The interesting report states: “Indonesia and Thailand focus their internet censorship efforts on social issues—particularly online pornography—whereas Malaysia, Vietnam, Myanmar (and to some extent Thailand too) have gone to some lengths to crack down on cyber dissidents deemed a threat to regime stability.”
Really? Thailand? As far as I can tell from the available data, the majority of the action on Thailand is to “protect” the monarchy. Likewise, the “cyber scouts” in Thailand are responsible for chasing down and responding to those who dare to comment on the monarchy.
[…] that Malaysia hasn’t been a ‘moderate’ Islamic country. Having analysed recurring trends of state violence, he concludes that “the dominant form of Islam in Malaysia is Islamofascism”, which concept […]
1. Actually they are completely “revolution” based. They see themselves as wiping out the “corruption of democracy”, while the red-shirts see themselves as wiping out the “corruption of the aristocracy”. Guess which side is right…? I was there when the yellow-shirts were camping in the main street. I’m Half-Thai, and I was staying in the Hyatt Hotel visiting my mom. I was also there when the Erawan Shrine was blown up at the corner. I saw the absolute radical ideological nature of the anti-Thaksin people. While he likely did do some corrupt dealings, the spin that has been put on it to stir up anti-democratic sentiment was a whole national movement. Vice did multiple good half-an-hour or longer videos on this.
2. Just look up “Prayut” on wikipedia. They have a “viewpoints” section where each point is a quote from him explaining the context to it. There are lots and lots, and it is all sourced and accurate, I have confirmed many of them, which I encourage you to do as well. The things he says are absolutely appalling, but one thing is clear. He sees himself as the personal savior of Thailand and ultimate ruler who has the final say in everything. How is this not building a leadership cult?
3. This is the same as number 1.
You basically said that because one side is democratic fighting against fascism, because they are “revolutionaries”, they somehow are also fascist. Also, Thailand does have something like the German 25 points. It’s called the 12 values. Something every Thai citizen must now memorize and recite in school. Some of these include “Upholding the three main pillars: the Nation, the Religion, and the Monarchy”, “Being conscious and mindful of action in line with His Majesty’s the King’s royal statements”, “Putting the public and national interest before personal interest”, etc.
The author of this post has no doubt defined ‘oligarchy’ and ‘oligarchic’ in earlier writings of his, but it is still regrettable that he has not provided a definition in this post. As a consequence, it is tempting for the reader to experiment with excising these words wherever they appear to see what difference it makes. For example, what is the difference between ‘such appeals have the potential to connect otherwise detached oligarchic elites to broader bases of support’ and ‘such appeals have the potential to connect otherwise detached elites to broader bases of support’. Other readers may be more discerning or more patient, but I have not been able to find a single sentence in which ‘oligarchy’ or ‘oligarchic’ seems absolutely necessary.
What about ‘the ability of oligarchic elites to deploy the social agents of Islamic politics for (sic) their own interests’ compared with ‘the ability of elites to deploy the social agents of Islamic politics in their own interests’? Have we lost anything here?
Indonesia is a capitalist country and the rich in Indonesia as elsewhere in the capitalist world, and not only there, wield enormous power. But are those who govern Indonesia the richest Indonesians? Soeharto made a point of allowing his favourite Chinese to accumulate great wealth but also denied them direct political power, only appointing a Chinese minister in his last, and shortest-lived, cabinet. It goes without saying that an Ahok would have been impossible in the New Order.
Indonesian usage tends to confuse oligarchs in the sense of the wealthy with political oligarchs, who are often no more than party leaders. Does the author share this confusion? Is SBY, for example, an oligarch, or Megawati?
One needs to recall from time to time that Indonesian post-independence history did not begin with Soeharto. It should not just be ‘uncomfortable memories of the suffocating nature of New Order political discourse’ that are prompted by Gatot’s utterances, but similar memories of the Old Order. Sukarno began the tradition of excoriating Western democracy as hostile to Indonesia’s essence. For example, he attacked ‘textbook-thinking’ in the late 1950s, by which he meant Western thinking, and he even tried to get Dutch-educated Indonesians to stop speaking Dutch. One witty Indonesian, Mohammed Said, responded that he would talk Dutch as much as possible so that it would all go out of his head. Gatot deserves similar ironic responses today. Among other factors, Sukarno’s onslaught on Western democratic norms paved the way towards his Guided Democracy, the dry run for the New Order.
Too much of a focus on the material side of ’empowerment’?
Perhaps, but to avoid the reality of wealth as an important element of empowerment seems foolhardy, even mean, for females of this era.
The power in empowerment can be defined a few different ways, but let us not look down on those individuals (who happen to be women) who prefer making some cash over the ‘structural’ movement as a whole–whatever ‘structural’ means…
The fastest way to true power within empowerment is via the checkbook. Why hold women to a different standard than men on this account?
I can think of no easier way to look down on women than to pretend that wealth is not a function of freedom today (as if they weren’t aware of this anyway). Economic prosperity is awesome. To not be a truth-teller of wealth’s salience for empowerment is the only thing that seems ‘problematic’ here.
An interesting article indeed! I think that it is understandable in being concerned about the language proficiency as we have to be willing to accept, respect and learn about the cultures of the country that you are living in. Naturally, language is among them. Nevertheless, no one likes to learn a language if they were forced into it. Language shaming is not a laughing matter and I do agree with your points.
I do feel much more comfortable in using English to converse with others as opposed to Malay. As a Malaysian myself, I guess I can count myself lucky as I have not experienced any language shaming in both Malay and English at all. Judging from past experiences, I believe that language shaming is not prevalent between the different races in a multiracial society like Malaysia but surprisingly, it occurs within the same race.
I am a Chinese who can’t really understand or speak Mandarin at all. Most of the time when I try to speak, all of my sentences are broken and jumbled up with other different dialects (Cantonese, Hakka). This of course, had led me to experience language shaming as a Chinese banana among my own race.
The Permanent Resident IC is in actual fact, purple colour. It is described in official documents in Malay as ‘ungu’, which is the word for purple. However, in Chinese vernacular, this IC is described as ‘red IC’, a description that has also spilled over into other languages, so sometimes you hear the PR IC being referred to as red IC instead of purple.
Brunei citizens get free healthcare, education and rights to own freehold land. Until recently, the PRs are not eligible to own any land, but the law has since amended to allow them to own land with 60-year leases. PRs pay for healthcare, but it is a small amount, and there have been some cases of PRs enjoying free treatments for major illnesses like cancer. PRs also have to pay fees to attend local primary and secondary schools, which is almost negligible if you compare the fees to those charged by private schools. However, PRs have to pay higher fees at tertiary institutions and do not get monthly allowance, like their citizen counterparts. PRs above 60 years old also enjoy getting monthly allowance (B$250) from the government, like the citizens.
[…] Jokowi tidak mengembang dengan bagus karena terlalu banyak yang mengerecoki. Hal ini sebetulnya sudah diprediksi jauh sebelum Jokowi memenangkan Pilpres 2014 […]
[…] de roches et de cendres qui s’abattit sur l’île durant presque une année entière. Sukarno, entêté dans sa confrontation avec la Malaisie, ne demanda aucune aide à ses voisins et minimisa la catastrophe. En réalité, plus de 50 000 […]
The legitimacy of the Cambodian Tribunal should not be based solely on criteria of how many geriatric old Khmer Rouge are hauled before the tribunal.
The active participation of Cambodians in the tribunal process, the piecing together of the history of the DK regime led by Pol Pot,new textbooks on the period in the schools should all be taken into account.
All international justice tribunals have been flawed and Cambodian one is no exception.
The jury is still out on the assessment of the Cambodia ‘s “Extraordinary Tribunal” to progress of international justice but many human rights advocates like this correspondent would say the tribunals achievements have so far been been reported with little insight and even less balance.
Tom Fawthrop co-author Getting Away with Genocide?
Elusive Justice and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal [email protected]
Many of us were left off the mailing list and hence were unable to sign the joint letter. It is great that even Professor James C. Scott (Yale) led the charge as the first signatory. Despite the important mission contained in the letter signed by 418 mostly non-domiciled scholars, it is even more telling that less than 3 local or Bangkok-based scholars actually signed the letter…it tells us that it is better to snipe at the government from far away and from a very safe distance. Fewer scholars and political scientists dare to attack the government in 2017 and alas probably in 2018 and 2019 too. The upcoming General Election might also see a landslide win for the military government under the illustrious self-appointed martial law prime minister Chanocha who is very likely to run for PM if he thinks he can win. The belligerent Thai government with its nefarious secret operations against Red Shirt leaders and new fangled schemes to get more money for Yellow Shirt misdeeds as academic freedom, freedom of assembly, and freedom of expression in Thailand diminishes by the day and into the night. Prof Antonio L Rappa, The King and the Making of Modern Thailand (London: Routledge, 2017)
This is one of the most even-handed pieces on the debates on Rohingya nomenclature I have read, and on the uses and abuses of history, and the limits to invoking historical references. The report by the Rakhine Commission appointed by ASSK and led by Koffi Annan deliberately avoided using the term Rohingya, referring to Bengali Muslims. Despite this “neutrality” of vocabulary, by suggesting amongst its 88 recommendations that this ethnic group should be provided with a means of obtaining citizenship, the report seems to have provoked the wrath of the Tatmadaw. The day after its publication (25th August) in response to an ostensible terrorist attack the Army launched its most vicious wave of oppression yet, continuing the failed ‘four cuts’ policy of dealing with minority insurgencies it has practiced since Myanmar’s Independence. However this time a new nomenclature has been invoked, that of ‘terrorist’: suppressing terrorists of course is something the international community approves of.
As Nick Cheeseman wrote in an earlier post the central problem is not only that of defining citizenship through ethnic indigeneity, but the absence of of citizenship through the Military orchestrated invoking of national races… and races excluded from the nation.
The son of the former King was a student at Baylor in the English Department, and mentored by a professor. She asked to bring a group of students to Thailand, and go the “royal treatment.” Then Baylor was very involved on an international levelin the transition of Hong Kong into being its own country. The King invited her to set up this English program, or she asked and he okayed or something. She is dead now, and the program was passed on to another Baylor professor, and continues.
Blame the military, and not Suu Kyi. The world needs to be reminded that the once-tarnished Tatmadaw (armed forces) retain great power in Burma, and Suu Kyi does not exercise effective control over them.
It’s pointless and unproductive to blame Suu Kyi for not speaking out against the atrocities committed by the military. She is powerless to stop it; and she is a politician. *I’m not Mother Teresa*, Suu Kyi once said.
It’s political suicide for her to speak out on the atrocities against the minorities, including Rohingya, Karen (her mother’s people), Shan Kachin, Chin, Karenni, Mon and Rakhine. No ethnic group is spared. Even the majority Burmans were shown no mercy by the peasant-army soldiers. Thousands were killed during the nation-wide uprising in 1988.
International pressure should be brought to bear on the undisciplined and corrupt military. Impose sanctions on the brass, including ex-generals. Freeze their ill-gotten gains in foreign banks. Hit them where it hurts most.
Meanwhile, let’s not forget the huge oil and gas reserves off shore from where the Rohingya dwell in norther Rakhine.
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Southeast Asian cyberspace: politics, censorship, polarisation
The interesting report states: “Indonesia and Thailand focus their internet censorship efforts on social issues—particularly online pornography—whereas Malaysia, Vietnam, Myanmar (and to some extent Thailand too) have gone to some lengths to crack down on cyber dissidents deemed a threat to regime stability.”
Really? Thailand? As far as I can tell from the available data, the majority of the action on Thailand is to “protect” the monarchy. Likewise, the “cyber scouts” in Thailand are responsible for chasing down and responding to those who dare to comment on the monarchy.
Jokowi forges a tool of repression
[…] Hamid, diretor da Anistia Internacional da Indonésia, lembrou ao governo Jokowi que há melhores alternativas para combater o […]
Farewelling King Bhumibol in Munich
Following regular news in my hometown and having contacts to the Thai community here I haven’t heard of this being announced in advance.
Jokowi forges a tool of repression
[…] Hamid, director of Amnesty International Indonesia, reminded the Jokowi government that there are better alternatives to combating […]
Mount Agung’s 18th-Century Eruption
[…] Perspectives On the Past – Mount Agung's 18th-Century Eruption […]
Islam, politics and violence in Malaysia
[…] that Malaysia hasn’t been a ‘moderate’ Islamic country. Having analysed recurring trends of state violence, he concludes that “the dominant form of Islam in Malaysia is Islamofascism”, which concept […]
A state of madness
1. Actually they are completely “revolution” based. They see themselves as wiping out the “corruption of democracy”, while the red-shirts see themselves as wiping out the “corruption of the aristocracy”. Guess which side is right…? I was there when the yellow-shirts were camping in the main street. I’m Half-Thai, and I was staying in the Hyatt Hotel visiting my mom. I was also there when the Erawan Shrine was blown up at the corner. I saw the absolute radical ideological nature of the anti-Thaksin people. While he likely did do some corrupt dealings, the spin that has been put on it to stir up anti-democratic sentiment was a whole national movement. Vice did multiple good half-an-hour or longer videos on this.
2. Just look up “Prayut” on wikipedia. They have a “viewpoints” section where each point is a quote from him explaining the context to it. There are lots and lots, and it is all sourced and accurate, I have confirmed many of them, which I encourage you to do as well. The things he says are absolutely appalling, but one thing is clear. He sees himself as the personal savior of Thailand and ultimate ruler who has the final say in everything. How is this not building a leadership cult?
3. This is the same as number 1.
A state of madness
You basically said that because one side is democratic fighting against fascism, because they are “revolutionaries”, they somehow are also fascist. Also, Thailand does have something like the German 25 points. It’s called the 12 values. Something every Thai citizen must now memorize and recite in school. Some of these include “Upholding the three main pillars: the Nation, the Religion, and the Monarchy”, “Being conscious and mindful of action in line with His Majesty’s the King’s royal statements”, “Putting the public and national interest before personal interest”, etc.
Behind Indonesia’s illiberal turn
The author of this post has no doubt defined ‘oligarchy’ and ‘oligarchic’ in earlier writings of his, but it is still regrettable that he has not provided a definition in this post. As a consequence, it is tempting for the reader to experiment with excising these words wherever they appear to see what difference it makes. For example, what is the difference between ‘such appeals have the potential to connect otherwise detached oligarchic elites to broader bases of support’ and ‘such appeals have the potential to connect otherwise detached elites to broader bases of support’. Other readers may be more discerning or more patient, but I have not been able to find a single sentence in which ‘oligarchy’ or ‘oligarchic’ seems absolutely necessary.
What about ‘the ability of oligarchic elites to deploy the social agents of Islamic politics for (sic) their own interests’ compared with ‘the ability of elites to deploy the social agents of Islamic politics in their own interests’? Have we lost anything here?
Indonesia is a capitalist country and the rich in Indonesia as elsewhere in the capitalist world, and not only there, wield enormous power. But are those who govern Indonesia the richest Indonesians? Soeharto made a point of allowing his favourite Chinese to accumulate great wealth but also denied them direct political power, only appointing a Chinese minister in his last, and shortest-lived, cabinet. It goes without saying that an Ahok would have been impossible in the New Order.
Indonesian usage tends to confuse oligarchs in the sense of the wealthy with political oligarchs, who are often no more than party leaders. Does the author share this confusion? Is SBY, for example, an oligarch, or Megawati?
One needs to recall from time to time that Indonesian post-independence history did not begin with Soeharto. It should not just be ‘uncomfortable memories of the suffocating nature of New Order political discourse’ that are prompted by Gatot’s utterances, but similar memories of the Old Order. Sukarno began the tradition of excoriating Western democracy as hostile to Indonesia’s essence. For example, he attacked ‘textbook-thinking’ in the late 1950s, by which he meant Western thinking, and he even tried to get Dutch-educated Indonesians to stop speaking Dutch. One witty Indonesian, Mohammed Said, responded that he would talk Dutch as much as possible so that it would all go out of his head. Gatot deserves similar ironic responses today. Among other factors, Sukarno’s onslaught on Western democratic norms paved the way towards his Guided Democracy, the dry run for the New Order.
ASEAN and women: empower movements, not just individuals
Too much of a focus on the material side of ’empowerment’?
Perhaps, but to avoid the reality of wealth as an important element of empowerment seems foolhardy, even mean, for females of this era.
The power in empowerment can be defined a few different ways, but let us not look down on those individuals (who happen to be women) who prefer making some cash over the ‘structural’ movement as a whole–whatever ‘structural’ means…
The fastest way to true power within empowerment is via the checkbook. Why hold women to a different standard than men on this account?
I can think of no easier way to look down on women than to pretend that wealth is not a function of freedom today (as if they weren’t aware of this anyway). Economic prosperity is awesome. To not be a truth-teller of wealth’s salience for empowerment is the only thing that seems ‘problematic’ here.
Language shaming in Malaysia
An interesting article indeed! I think that it is understandable in being concerned about the language proficiency as we have to be willing to accept, respect and learn about the cultures of the country that you are living in. Naturally, language is among them. Nevertheless, no one likes to learn a language if they were forced into it. Language shaming is not a laughing matter and I do agree with your points.
I do feel much more comfortable in using English to converse with others as opposed to Malay. As a Malaysian myself, I guess I can count myself lucky as I have not experienced any language shaming in both Malay and English at all. Judging from past experiences, I believe that language shaming is not prevalent between the different races in a multiracial society like Malaysia but surprisingly, it occurs within the same race.
I am a Chinese who can’t really understand or speak Mandarin at all. Most of the time when I try to speak, all of my sentences are broken and jumbled up with other different dialects (Cantonese, Hakka). This of course, had led me to experience language shaming as a Chinese banana among my own race.
Brunei’s stateless left in a state of confusion
The Permanent Resident IC is in actual fact, purple colour. It is described in official documents in Malay as ‘ungu’, which is the word for purple. However, in Chinese vernacular, this IC is described as ‘red IC’, a description that has also spilled over into other languages, so sometimes you hear the PR IC being referred to as red IC instead of purple.
Brunei citizens get free healthcare, education and rights to own freehold land. Until recently, the PRs are not eligible to own any land, but the law has since amended to allow them to own land with 60-year leases. PRs pay for healthcare, but it is a small amount, and there have been some cases of PRs enjoying free treatments for major illnesses like cancer. PRs also have to pay fees to attend local primary and secondary schools, which is almost negligible if you compare the fees to those charged by private schools. However, PRs have to pay higher fees at tertiary institutions and do not get monthly allowance, like their citizen counterparts. PRs above 60 years old also enjoy getting monthly allowance (B$250) from the government, like the citizens.
Jokowi: modern man of the people or divine clown?
[…] Jokowi tidak mengembang dengan bagus karena terlalu banyak yang mengerecoki. Hal ini sebetulnya sudah diprediksi jauh sebelum Jokowi memenangkan Pilpres 2014 […]
Fragile paradise: Bali and volcanic threats to our region
[…] de roches et de cendres qui s’abattit sur l’île durant presque une année entière. Sukarno, entêté dans sa confrontation avec la Malaisie, ne demanda aucune aide à ses voisins et minimisa la catastrophe. En réalité, plus de 50 000 […]
Trials and tribulations in Cambodia
Dear Rebecca,
The legitimacy of the Cambodian Tribunal should not be based solely on criteria of how many geriatric old Khmer Rouge are hauled before the tribunal.
The active participation of Cambodians in the tribunal process, the piecing together of the history of the DK regime led by Pol Pot,new textbooks on the period in the schools should all be taken into account.
All international justice tribunals have been flawed and Cambodian one is no exception.
The jury is still out on the assessment of the Cambodia ‘s “Extraordinary Tribunal” to progress of international justice but many human rights advocates like this correspondent would say the tribunals achievements have so far been been reported with little insight and even less balance.
Tom Fawthrop co-author Getting Away with Genocide?
Elusive Justice and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal
[email protected]
Letter from colleagues of Prof Chayan
Many of us were left off the mailing list and hence were unable to sign the joint letter. It is great that even Professor James C. Scott (Yale) led the charge as the first signatory. Despite the important mission contained in the letter signed by 418 mostly non-domiciled scholars, it is even more telling that less than 3 local or Bangkok-based scholars actually signed the letter…it tells us that it is better to snipe at the government from far away and from a very safe distance. Fewer scholars and political scientists dare to attack the government in 2017 and alas probably in 2018 and 2019 too. The upcoming General Election might also see a landslide win for the military government under the illustrious self-appointed martial law prime minister Chanocha who is very likely to run for PM if he thinks he can win. The belligerent Thai government with its nefarious secret operations against Red Shirt leaders and new fangled schemes to get more money for Yellow Shirt misdeeds as academic freedom, freedom of assembly, and freedom of expression in Thailand diminishes by the day and into the night. Prof Antonio L Rappa, The King and the Making of Modern Thailand (London: Routledge, 2017)
Rohingya identity and the limits to history
Sorry Nick, its Cheesman and your post is dated 1st May.
Rohingya identity and the limits to history
This is one of the most even-handed pieces on the debates on Rohingya nomenclature I have read, and on the uses and abuses of history, and the limits to invoking historical references. The report by the Rakhine Commission appointed by ASSK and led by Koffi Annan deliberately avoided using the term Rohingya, referring to Bengali Muslims. Despite this “neutrality” of vocabulary, by suggesting amongst its 88 recommendations that this ethnic group should be provided with a means of obtaining citizenship, the report seems to have provoked the wrath of the Tatmadaw. The day after its publication (25th August) in response to an ostensible terrorist attack the Army launched its most vicious wave of oppression yet, continuing the failed ‘four cuts’ policy of dealing with minority insurgencies it has practiced since Myanmar’s Independence. However this time a new nomenclature has been invoked, that of ‘terrorist’: suppressing terrorists of course is something the international community approves of.
As Nick Cheeseman wrote in an earlier post the central problem is not only that of defining citizenship through ethnic indigeneity, but the absence of of citizenship through the Military orchestrated invoking of national races… and races excluded from the nation.
Positions teaching “the future king of Thailand”
The son of the former King was a student at Baylor in the English Department, and mentored by a professor. She asked to bring a group of students to Thailand, and go the “royal treatment.” Then Baylor was very involved on an international levelin the transition of Hong Kong into being its own country. The King invited her to set up this English program, or she asked and he okayed or something. She is dead now, and the program was passed on to another Baylor professor, and continues.
On the latest Rohingya crisis
Blame the military, and not Suu Kyi. The world needs to be reminded that the once-tarnished Tatmadaw (armed forces) retain great power in Burma, and Suu Kyi does not exercise effective control over them.
It’s pointless and unproductive to blame Suu Kyi for not speaking out against the atrocities committed by the military. She is powerless to stop it; and she is a politician. *I’m not Mother Teresa*, Suu Kyi once said.
It’s political suicide for her to speak out on the atrocities against the minorities, including Rohingya, Karen (her mother’s people), Shan Kachin, Chin, Karenni, Mon and Rakhine. No ethnic group is spared. Even the majority Burmans were shown no mercy by the peasant-army soldiers. Thousands were killed during the nation-wide uprising in 1988.
International pressure should be brought to bear on the undisciplined and corrupt military. Impose sanctions on the brass, including ex-generals. Freeze their ill-gotten gains in foreign banks. Hit them where it hurts most.
Meanwhile, let’s not forget the huge oil and gas reserves off shore from where the Rohingya dwell in norther Rakhine.