has avoided, maybe because it’s a big issue, maybe because he doesn’t have enough information. maybe because he isn’t interested in the philosophical issues connected with problems of measurement.
Neither has Mr Hisham convincingly argued that the CPI figures in Malaysia are credible – for that he’d have to defend their reference period, the choice of commodities (tilapia or bawal), choice of markets (supermarkets, fishing villages, kampung kedai runcit), sample size, distribution of respondents, etc, etc. This will be a big study, which one can’t expect him to do. There are other ways in which one can detect a divergence, but they aren’t mentioned. Neither are there local studies cited to prove the point.
Instead Mr Hisham damages his credibility by citing irrelevant papers that he probably thought nobody would read. These shady tactics are precisely what damage the credibility of anything that comes from government sources.
In any case, the discussion has raised more questions than answers – and that’s a good first start to questioning statistics. We are reminded that statistical measures are not beyond question for any country, Malaysia included.
Ahok’s satisfied non-voters: an anatomy
I would remind readers to familiarise themselves with the blasphemy cases across NTT in the 90s when Communion Hosts were allegedly desecrated, the violent, organised reactions, and the role leading Church and PDI figures [who subsequently became PDIP leaders] played in the violence. Religion is superstition. It has always been, and sadly continues to be, used by ambitious individuals to mobilise the masses.
Class dismissed? Economic fairness and identity politics in Indonesia
Perhaps the blasphemy case also had impact to those data, although I’m not sure how big. What if he goes to jail? Why did he say those bad things about Al Qur’an? Did he call Ulamas/Ustadz liars? So on, so forth. Those can form opinion, and people make decisions based on that.
Class dismissed? Economic fairness and identity politics in Indonesia
To generalise all Muslims to behave like PKS Hardline supporters/politic machine will not help anything, and will alienate the much longer standing and widely accepted moderate groups such as Nahdiyyin.. and ah yes, if we talk about Indonesian tolerance we can not just assume it will be reflected by narrow scoop of DKI politic stage. And did you really just say Ahok behaved in pasar ikan fish seller standard? So much for a revered elite politician. If we concern diversity that much, I honestly think all sides should work harder. Do people from upper class have diverse friends already or only engange with their elite secluded community? We perhaps should learn from grassroot level in which people can buy Tempe and tahu together with their neighbors peacefully every morning in kampung regardless of ethnicity or religious background they have. SMH @ arrogant middle class and elites with whatever elitist concept of diversity they have.