I won’t comment on your narrative nor repeat what I wrote above in the original post. Your main claim is that I mis-characterise the reds and yellows. All I can say is that you should read my NM piece rather more carefully. For someone who has claimed to want nuance, you have missed quite a deal of it (e.g. in what I say about red shirts). There is also some nuance in the way that I characterise yellow shirts over the long period from 2006 to 2014.
My concentration on yellow shirts for this piece is because for most of their existence they have proposed measures that are opposed to electoral politics, whether that be calling for royal or military intervention. And, to date, they have been the victors in that their ideas (which are not new in Thailand) largely motivate the current junta and its rule-making for the future.
[…] Mardiana, is one of over 200 cultural events to be shown at the Europalia 2017 Arts Festival. As we wrote on the blog recently, Indonesia is the guest of honour for this year’s festival, and many of the exhibitions and […]
Kevin,
“I realise that this is being perhaps all too academic.”
Not too academic for this academic. I have quickly read through some of your articles and must say that they are considerably more informed and nuanced than your NM post. I recommend them as one voice on the issues.
My problem with your NM piece is that you paint the yellowshirts and redshirts as anti- and pro-democracy monoliths. This kind of simplistic casting can be dangerous in terms of the way the international community assesses local situations.
The original yellowshirts, the PAD, was indeed an alliance largely opposed to Thaksin’s suppression of criticism and dissent, his disasterous handling of ethnic Malay Southern Thailand, a Duterte-style war on drugs, and massive corruption to the point that Cabinet members were resigning in protest. The protesters were, in the well established Thai tradition, calling in massive street protests for the government to step down. They were not calling for a coup, though many cheered when it happened.
The renewed yellowshirt protests after post-coup elections gave the government to Thaksin’s faction were decidedly anti-democratic and the excesses (occupying the airport) spelled the virtual end of the yellowshirt movement.
The PDRC, started as a protest when Yinglucks’s (Thaksin’s sister) called a late night session of parliament to vote on a contraversial amnesty bill (which I actually supported) but only told members of the governing coalition. Those protests morphed into a very antidemocratic movement, directly calling for a coup and imposition of military dictatorship, ushering in the present disaster. But those calling for that was neither everyone who opposed Thaksin nor all of the former yellowshirts.
Similarly, the redshirt movement includes multiple factions. The largest, rice farmers from the North and Northeast are loyal to Thaksin personally, and not necessarily his policies alone. If they are pro-democracy, it’s only because Thaksin parties have been winning elections. There are also republicans, genuine democracy advocates and (former) Communists. Some of these engaged in firing and throwing grenades into yellowshirt, then PDRC demonstrations with attendant fatalities, but we needn’t blame those actions on “the redshirts” as a whole. Then there were the 2009 and 2010 (lightly) armed uprisings against the Abhisit government. The Abhisit government had come to power in what can only be called a judicial coup against a Thaksin surrogate (his brother-in-law, as I recall), yet expanded many of Thaksin’s social welfare programs and putting them on sound financial footing. He offered to step down after (I think) three months to complete the implemention of economic policies. The protest leaders refused, leading to the disasterous and unforgivable suppression of the redshirt occupation of a major business district. I mean Abhisit’s handling and ultimate suppression of the uprising, in which nearly 100 were killed, was unforgivable.
There’s much much more. Of course you couldn’t have put all that into your piece, you just needed to indicate some anti-democratic elements in civil society. As it is you came accross as a redshirt partizan.
–Steve
Thanks Steve. As you decline to point out the faults, I will only comment on one aspect of your response. In referring you to my “blog” I was suggesting that the articles and chapters there show a pretty full citation of the materials (books, newspapers, magazines and more) that I believe corroborate my points in the NM post. I realise that this is being perhaps all too academic but this is one way of considering Thailand’s politics in a way that goes beyond the anecdotal.
Perhaps I could extend the scope of this article beyond Malaysia and into SE Asia and Asia as a whole. Young people increasingly realise (even if it is not so much “fun”) that they must get hold of the levers of power if they are to make lasting effective change in society. That is why NGOs such as the senior women’s rights activist with the “been there, done that” attitude must crucially have a humble respect for the enthusiasm and tenacity of youth.
I am encouraged by the development of NOYDA, the Network of Young Democratic Asians and hope to see future New Mandala articles charting its progress.
Kevin,
I quite understand that a blog post oversimplifies by necessity, almost by definition. Similarly, a comment can do little more than, at best, throw out a few out-of-context facts, more usually empty opinions. This thing has already been debated to death, unconclusively, and I don’t want to repeat that here. I simply wanted to caution readers against imagining that your piece gives anything like an accurate picture–if they want to form opinions on the situation they need to do extensive research.
I’ve lived in Thailand since 2000, first in Bangkok now in Isan (Redshirt country), speak, read, and write Thai and have followed events closely. I’m well aquainted with people all accross the spectrum. What you presented is a shallow caricature with no hint that things might be more nuanced. I apologize for “crass” and “grotesque”.
You offer your own website for corroboration. Of course, it will corroborate your own blog post, and “considerable evidence and extensive citation” can easily be found to support any one of the many positions that have been held on the extended crisis.
–Steve
Difficult to reply to a comment that is critical but includes no detail, just abuse. That a blog post, restricted in length, might miss out some things seems unsurprising.
In this context, perhaps you can point out the points that are crass (lacking sensitivity, refinement, or intelligence), grotesque (comically or repulsively ugly or distorted), or misleading (giving the wrong idea or impression) on Thailand’s recent political history?
If detailing alleged failures is not what you want to do, you can actually go to this website (https://kevinhewison.wordpress.com/2010-present/). There and in other pages of the blog you can access detailed arguments in articles, written over the past decade or so, that make many of these points, each with considerable evidence and extensive citation.
These findings are not surprising for the reasons the author indicates. However, I tend to doubt that TPS location was a causal factor. It is true that there was a great deal of direct and indirect campaigning in mosques and mushollah. Examples of indirect campaigning include posters featuring Habib Rizieq’s photo and the text of Surat al-Maidah 51 of the Qur’an which was a central component of anti-Ahok rhetoric. There was also a great deal of religiously inspired anti-Ahok rhetoric in many Majelis Taklim (religious study groups). Sermons combining anti-Chinese and anti-Christian themes were common. Similar themes were broadcast on social media platforms particularly Facebook and Twitter. The often contained outrageous, but potentially frightening lies including one Tweet that Ahok had banned dzikir in the national mosque. Many of the voters I interviewed on Election Day were entirely convinced that Ahok had indeed insulted Islam and the Qur’an and was consequently not fit to serve. Many thought he should be jailed and more than a few expressed the opinion that he should be executed. Some potential Ahok voters stayed away from the polls because they felt intimidated. In sum, the anti-Ahok forces ran a very effective racist, sectarian propaganda campaign. Ahok chose to run a policy based campaign. It failed because too many voters were convinced that he posed a threat to Islam and the Muslim community.
The general point, that civil society is a contested space in which both democratic/progressive and anti democratic/progressive forces operate is obviously correct and very much worthy of consideration. However the treatment of Thailand is a crass, if not grotesque, certainly misleading oversimplification.
As John Gray never tires of pointing out, one of the central conceits of modernity and the modern intellectuals that espouse it, and western (and non-western, but western influenced liberal elites – including NGO’s, academics, politicians of every stripe and of course the mainstream media, is their unquestioning belief in “progress”:
That this mantra has been shown, repeatedly shown, to be nothing more than an act of faith, and not a fact, has done little or nothing to shake the attachment of the aforementioned to it, as a means of interpreting the world and those in it.
What the likes of China, SE Asia, the Middle East and most of Africa clearly demonstrate, is not only is there no predestined path to liberal democracy, but quite the opposite, there seems to be clear evidence of a at best a cyclical pattern to human history.
Furthermore, the patterns of religious belief in the USA, Japan and South Korea seem to strongly suggest, that even when pluralist democracy does take hold in society, that doesn’t mean that psychological reliance on mumbo-jumbo diminishes, let alone dies.
One hundred percent of people can believe something. That does not make it true.
It is true that religions may bring comfort and peace to some people due to the rituals and the structure that they provide. It is true that religion in some circumstances may help communities bond and grow by adopting standardised behaviours and values.
But it is also true that violence, bigotry and fraud on a massive scale has been conducted in the name of religion.
@ThaiJasmine you are truly a victim of years of indoctrination and brainwashing. You read what is common knowledge outside of Thailand and you didn’t like it because it was incongruent with all you’ve been taught about the inviolability of the supposed constitutional monarchy (with its lese majeste laws which prevents any serious discussion of Bhumibol’s relationship with the military, or any discussion period). There have been many brave souls serving hard time in prison for merely examining the role of “unseen and unspeakable forces.” If it contents you to reside in your fairy tale dreamworld, then by all means carry on.
Don’t forget the likes of Thanin Kraivichien and General Surayud Chulanont, both whom managed to obtain lifetime appointments to the vaunted privy council. Oh, and speaking of Chulabhorn’s pretentiousness, have you seen the title she goes by: “Doctor Professor Her Royal Highness Princess Chulabhorn” A preposterous awkward usage that hints at the possibility that Chulabhorn’s academic credentials are largely inflated. With such titles, I would expect many peer-reviewed and cited papers….alas. Also the incredulity of claiming to love Thailand “to death” while skiing in what appears to be the European (possible Swiss) alps.
It’s quite a remarkable tribute that Rayne Kruger’s Discus lives on! A recent academic inquiry raised some very basic and crucial questions. Can anyone help? Here, of course, but please let me know at [email protected].
Speculation and rumours so often become accepted facts.
1) DD was published in 1964 in London. We don’t know how many copies were printed. However, the fact there are so few used copies has led people to presume the Thai govt pressured the publisher to destroy all copies not distributed. I’ve even heard it said Thai govt bought the entire run and convinced Constable not to reprint.
2) Books are only banned by being Gazetted under the Printing Act 1941. Was DD in English actually banned immediately as is presumed? I don’t think I’ve ever seen a Royal; Gazette entry to determine the actual date of the ban.
3) And was Rayne Kruger actually declared PNG as Prue Leith tells me? In any case, he prudently never returned to Thailand!
4) The ban of DD in English (if there was one) would have been solely for govt face.
5) More to the point, we know for fact when DD was published in Thai in 1971, it was not banned until
6) There is also unconfirmed speculation about the Thai edition. We’ve heard it was translated into Thai by the brother of one of the Palace servants executed. And that the printing plant was burned to the ground by an angry mob!
7) We know for sure the Thai translation was only banned by the 2006 coup, order attached. In fact, if the content was so inflammatory, you’d think govt would have taken steps long before.
8) My own speculation on the timing is that one, maybe two, enterprising fellows photocopied กงจักรปีศาจ and sold copies outside Lumpini during Sonthi’s original yellow rallies. One was followed home and warned but not arrested. I have not followed up but I believe one of them was fairly recently banged up for L-M over this incident.
As Western influence is on the wane in the global scene, the chance to revive liberal democracy is getting slimmer. Politicians around the world even in the West now abuse democracy, for exmaple; Brexit, Catalunya separatists. To resist this abuse, democratic mechanism also need to be revamped.
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Rethinking Southeast Asian civil society
I won’t comment on your narrative nor repeat what I wrote above in the original post. Your main claim is that I mis-characterise the reds and yellows. All I can say is that you should read my NM piece rather more carefully. For someone who has claimed to want nuance, you have missed quite a deal of it (e.g. in what I say about red shirts). There is also some nuance in the way that I characterise yellow shirts over the long period from 2006 to 2014.
My concentration on yellow shirts for this piece is because for most of their existence they have proposed measures that are opposed to electoral politics, whether that be calling for royal or military intervention. And, to date, they have been the victors in that their ideas (which are not new in Thailand) largely motivate the current junta and its rule-making for the future.
Salt
[…] Mardiana, is one of over 200 cultural events to be shown at the Europalia 2017 Arts Festival. As we wrote on the blog recently, Indonesia is the guest of honour for this year’s festival, and many of the exhibitions and […]
Indian migrant workers in Malaysia – part 2
[…] Indian migrant workers in Malaysia – Part 2 […]
Indian migrant workers in Malaysia – part 1
[…] Indian migrant workers in Malaysia – Part 1 […]
Rethinking Southeast Asian civil society
Kevin,
“I realise that this is being perhaps all too academic.”
Not too academic for this academic. I have quickly read through some of your articles and must say that they are considerably more informed and nuanced than your NM post. I recommend them as one voice on the issues.
My problem with your NM piece is that you paint the yellowshirts and redshirts as anti- and pro-democracy monoliths. This kind of simplistic casting can be dangerous in terms of the way the international community assesses local situations.
The original yellowshirts, the PAD, was indeed an alliance largely opposed to Thaksin’s suppression of criticism and dissent, his disasterous handling of ethnic Malay Southern Thailand, a Duterte-style war on drugs, and massive corruption to the point that Cabinet members were resigning in protest. The protesters were, in the well established Thai tradition, calling in massive street protests for the government to step down. They were not calling for a coup, though many cheered when it happened.
The renewed yellowshirt protests after post-coup elections gave the government to Thaksin’s faction were decidedly anti-democratic and the excesses (occupying the airport) spelled the virtual end of the yellowshirt movement.
The PDRC, started as a protest when Yinglucks’s (Thaksin’s sister) called a late night session of parliament to vote on a contraversial amnesty bill (which I actually supported) but only told members of the governing coalition. Those protests morphed into a very antidemocratic movement, directly calling for a coup and imposition of military dictatorship, ushering in the present disaster. But those calling for that was neither everyone who opposed Thaksin nor all of the former yellowshirts.
Similarly, the redshirt movement includes multiple factions. The largest, rice farmers from the North and Northeast are loyal to Thaksin personally, and not necessarily his policies alone. If they are pro-democracy, it’s only because Thaksin parties have been winning elections. There are also republicans, genuine democracy advocates and (former) Communists. Some of these engaged in firing and throwing grenades into yellowshirt, then PDRC demonstrations with attendant fatalities, but we needn’t blame those actions on “the redshirts” as a whole. Then there were the 2009 and 2010 (lightly) armed uprisings against the Abhisit government. The Abhisit government had come to power in what can only be called a judicial coup against a Thaksin surrogate (his brother-in-law, as I recall), yet expanded many of Thaksin’s social welfare programs and putting them on sound financial footing. He offered to step down after (I think) three months to complete the implemention of economic policies. The protest leaders refused, leading to the disasterous and unforgivable suppression of the redshirt occupation of a major business district. I mean Abhisit’s handling and ultimate suppression of the uprising, in which nearly 100 were killed, was unforgivable.
There’s much much more. Of course you couldn’t have put all that into your piece, you just needed to indicate some anti-democratic elements in civil society. As it is you came accross as a redshirt partizan.
–Steve
Rethinking Southeast Asian civil society
Thanks Steve. As you decline to point out the faults, I will only comment on one aspect of your response. In referring you to my “blog” I was suggesting that the articles and chapters there show a pretty full citation of the materials (books, newspapers, magazines and more) that I believe corroborate my points in the NM post. I realise that this is being perhaps all too academic but this is one way of considering Thailand’s politics in a way that goes beyond the anecdotal.
Youth and a culture of protest in Southeast Asia
Perhaps I could extend the scope of this article beyond Malaysia and into SE Asia and Asia as a whole. Young people increasingly realise (even if it is not so much “fun”) that they must get hold of the levers of power if they are to make lasting effective change in society. That is why NGOs such as the senior women’s rights activist with the “been there, done that” attitude must crucially have a humble respect for the enthusiasm and tenacity of youth.
I am encouraged by the development of NOYDA, the Network of Young Democratic Asians and hope to see future New Mandala articles charting its progress.
http://time.com/4560233/asia-youth-democracy-network-noyda/
Rethinking Southeast Asian civil society
Kevin,
I quite understand that a blog post oversimplifies by necessity, almost by definition. Similarly, a comment can do little more than, at best, throw out a few out-of-context facts, more usually empty opinions. This thing has already been debated to death, unconclusively, and I don’t want to repeat that here. I simply wanted to caution readers against imagining that your piece gives anything like an accurate picture–if they want to form opinions on the situation they need to do extensive research.
I’ve lived in Thailand since 2000, first in Bangkok now in Isan (Redshirt country), speak, read, and write Thai and have followed events closely. I’m well aquainted with people all accross the spectrum. What you presented is a shallow caricature with no hint that things might be more nuanced. I apologize for “crass” and “grotesque”.
You offer your own website for corroboration. Of course, it will corroborate your own blog post, and “considerable evidence and extensive citation” can easily be found to support any one of the many positions that have been held on the extended crisis.
–Steve
Rethinking Southeast Asian civil society
Difficult to reply to a comment that is critical but includes no detail, just abuse. That a blog post, restricted in length, might miss out some things seems unsurprising.
In this context, perhaps you can point out the points that are crass (lacking sensitivity, refinement, or intelligence), grotesque (comically or repulsively ugly or distorted), or misleading (giving the wrong idea or impression) on Thailand’s recent political history?
If detailing alleged failures is not what you want to do, you can actually go to this website (https://kevinhewison.wordpress.com/2010-present/). There and in other pages of the blog you can access detailed arguments in articles, written over the past decade or so, that make many of these points, each with considerable evidence and extensive citation.
Mosque polling stations and voting for Anies
These findings are not surprising for the reasons the author indicates. However, I tend to doubt that TPS location was a causal factor. It is true that there was a great deal of direct and indirect campaigning in mosques and mushollah. Examples of indirect campaigning include posters featuring Habib Rizieq’s photo and the text of Surat al-Maidah 51 of the Qur’an which was a central component of anti-Ahok rhetoric. There was also a great deal of religiously inspired anti-Ahok rhetoric in many Majelis Taklim (religious study groups). Sermons combining anti-Chinese and anti-Christian themes were common. Similar themes were broadcast on social media platforms particularly Facebook and Twitter. The often contained outrageous, but potentially frightening lies including one Tweet that Ahok had banned dzikir in the national mosque. Many of the voters I interviewed on Election Day were entirely convinced that Ahok had indeed insulted Islam and the Qur’an and was consequently not fit to serve. Many thought he should be jailed and more than a few expressed the opinion that he should be executed. Some potential Ahok voters stayed away from the polls because they felt intimidated. In sum, the anti-Ahok forces ran a very effective racist, sectarian propaganda campaign. Ahok chose to run a policy based campaign. It failed because too many voters were convinced that he posed a threat to Islam and the Muslim community.
Rethinking Southeast Asian civil society
The general point, that civil society is a contested space in which both democratic/progressive and anti democratic/progressive forces operate is obviously correct and very much worthy of consideration. However the treatment of Thailand is a crass, if not grotesque, certainly misleading oversimplification.
Rethinking Southeast Asian civil society
As John Gray never tires of pointing out, one of the central conceits of modernity and the modern intellectuals that espouse it, and western (and non-western, but western influenced liberal elites – including NGO’s, academics, politicians of every stripe and of course the mainstream media, is their unquestioning belief in “progress”:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NuWi-TU_sFE
That this mantra has been shown, repeatedly shown, to be nothing more than an act of faith, and not a fact, has done little or nothing to shake the attachment of the aforementioned to it, as a means of interpreting the world and those in it.
What the likes of China, SE Asia, the Middle East and most of Africa clearly demonstrate, is not only is there no predestined path to liberal democracy, but quite the opposite, there seems to be clear evidence of a at best a cyclical pattern to human history.
Furthermore, the patterns of religious belief in the USA, Japan and South Korea seem to strongly suggest, that even when pluralist democracy does take hold in society, that doesn’t mean that psychological reliance on mumbo-jumbo diminishes, let alone dies.
A crown prince and German affairs
One hundred percent of people can believe something. That does not make it true.
It is true that religions may bring comfort and peace to some people due to the rituals and the structure that they provide. It is true that religion in some circumstances may help communities bond and grow by adopting standardised behaviours and values.
But it is also true that violence, bigotry and fraud on a massive scale has been conducted in the name of religion.
It is also true that there is no god.
Princess Chulabhorn’s politics
@ThaiJasmine you are truly a victim of years of indoctrination and brainwashing. You read what is common knowledge outside of Thailand and you didn’t like it because it was incongruent with all you’ve been taught about the inviolability of the supposed constitutional monarchy (with its lese majeste laws which prevents any serious discussion of Bhumibol’s relationship with the military, or any discussion period). There have been many brave souls serving hard time in prison for merely examining the role of “unseen and unspeakable forces.” If it contents you to reside in your fairy tale dreamworld, then by all means carry on.
Princess Chulabhorn’s politics
Don’t forget the likes of Thanin Kraivichien and General Surayud Chulanont, both whom managed to obtain lifetime appointments to the vaunted privy council. Oh, and speaking of Chulabhorn’s pretentiousness, have you seen the title she goes by: “Doctor Professor Her Royal Highness Princess Chulabhorn” A preposterous awkward usage that hints at the possibility that Chulabhorn’s academic credentials are largely inflated. With such titles, I would expect many peer-reviewed and cited papers….alas. Also the incredulity of claiming to love Thailand “to death” while skiing in what appears to be the European (possible Swiss) alps.
The Devil’s Discus – in Thai
It’s quite a remarkable tribute that Rayne Kruger’s Discus lives on! A recent academic inquiry raised some very basic and crucial questions. Can anyone help? Here, of course, but please let me know at [email protected].
Speculation and rumours so often become accepted facts.
1) DD was published in 1964 in London. We don’t know how many copies were printed. However, the fact there are so few used copies has led people to presume the Thai govt pressured the publisher to destroy all copies not distributed. I’ve even heard it said Thai govt bought the entire run and convinced Constable not to reprint.
2) Books are only banned by being Gazetted under the Printing Act 1941. Was DD in English actually banned immediately as is presumed? I don’t think I’ve ever seen a Royal; Gazette entry to determine the actual date of the ban.
3) And was Rayne Kruger actually declared PNG as Prue Leith tells me? In any case, he prudently never returned to Thailand!
4) The ban of DD in English (if there was one) would have been solely for govt face.
5) More to the point, we know for fact when DD was published in Thai in 1971, it was not banned until
6) There is also unconfirmed speculation about the Thai edition. We’ve heard it was translated into Thai by the brother of one of the Palace servants executed. And that the printing plant was burned to the ground by an angry mob!
7) We know for sure the Thai translation was only banned by the 2006 coup, order attached. In fact, if the content was so inflammatory, you’d think govt would have taken steps long before.
8) My own speculation on the timing is that one, maybe two, enterprising fellows photocopied กงจักรปีศาจ and sold copies outside Lumpini during Sonthi’s original yellow rallies. One was followed home and warned but not arrested. I have not followed up but I believe one of them was fairly recently banged up for L-M over this incident.
Old dominance, new dominoes in Southeast Asia
As Western influence is on the wane in the global scene, the chance to revive liberal democracy is getting slimmer. Politicians around the world even in the West now abuse democracy, for exmaple; Brexit, Catalunya separatists. To resist this abuse, democratic mechanism also need to be revamped.
Mount Agung’s 18th-Century Eruption
I just want to personally say, Great Article, I’ve been looking for info on that eruption and you just filled in the gaps… Thanx Again!!!
Mount Agung’s 18th-Century Eruption
[…] Perspectives On the Past – Mount Agung's 18th-Century Eruption […]
Farewelling King Bhumibol in Munich
Glad to see another Nick Nostitz pictorial. covering Thais from afar.