[…] In the latter period of the Thaksin era it has become clear that many of these leftish-leaning commentators have been bewildered by the “rural betrayal.” Contrary to the images promoted in the various campaigns of political empowerment (such as the long standing campaign for community forestry) many rural voters seem to have embraced Thaksin’s vision of market oriented economic diversification. The result has been an increasing disconnect between academic and activist commentary and the rapidly changing livelihoods and apsirations of people in rural areas. The disconnect is powerfully expressed in the NGO/academic rejection of Thaksin in contrast to his broad electoral popularity in many rural areas. As I argued in a previous post, the constant disparaging of Thaksin’s electoral support has contributed significant ideological legitimacy to the military takeover. […]
Thanks for your comment. There are some important points here, so I will provide some brief clarification.
As I note in the review, Ukrist and McCargo go to some lengths to describe how a political crisis – perhaps provoked by the alienation of “ultra-conservative forces\” – could unravel the Thaksin Prime Ministership.
This seems like a keen observation, especially when made in the heady days of 2004.
They foreshadow the kind of showdown that we have just seen. They never argued that Thaksin was indestructible. They just happened to focus on his ascendancy at that time and the ways that he had changed politics (and political economy) in Thailand. They didn’t argue that he was necessarily immune to the palace and its intrigues.
Perhaps, as you say, the type of power Thaksin accumulated has been shown to be largely worthless. This is an interesting and potentially important observation. It is also an observation that, in my view, could not have been made with any confidence 3 years ago, or 3 months ago or even 3 weeks ago.
That’s why I am still uncomfortable dismissing the Ukrist and McCargo book as “useless”. I do, however, see why some may feel strongly that the Thaksin years were anomalous. Some may see recent events as a return to the standard pattern, now that the conservatives are back in charge.
I’ve read your post on your review of the Thaksinization of Thailand. But I disagree that it has stood the test of time.
You noted how the book described Thaksin’s effectiveness at “create for himself a remarkable base of loyal supporters”, controlling the media, and changing the face of Thai political discourse. And how this made him remarkably powerful.
But the ease with which he was removed from power suggests that all of this was in vain, and that any power, no matter how great, is reduced to insignificance when the palace wishes to strike down on it.
Power in Thailand, no matter how effectively and innovatively it might have been accumulated or to what good ends it might be used, is a useless endeaver. Why bother, when in the end, you’ll be struck down.
A book like the Thaksinization is useless as long as the current King is still alive.
One must live a long time in Thailand to really understand how things are done.
No Thais are surprised about the recent coup simply because that is the only way now, do they really like a coup, no, but in this situation just to get rid of Taksin is a okay to all.
However, in a few weeks, you’ll also realised that they are not happy with the Junta.
Peter Hartcher’s analysis is thought provoking, in a sense refreshingly devoid of much of the “Thai-centric gaze” that has dominated commentary on the coup to date but replacing Thai centrism with “democro-centrism” doesn’t get us away from orientalism and hagiography.
From the editorials of the Bangkok Post and Nation newspapers to much of the initial coverage in the Australian press, I think a disturbing element of “orientalism” has pervaded reporting. Facile details of roses and yellow ribbons dominate commentary, interspersed with interviews with tourists on the streets and their impressions (feelings) about the coup abound, meanwhile details such as the fact that this time around Tanks are also on the streets of Chiangmai (see Chiangmai News 22/09/06); the military presence in front of government offices is far more pervasive than before; and that troops are being positioned in strategic places within population centres outside of Bangkok (eg Khon Kaen), previously absent in earlier coups, go unnoticed. The implications of these developments, especially in the context of a heightened campaign of Royalist legitimacy by the coup leaders appears to be lost in and on the press. Indeed “the day of the Thai coup is an unambiguously dark one.”, but just how dark is what I think we need to be thinking about.
Hartcher’s analysis pivots on an implict understanding that the King himself is somehow a stabilising presence that mitigates the full impact of the coup (perhaps makes it ok?). This sentiment I would argue is an extension of the royalist hagiography that characterises and dominates much political discussion and analysis of Thailand and echos the orientalism of the press coverage of the coup outlined above. It certainly exhibits a belief that the King ended the violence in 1992. Anyone who was in Bangkok in May 1992 would know that the killing and political wrangling had ended long before the King stepped in. The question, “Who then will decide when and whether democracy will be allowed to operate?”, could probably be better conceived as “Who has decided when and whether democracy will be allowed to operate, in the past?”, certainly not the King. From Sarit Thannarat to present the King’s role in Thai democracy has been as uncertain as the future of each successive regime that has seized power. The implication in Hartcher’s analysis that the king is uniformly popular with the population of Thailand exhibits an ignorance of how the generation of 76 perceives him after he last allied himself with the military at the expense of many lives (their contemporary’s lives). The crown prince is certainly not without power and influence and has already showed his ability to maneuver politically, regardless of whether he may offend the sensibilities of the hagiographers who would perhaps prefer a Thai queen.
If through this coup we start to think of Thailand as a democracry lost, aren’t we forgetting, perhaps rewriting, Thailand’s predominantly facist past as something else and failing to see what is really happening and that is Thailand, “Politics as usual”?
More than the persistence of the, to date tenuous, existence of democracy in Thailand is at stake here and recourse to the unreflective yet familiar scripts of [nation, religion] King are not going to illuminate the sitution much further. Remember that many in Thai Rak Thai were/are vocal republicans and not without their own power. Could it be that rather than worrying that Thailand is “losing” democracry we should be preparing for some of the worst violence in decades?
[…] One recent comment post on NewMandala argues that Thaksin “forfeited his right to play the ‘democracy’ card when he winked at more than 2,000 extra-judicial killings in 2003.” A telling point. Thaksin winked and many in the electorate nodded. Now a new form of extra-judicial, extra-constitutional and extra-electoral governing has been put in place. Strategically placed yellow ribbons are a clever public relations move but, at the same time, they underline that fact that governing by the gun resonates with broader cultural orientations to national leadership. […]
Fifteen minutes ago it was possible to access this site, http://www.19sep.org, but now it’s not. A threat has been repeated posted saying the site has been reported to the ICT Ministry now in charge of monitoring, closing or destroying electronic media unfavourable to the coup. Still have to wait and see if this inaccessibility is due to the site sudden popularity or its closure.
Wow Judi, how impolite to make such a harsh comment like that. Shame on you for being so petty, and it really was petty.
Perhaps your parents forgot to teach you about good manners and the real meaning of ‘mai pen rai’.
well, well, well oddly enough as a freelance writer and a Thai person, i feel more at ease and secured with “new military junta” than with “thaksin’s democratic rule”. me? an urban middle class? i live in a village in the south, sir.
many foreigners talked about “rural people”. and the south? no rural people in the south?
u know that Thaksin is not the child of his “official parents”? an adopted child exploited by his hakka chinese parents. hard life, sir.
Thaksin forfeited his right to play the “democracy” card when he winked at more than 2,000 extra-judicial killings in 2003. I’m deeply sorry to see a coup, but Thaksin knew the stakes and he overplayed his hand. He shouldn’t be considered a victim. He did much to undermine the constitution and the rule of law.
I find the banning of gatherings of five people disturbing. I don’t know if it is still the case, but the Burmese military had (has?) a similar ban. I hope the Thai and Burmese military haven’t been exchanging notes.
Good on the generals, Thaksin is nothing more than a crook they should drag him back to Thailand and execute the bastard. If Australians had any balls instead of being pro American scum, the army would have placed Kerr and Fraser under house arrest as the taritorous scum they were, given them a fair trial and then hung the bastards.
not just Tuesday is a strong day. Saturday is also a strong day. do a bit more research and give the right fact to others otherwise you’re pretty much similar to those stupid news writers and irresponsible journalists.
Facebook 
Twitter 
Soundcloud 
Youtube 
Rss
A triumph for the so-called pro-democracy movement
[…] In the latter period of the Thaksin era it has become clear that many of these leftish-leaning commentators have been bewildered by the “rural betrayal.” Contrary to the images promoted in the various campaigns of political empowerment (such as the long standing campaign for community forestry) many rural voters seem to have embraced Thaksin’s vision of market oriented economic diversification. The result has been an increasing disconnect between academic and activist commentary and the rapidly changing livelihoods and apsirations of people in rural areas. The disconnect is powerfully expressed in the NGO/academic rejection of Thaksin in contrast to his broad electoral popularity in many rural areas. As I argued in a previous post, the constant disparaging of Thaksin’s electoral support has contributed significant ideological legitimacy to the military takeover. […]
The “De-Thaksinization” of Thailand
XKMasada,
Thanks for your comment. There are some important points here, so I will provide some brief clarification.
As I note in the review, Ukrist and McCargo go to some lengths to describe how a political crisis – perhaps provoked by the alienation of “ultra-conservative forces\” – could unravel the Thaksin Prime Ministership.
This seems like a keen observation, especially when made in the heady days of 2004.
They foreshadow the kind of showdown that we have just seen. They never argued that Thaksin was indestructible. They just happened to focus on his ascendancy at that time and the ways that he had changed politics (and political economy) in Thailand. They didn’t argue that he was necessarily immune to the palace and its intrigues.
Perhaps, as you say, the type of power Thaksin accumulated has been shown to be largely worthless. This is an interesting and potentially important observation. It is also an observation that, in my view, could not have been made with any confidence 3 years ago, or 3 months ago or even 3 weeks ago.
That’s why I am still uncomfortable dismissing the Ukrist and McCargo book as “useless”. I do, however, see why some may feel strongly that the Thaksin years were anomalous. Some may see recent events as a return to the standard pattern, now that the conservatives are back in charge.
NSF
The “De-Thaksinization” of Thailand
I’ve read your post on your review of the Thaksinization of Thailand. But I disagree that it has stood the test of time.
You noted how the book described Thaksin’s effectiveness at “create for himself a remarkable base of loyal supporters”, controlling the media, and changing the face of Thai political discourse. And how this made him remarkably powerful.
But the ease with which he was removed from power suggests that all of this was in vain, and that any power, no matter how great, is reduced to insignificance when the palace wishes to strike down on it.
Power in Thailand, no matter how effectively and innovatively it might have been accumulated or to what good ends it might be used, is a useless endeaver. Why bother, when in the end, you’ll be struck down.
A book like the Thaksinization is useless as long as the current King is still alive.
Governing by the gun
One must live a long time in Thailand to really understand how things are done.
No Thais are surprised about the recent coup simply because that is the only way now, do they really like a coup, no, but in this situation just to get rid of Taksin is a okay to all.
However, in a few weeks, you’ll also realised that they are not happy with the Junta.
The King Never Smiles?
Where can I buy this book ?
Thanks to anyone who can provide me the information where to buy.
New book on Southeast Asian “margins”
The full list is…
Amster, M. “Narrating the Border: Perspectives from the kelabit Highlands of Borneo”
Askew, M “Sex and the Sacred: Sojourners and Visitors in the Making of the southern Thai borderland”
Chou, C “Borders and Multiple Realities: The Orang Suku Laut of Riau, Indonesia”
Cummings, W. “Would-Be Centres: The texture of Historical Discourse in Makassar”
Davis, S “Premodren Flows in Postmodern China:Globalisation and the Sipsongpanna Tais”
Hortsmann, A “Deconstructing Citizenship from the Border: Dual Ethnic Minorities and Local Reworking of Citizenship at the Thai-Malaysian frontier”
Niti, P “Once were Burmese Shans”
Sprenger, G “Political Periphery, Cosmological Centre: The reproduction of Rmeet Sociocosmic Order and the Laos Thailand border”
Tirtosudarmo, R “In the Margin of a Borderland: The Florenese Community between Nunukan and Tawau”
Wadley, R “Centering the Margin in Southeast Asia” Introduction.
SMH Opinion: Unambiguously Dark?
Peter Hartcher’s analysis is thought provoking, in a sense refreshingly devoid of much of the “Thai-centric gaze” that has dominated commentary on the coup to date but replacing Thai centrism with “democro-centrism” doesn’t get us away from orientalism and hagiography.
From the editorials of the Bangkok Post and Nation newspapers to much of the initial coverage in the Australian press, I think a disturbing element of “orientalism” has pervaded reporting. Facile details of roses and yellow ribbons dominate commentary, interspersed with interviews with tourists on the streets and their impressions (feelings) about the coup abound, meanwhile details such as the fact that this time around Tanks are also on the streets of Chiangmai (see Chiangmai News 22/09/06); the military presence in front of government offices is far more pervasive than before; and that troops are being positioned in strategic places within population centres outside of Bangkok (eg Khon Kaen), previously absent in earlier coups, go unnoticed. The implications of these developments, especially in the context of a heightened campaign of Royalist legitimacy by the coup leaders appears to be lost in and on the press. Indeed “the day of the Thai coup is an unambiguously dark one.”, but just how dark is what I think we need to be thinking about.
Hartcher’s analysis pivots on an implict understanding that the King himself is somehow a stabilising presence that mitigates the full impact of the coup (perhaps makes it ok?). This sentiment I would argue is an extension of the royalist hagiography that characterises and dominates much political discussion and analysis of Thailand and echos the orientalism of the press coverage of the coup outlined above. It certainly exhibits a belief that the King ended the violence in 1992. Anyone who was in Bangkok in May 1992 would know that the killing and political wrangling had ended long before the King stepped in. The question, “Who then will decide when and whether democracy will be allowed to operate?”, could probably be better conceived as “Who has decided when and whether democracy will be allowed to operate, in the past?”, certainly not the King. From Sarit Thannarat to present the King’s role in Thai democracy has been as uncertain as the future of each successive regime that has seized power. The implication in Hartcher’s analysis that the king is uniformly popular with the population of Thailand exhibits an ignorance of how the generation of 76 perceives him after he last allied himself with the military at the expense of many lives (their contemporary’s lives). The crown prince is certainly not without power and influence and has already showed his ability to maneuver politically, regardless of whether he may offend the sensibilities of the hagiographers who would perhaps prefer a Thai queen.
If through this coup we start to think of Thailand as a democracry lost, aren’t we forgetting, perhaps rewriting, Thailand’s predominantly facist past as something else and failing to see what is really happening and that is Thailand, “Politics as usual”?
More than the persistence of the, to date tenuous, existence of democracy in Thailand is at stake here and recourse to the unreflective yet familiar scripts of [nation, religion] King are not going to illuminate the sitution much further. Remember that many in Thai Rak Thai were/are vocal republicans and not without their own power. Could it be that rather than worrying that Thailand is “losing” democracry we should be preparing for some of the worst violence in decades?
Kev (Khon Kaen)
“Don’t let the authorities harm those protestors”
The Nation is reporting on the petition.
Governing by the gun
The wise men of Bangkok decide, of course!
Governing by the gun
The question is, who decides when someone forfeits their right to play democracy? What about leaving it to the electorate.
A triumph for the so-called pro-democracy movement
[…] One recent comment post on NewMandala argues that Thaksin “forfeited his right to play the ‘democracy’ card when he winked at more than 2,000 extra-judicial killings in 2003.” A telling point. Thaksin winked and many in the electorate nodded. Now a new form of extra-judicial, extra-constitutional and extra-electoral governing has been put in place. Strategically placed yellow ribbons are a clever public relations move but, at the same time, they underline that fact that governing by the gun resonates with broader cultural orientations to national leadership. […]
Some perspectives on the coup from Australia
Please consider the following online petition initiated by Thongchai WinichakulOn-line petition http://www.petitiononline.com/thaicoup/petition.html
19/9 Network Against the Coup
Fifteen minutes ago it was possible to access this site, http://www.19sep.org, but now it’s not. A threat has been repeated posted saying the site has been reported to the ICT Ministry now in charge of monitoring, closing or destroying electronic media unfavourable to the coup. Still have to wait and see if this inaccessibility is due to the site sudden popularity or its closure.
19/9, a Tuesday
Wow Judi, how impolite to make such a harsh comment like that. Shame on you for being so petty, and it really was petty.
Perhaps your parents forgot to teach you about good manners and the real meaning of ‘mai pen rai’.
19/9 Network Against the Coup
Black is the new yellow.
General Prem and the phi
well, well, well oddly enough as a freelance writer and a Thai person, i feel more at ease and secured with “new military junta” than with “thaksin’s democratic rule”. me? an urban middle class? i live in a village in the south, sir.
many foreigners talked about “rural people”. and the south? no rural people in the south?
u know that Thaksin is not the child of his “official parents”? an adopted child exploited by his hakka chinese parents. hard life, sir.
A triumph for the so-called pro-democracy movement
Thaksin forfeited his right to play the “democracy” card when he winked at more than 2,000 extra-judicial killings in 2003. I’m deeply sorry to see a coup, but Thaksin knew the stakes and he overplayed his hand. He shouldn’t be considered a victim. He did much to undermine the constitution and the rule of law.
The rules of the game
I find the banning of gatherings of five people disturbing. I don’t know if it is still the case, but the Burmese military had (has?) a similar ban. I hope the Thai and Burmese military haven’t been exchanging notes.
A triumph for the so-called pro-democracy movement
Good on the generals, Thaksin is nothing more than a crook they should drag him back to Thailand and execute the bastard. If Australians had any balls instead of being pro American scum, the army would have placed Kerr and Fraser under house arrest as the taritorous scum they were, given them a fair trial and then hung the bastards.
19/9, a Tuesday
not just Tuesday is a strong day. Saturday is also a strong day. do a bit more research and give the right fact to others otherwise you’re pretty much similar to those stupid news writers and irresponsible journalists.