Andrew: Of course the electoral system was skewed. The first thing that needs to be banned is “pandering to the unprincipled wants and needs of the attention-deficient, politically apathetic masses” (The Nation editorial).
The “attention-deficit, politically apathetic masses” don’t know what is good for them. Obviously, the solution is to limit the voting to the educated classes or military appointed civilian leaders.
[…] An interesting seminar this morning at ANU by historian Peter Jackson on the deva-raja (god-king) in Thailand. Too late for NewMandala readers to go to the seminar but the circulated abstract makes interesting reading in the light of some of our earlier discussion: God-King as Commodity: Thailand’s King Bhumiphol as a “Virtual Deity”. In this work-in-progress seminar I will discuss the re-emergence of the discourse of “deva-raja” (god-king) around the present King of Thailand, Bhumiphol. Historically the legitimacy of monarchical rule in Thailand drew both on Buddhist notions of “dhamma-raja” (righteous monarch) and Brahmanical notions of “deva-raja” (god-king). There was never a clearly formulated resolution of the tension between these different conceptions of kingship, with the alternative Buddhist and Brahmanical symbolisms of royal rule rising and falling in prominence in different periods. In the modern period, ideas of Buddhist kingship have generally been more popular and linked with notions of modernity, scientific rationality, and progressive democratic rule. In contrast, Brahmanical symbolisms have at times been critiqued for their historical association with “irrational” beliefs and “dictatorial” government. However, in the past couple of decades the notion of Thailand’s king as a “deva-raja” or “god-king” has begun to reappear in nationalist discourse, even if in the somewhat ironic idiom of a “virtual god-king” (sammuti deva-raja). […]
[…] During my recent time in Burma, the Chinese influence was more apparent than ever before. A new report that is being carried by Narinjara provides a reasonable English-language overview of Chinese involvement in the Burmese scene. It includes a large and relevant bibliography. […]
– The official translation of the junta’s name is the “Council for the Democratic Reform under the Constitutional Monarchy”. Although this isn’t really accurate: the Thai name literally is the “Council for Administrative Reform of Democracy with a Monarch as Head of State”. The Thai name does not make any pretense as to “Democratic Reform,” merely to “Reform”. The Thai name also makes no mention of the Constitution, which makes sense given that the first thing the junta did was to abrogate the Constitution.
– The site is a .com, which means the coup is officially a commercial enterprise. That explains the recently announced 100 billion baht stimulous package, I guess 🙂
The Mahachon party’s February 2005 campaign is one of reason I think that the Democrat party’s aborted October 2006 was doomed for failure.
Mahachon had what was essentially a “dual-track” campaign strategy. Mahachon tried to appeal to Bangkokians by trumping Acharn Anek, the party leader, and being the only party to explicitely promise that it would not privatize state enterprises. For rural voters, it tried to “out-Thaksin Thaksin” and beat TRT at its own populist game. Thus, while Thaksin promised and delivered 30 Baht healthcare, Mahachon promised free healthcare. While Thaksin promised and delivered education reform, Anek promised to give free education to the Bachelor’s degree level.
The result: humiliating defeat for Mahachon. I think they got only 1 seat in the first election (they added one or two more in by-elections).
The Democrats repeated the Mahachon strategy over the past few months (see Wikipedia for details and citations). The Democrats promised not only that tuition would be free, but that there would be no hidden costs and that textbooks, milk and lunchtime food would be free. The Democrats also cloned Mahachon’s 0-baht free-as-in-beer healthcare plan.
Why did Mahachon fail, and why were the Democrats doomed for failure? I believe the issue was credibility. Anek, Snoh, Abhisit, and all of their proxy bulldogs had used the broadest of brushstrokes to paint Thaksin as an evil monster out to bankrupt Thailand by overspending on populist handouts. Yet it was obvious that they were copying and amplifying his populist campaign.
It is as if the US Democrats spent 3 years protesting war in Afghanistan and Iraq, but in the election campaign, suddenly came out to say that it was also neccesary to wage war against Iran and Syria.
Political memories in Thailand are short, but they’re not *that* short, and the Bangkok elite always underestimates the intelligence of their upcountry brothers. Hopefully, the TRT will not be banned from the next election, and we’ll see whether the Thai people can be completely brainwashed about TRT’s track record in delivering on populism.
We can argue back and forth on this issue –
But the crux of the matter is that Khun Giles has NOT given the “coup” leaders the paltry 2 or 3 weeks within which they promised to appoint an “Interim” PM who would then take all the necessary corrective steps to prepare the couintry for TRUE Democracy .
If the “coup” leaders do not keep their word – and we only have a week or so to see this – then we can debate as to whether these “coup” leaders can be trusted or not .
If , however , they do keep to their word then we should all respect their honest intention in staging this coup and give every support to the opportunity they have given to this country to become truly democratic once more .
[…] I have received, via forwarded email, the following statement by Giles Ji Ungpakorn who, at this stage, seems to be emerging as one of the key public intellectuals opposed to the coup. There was a democratic alternative to the coup […]
Andrew: For me nothing beats this from the Independent:
“It’s a tale of two countries,” he said. “You have the urban middle classes and the rural poor. Thaksin was the first to really provide political programmes for the poor. There is this argument that he won elections fraudulently, but there’s no real evidence for that. I think the rural poor voted for him because he provided policies for them. That’s democracy and if you don’t like it you have to set up a political party and offer something better. In this country it’s the rural poor who respect democracy – and it’s the educated elite who don’t.”
I like your analysis of the NGO/rural disjuncture, Andrew, especially in terms of the simplified and romantic images of communal solidarity that activists and NGOs resort to in their attempts to defend the rights of the rural “folk”. I would go further and say that they in fact buy into state centric views of much of the rural population, discursively producing a particular subject for their own purposes and agendas that does the work for the state in terms of muting much of the rural population’s voice. I am a little unclear as to what “otherworldly” pursuits you make reference to and should probably follow up your earlier post or work on this topic as it sounds interesting (are you talking cosmology here/).
Anyway, I would dispute with you that the power of Thaksin in the rural areas is based on appeal alone. This view certainly fits much media reporting and urban middle-class sentiment regarding his successive electroral victories but on the ground in the South (outside of the three border provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala) and the northeast (esp Udorn, KK and Ubon) the Thai Rak Thai power base is grounded in much more complex sets of relations than mere polular appeal. In particular there is a very real threat of violence that hangs over their competitor’s heads and other’s heads, then there is debt, and most importantly how well the party managed to ally itself with local political figures in its corporatisation of politics model (the move to abolish Tambol level politics being in part due to how difficult this level of government, over district and village levels was to control).
My point being that I agree that the rural betrayal you speak of is certainly due to a failure of the leftist activists to recognise what was happening, but I disagree that Thaksin had a more accute understanding of the rural populations aspirations (everyone knows them, the left does not respect them and the right, Thai Rak Thai exploited them). Rather, I think through a combination of exploitation of aspirations, intimidation and a Suharto-esque corporatisiation of local political power, they have managed to retain office, until the coup…the tensions that the expansion of the Thai Rak Thai power base has caused with the military and monarchy has of course been an ongoing presence through the whole process…and most visible in the violence in the south and the War on Drugs extrajudicial killings spree, and more recently the coup
Talk of “Self-sufficient economy” over the past decade has always resonated closely with “horticultural” obligations of the Phibun Era to me, and so I think any discussion of these ideas and their currency in political rhetoric needs to entertain the possibility of it being pure ideology, now and then.
Geoff
[…] Trying to specify ministerial familiarity with the King’s ideas on economic development is a different matter altogether. To my eye, it is much more problematic. Here at New Mandala we have often written about “self-sufficiency”. In the context of Andrew’s earlier comments on future strategies for left(ish) activist-academics in the post-coup environment, Sophon’s proclamation (however fanciful it may actually be) is a sign that “self-sufficiency” could become a new battleground. […]
[…] Specifying ministerial familiarity with the King’s ideas on economic development is a different matter altogether. To my eye, it is much more problematic. Here at New Mandala we have often written about “self-sufficiency”. In the context of Andrew’s earlier comments on future strategies for left(ish) activist-academics in the post-coup environment, Sophon’s proclamation (however fanciful it may actually be) is a sign that “self-sufficiency” could become a new battleground. […]
[…] Specifying familiarity with the King’s ideas on economic development is a different matter altogether. To my eye, it is much more problematic. Here at New Mandala we have often written about “self-sufficiency”. In the context of Andrew’s earlier comments on future strategies for left(ish) activist-academics in the post-coup environment, Sophon’s proclamation (however fanciful it may actually be) is a sign that “self-sufficiency” could become a new battleground. […]
[…] Specifying familiarity with the King’s ideas on economic development is a different matter altogether. To my eye, it is much more problematic. Here at New Mandala we have often written about “self-sufficiency”. In the context of Andrew’s earlier comments on future strategies for left(ish) activist-academics in the post-coup environment, Sophon’s proclamation (however fanciful it may actually be) is a sign that “self-sufficiency” could become a new battleground. […]
[…] Specifying familiarity with the King’s ideas on economic development is a different matter altogether. To my eye, it is much more problematic. Here at New Mandala we have often written about “self-sufficiency”. In the context of Andrew’s earlier comments on future strategies for left(ish) activist-academics in the post-coup environment, Sophon’s proclamation (however fanciful it may actually be) is a sign that “self-sufficiency” could become a new battleground. […]
Thanks for your response, NSF; those are some very helpful comments.
As a Thai, I’m feeling emotionally frustrated at prospects for the future of Thai politics. The palace has proven itself incredibly capable of surviving in any type of regime – whether it be military dictatorship, unstable civilian government, or stable civilian government – and playing a key role in there downfall.
The question that I, and many Thais are asking is: what next? If the palace has shown that it is unwilling to co-exist with a stable (and by definition, highly popular) civilian government, then what type of government is it willing to co-exist with? And is that a type of government that going to be an appropriate for one where people have already had a taste for populism?
Ukrit and McCargo describe a near-complete chapter in Thai political history. It is a great prescient guide to the Rise and Fall of Thaksin. But to me, it is incomplete because they don’t give an indication about what the logical next step is.
Facebook 
Twitter 
Soundcloud 
Youtube 
Rss
Elections under Thaksin
Andrew: Of course the electoral system was skewed. The first thing that needs to be banned is “pandering to the unprincipled wants and needs of the attention-deficient, politically apathetic masses” (The Nation editorial).
The “attention-deficit, politically apathetic masses” don’t know what is good for them. Obviously, the solution is to limit the voting to the educated classes or military appointed civilian leaders.
The above should have sarcasm tags around it.
A royal Grant
[…] An interesting seminar this morning at ANU by historian Peter Jackson on the deva-raja (god-king) in Thailand. Too late for NewMandala readers to go to the seminar but the circulated abstract makes interesting reading in the light of some of our earlier discussion: God-King as Commodity: Thailand’s King Bhumiphol as a “Virtual Deity”. In this work-in-progress seminar I will discuss the re-emergence of the discourse of “deva-raja” (god-king) around the present King of Thailand, Bhumiphol. Historically the legitimacy of monarchical rule in Thailand drew both on Buddhist notions of “dhamma-raja” (righteous monarch) and Brahmanical notions of “deva-raja” (god-king). There was never a clearly formulated resolution of the tension between these different conceptions of kingship, with the alternative Buddhist and Brahmanical symbolisms of royal rule rising and falling in prominence in different periods. In the modern period, ideas of Buddhist kingship have generally been more popular and linked with notions of modernity, scientific rationality, and progressive democratic rule. In contrast, Brahmanical symbolisms have at times been critiqued for their historical association with “irrational” beliefs and “dictatorial” government. However, in the past couple of decades the notion of Thailand’s king as a “deva-raja” or “god-king” has begun to reappear in nationalist discourse, even if in the somewhat ironic idiom of a “virtual god-king” (sammuti deva-raja). […]
Mr. China and Drinking Coca-Cola in Mandalay
[…] During my recent time in Burma, the Chinese influence was more apparent than ever before. A new report that is being carried by Narinjara provides a reasonable English-language overview of Chinese involvement in the Burmese scene. It includes a large and relevant bibliography. […]
“Bad excuses for the coup”
i don`t like it its too boring
www.coup.com.th
Thanks very much for all your useful and informative comments!
www.coup.com.th
Some observations:
– The official translation of the junta’s name is the “Council for the Democratic Reform under the Constitutional Monarchy”. Although this isn’t really accurate: the Thai name literally is the “Council for Administrative Reform of Democracy with a Monarch as Head of State”. The Thai name does not make any pretense as to “Democratic Reform,” merely to “Reform”. The Thai name also makes no mention of the Constitution, which makes sense given that the first thing the junta did was to abrogate the Constitution.
– The site is a .com, which means the coup is officially a commercial enterprise. That explains the recently announced 100 billion baht stimulous package, I guess 🙂
A New Mandala scoop on vote buying
The Mahachon party’s February 2005 campaign is one of reason I think that the Democrat party’s aborted October 2006 was doomed for failure.
Mahachon had what was essentially a “dual-track” campaign strategy. Mahachon tried to appeal to Bangkokians by trumping Acharn Anek, the party leader, and being the only party to explicitely promise that it would not privatize state enterprises. For rural voters, it tried to “out-Thaksin Thaksin” and beat TRT at its own populist game. Thus, while Thaksin promised and delivered 30 Baht healthcare, Mahachon promised free healthcare. While Thaksin promised and delivered education reform, Anek promised to give free education to the Bachelor’s degree level.
The result: humiliating defeat for Mahachon. I think they got only 1 seat in the first election (they added one or two more in by-elections).
The Democrats repeated the Mahachon strategy over the past few months (see Wikipedia for details and citations). The Democrats promised not only that tuition would be free, but that there would be no hidden costs and that textbooks, milk and lunchtime food would be free. The Democrats also cloned Mahachon’s 0-baht free-as-in-beer healthcare plan.
Why did Mahachon fail, and why were the Democrats doomed for failure? I believe the issue was credibility. Anek, Snoh, Abhisit, and all of their proxy bulldogs had used the broadest of brushstrokes to paint Thaksin as an evil monster out to bankrupt Thailand by overspending on populist handouts. Yet it was obvious that they were copying and amplifying his populist campaign.
It is as if the US Democrats spent 3 years protesting war in Afghanistan and Iraq, but in the election campaign, suddenly came out to say that it was also neccesary to wage war against Iran and Syria.
Political memories in Thailand are short, but they’re not *that* short, and the Bangkok elite always underestimates the intelligence of their upcountry brothers. Hopefully, the TRT will not be banned from the next election, and we’ll see whether the Thai people can be completely brainwashed about TRT’s track record in delivering on populism.
Thongchai – bad excuses for the coup
There are no bad excuses for the “coup” – ONLY very good reasons !!
“There was a democratic alternative to the coup”
We can argue back and forth on this issue –
But the crux of the matter is that Khun Giles has NOT given the “coup” leaders the paltry 2 or 3 weeks within which they promised to appoint an “Interim” PM who would then take all the necessary corrective steps to prepare the couintry for TRUE Democracy .
If the “coup” leaders do not keep their word – and we only have a week or so to see this – then we can debate as to whether these “coup” leaders can be trusted or not .
If , however , they do keep to their word then we should all respect their honest intention in staging this coup and give every support to the opportunity they have given to this country to become truly democratic once more .
Good one Giles!
[…] I have received, via forwarded email, the following statement by Giles Ji Ungpakorn who, at this stage, seems to be emerging as one of the key public intellectuals opposed to the coup. There was a democratic alternative to the coup […]
Good one Giles!
Andrew: For me nothing beats this from the Independent:
“It’s a tale of two countries,” he said. “You have the urban middle classes and the rural poor. Thaksin was the first to really provide political programmes for the poor. There is this argument that he won elections fraudulently, but there’s no real evidence for that. I think the rural poor voted for him because he provided policies for them. That’s democracy and if you don’t like it you have to set up a political party and offer something better. In this country it’s the rural poor who respect democracy – and it’s the educated elite who don’t.”
Beyond the “rural betrayal”. Where to now for the left(ish) social movements?
I like your analysis of the NGO/rural disjuncture, Andrew, especially in terms of the simplified and romantic images of communal solidarity that activists and NGOs resort to in their attempts to defend the rights of the rural “folk”. I would go further and say that they in fact buy into state centric views of much of the rural population, discursively producing a particular subject for their own purposes and agendas that does the work for the state in terms of muting much of the rural population’s voice. I am a little unclear as to what “otherworldly” pursuits you make reference to and should probably follow up your earlier post or work on this topic as it sounds interesting (are you talking cosmology here/).
Anyway, I would dispute with you that the power of Thaksin in the rural areas is based on appeal alone. This view certainly fits much media reporting and urban middle-class sentiment regarding his successive electroral victories but on the ground in the South (outside of the three border provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala) and the northeast (esp Udorn, KK and Ubon) the Thai Rak Thai power base is grounded in much more complex sets of relations than mere polular appeal. In particular there is a very real threat of violence that hangs over their competitor’s heads and other’s heads, then there is debt, and most importantly how well the party managed to ally itself with local political figures in its corporatisation of politics model (the move to abolish Tambol level politics being in part due to how difficult this level of government, over district and village levels was to control).
My point being that I agree that the rural betrayal you speak of is certainly due to a failure of the leftist activists to recognise what was happening, but I disagree that Thaksin had a more accute understanding of the rural populations aspirations (everyone knows them, the left does not respect them and the right, Thai Rak Thai exploited them). Rather, I think through a combination of exploitation of aspirations, intimidation and a Suharto-esque corporatisiation of local political power, they have managed to retain office, until the coup…the tensions that the expansion of the Thai Rak Thai power base has caused with the military and monarchy has of course been an ongoing presence through the whole process…and most visible in the violence in the south and the War on Drugs extrajudicial killings spree, and more recently the coup
M.
First protest against the coup
Visit my blog to watch video interviews with the protestors: http://www.jotman.com.
The coup and self-sufficiency
Talk of “Self-sufficient economy” over the past decade has always resonated closely with “horticultural” obligations of the Phibun Era to me, and so I think any discussion of these ideas and their currency in political rhetoric needs to entertain the possibility of it being pure ideology, now and then.
Geoff
Beyond the “rural betrayal”. Where to now for the left(ish) social movements?
[…] Trying to specify ministerial familiarity with the King’s ideas on economic development is a different matter altogether. To my eye, it is much more problematic. Here at New Mandala we have often written about “self-sufficiency”. In the context of Andrew’s earlier comments on future strategies for left(ish) activist-academics in the post-coup environment, Sophon’s proclamation (however fanciful it may actually be) is a sign that “self-sufficiency” could become a new battleground. […]
Yellow Fever
[…] Specifying ministerial familiarity with the King’s ideas on economic development is a different matter altogether. To my eye, it is much more problematic. Here at New Mandala we have often written about “self-sufficiency”. In the context of Andrew’s earlier comments on future strategies for left(ish) activist-academics in the post-coup environment, Sophon’s proclamation (however fanciful it may actually be) is a sign that “self-sufficiency” could become a new battleground. […]
Being Wise and Local Lives
[…] Specifying familiarity with the King’s ideas on economic development is a different matter altogether. To my eye, it is much more problematic. Here at New Mandala we have often written about “self-sufficiency”. In the context of Andrew’s earlier comments on future strategies for left(ish) activist-academics in the post-coup environment, Sophon’s proclamation (however fanciful it may actually be) is a sign that “self-sufficiency” could become a new battleground. […]
Sufficiency in the City
[…] Specifying familiarity with the King’s ideas on economic development is a different matter altogether. To my eye, it is much more problematic. Here at New Mandala we have often written about “self-sufficiency”. In the context of Andrew’s earlier comments on future strategies for left(ish) activist-academics in the post-coup environment, Sophon’s proclamation (however fanciful it may actually be) is a sign that “self-sufficiency” could become a new battleground. […]
Gardening or farming?
[…] Specifying familiarity with the King’s ideas on economic development is a different matter altogether. To my eye, it is much more problematic. Here at New Mandala we have often written about “self-sufficiency”. In the context of Andrew’s earlier comments on future strategies for left(ish) activist-academics in the post-coup environment, Sophon’s proclamation (however fanciful it may actually be) is a sign that “self-sufficiency” could become a new battleground. […]
The “De-Thaksinization” of Thailand
Thanks for your response, NSF; those are some very helpful comments.
As a Thai, I’m feeling emotionally frustrated at prospects for the future of Thai politics. The palace has proven itself incredibly capable of surviving in any type of regime – whether it be military dictatorship, unstable civilian government, or stable civilian government – and playing a key role in there downfall.
The question that I, and many Thais are asking is: what next? If the palace has shown that it is unwilling to co-exist with a stable (and by definition, highly popular) civilian government, then what type of government is it willing to co-exist with? And is that a type of government that going to be an appropriate for one where people have already had a taste for populism?
Ukrit and McCargo describe a near-complete chapter in Thai political history. It is a great prescient guide to the Rise and Fall of Thaksin. But to me, it is incomplete because they don’t give an indication about what the logical next step is.