Jon: “HMK (is) the perfect final arbiter of disputes, for example during the 1991-1992 political turmoil.”
But whenever he is part of turmoil himself, could he still be an arbiter? Or is he a perpetrator? Example: 1976 MASSACRE.
Is there a way we can stop him from being an “arbiter” in case we do not want because he is not impartial? Examples: the 25 Apr 2006 intervention and the Sept 2006 coup.
So much talking about him as an arbiter. So little about him as a crucial party in a conflict itself, let alone a perpetrator.
The Rohingya Minority:
Fundamental Rights Denied
I. Introduction
The Muslim ethnic minority, generally known as the Rohingyas, who live in northern Rakhine State, western Myanmar, continue to suffer from several forms of restrictions and human rights violations. The Rohingyas’ freedom of movement is severely restricted and the vast majority of them have effectively been denied Myanmar citizenship. They are also subjected to various forms of extortion and arbitrary taxation; land confiscation; forced eviction and house destruction; and financial restrictions on marriage. Rohingyas continue to be used as forced labourers on roads and at military camps, although the amount of forced labour in northern Rakhine State has decreased over the last decade.
These practices, in addition to violating other basic human rights of the Rohingyas, are discriminatory towards the Rohingya population as they do not appear to be imposed in the same manner and at the same level on other ethnic nationalities in Rakhine State, or in the country as a whole. These restrictions and abuses, and the general discrimination against them, also amount to violations of the right to an adequate standard of living for many Rohingyas. As a consequence tens of thousands have fled to neighbouring Bangladesh and other countries.
This report is based on almost 50 testimonies taken from Rohingyas which were made available to Amnesty International during the last year. These interviews were conducted in private and in confidence in accordance with the organization’s general terms of reference for primary research. Information from other reliable and credible sources is also used to corroborate these testimonies. In order to protect the safety of those interviewed, all details which could identify individuals have been deleted, but information obtained from public sources is cited where appropriate.
Myanmar is not state party to most international human rights treaties. Amnesty International has consistently urged the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC, Myanmar’s government) to accede to these treaties. However, the fact that the SPDC has not done so does not release it from its obligation to respect fundamental human rights which, being provided for under customary international law, are binding on all states.
II. Background
Approximately one third of Myanmar’s population consists of ethnic minority groups; the seven ethnic minority states take their names from the Shan, Kachin, Chin, Kayin, Kayah, Mon, and Rakhine nationalities. These states surround the central plains of Myanmar, where most of the majority Bama (Burman) people live in the seven Divisions. However every State and Division comprises a mixture of ethnic nationalities; for example thousands of Kayin people live in the Ayeyarwaddy Division.
Since 1988 Amnesty International has documented human rights violations by the military against civilian members of ethnic minorities, most commonly in the context of counter-insurgency operations. These include forced labour; forcible relocation with no compensation; torture and ill-treatment; and extrajudicial executions. The organization published reports on violations against the Rohingyas in 1992 shortly after their second mass exodus to Bangladesh; and again in 1997, as refugee flows to Bangladesh continued.(1)
The vast majority of Rohingyas live in the Rakhine State, a geographically isolated area in western Myanmar, consisting of coastal plains; a network of streams and rivers; and a mountain range separating it from central Myanmar. The Naaf River marks part of the border between Bangladesh and Myanmar.
The Rakhine State (historically known as Arakan), is one of seven ethnic minority states which were formed under the constitution of 1974. The Rohingya population is mostly concentrated in the three northern townships: Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung. The Rohingyas speak a Bengali dialect similar to what is spoken in the Chittagong region of Bangladesh, mixed primarily with words from the Urdu, Hindi and Arabic languages, but also from the Bama and English languages. The first Muslims who settled in this region were believed to be Arab mariners and traders that arrived on the Rakhine coast in the 8th and 9th centuries. Other Muslims who came to the area in later centuries include Persians, Moghuls, Turks, Pathans and Bengalis. During the British colonial period from 1824-5 until 1948(2) there was also massive migration from Chittagong to what is now the Rakhine State.(3)
Apart from the Muslim population, the other major ethnic group is the Rakhine, who are Buddhists. They speak a related form of Bama, but claim separate political and nationality traditions from the ethnic Bama majority of Myanmar. The Rakhine people established independent kingdoms from central Myanmar; the last one was founded in the 15th century with its royal capital at Myo Haung (Mrauk-U). This kingdom was conquered by the Myanmar king Bodawpaya in 1784.(4)
The population of Rakhine State is estimated at some three million people. Apart from the majority Rakhine population, there are between 700,000 and 1┬╜ million Muslims, most of them Rohingyas from northern Rakhine State. (5) There are also a number of smaller ethnic minority groups, including the Mro, Daignet, Kamein, Thet, and also some Chin. The population of Northern Rakhine State (Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung) is estimated at some 800,000 people, of which 80% are Muslims.
The total Muslim population in Myanmar, the majority of whom live in urban areas throughout the country, is estimated at between 4 – 5% of the total population. The word Rohingya refers to the Muslim population in northern Rakhine State, who have developed a distinct culture and dialect. There are also other Muslim communities in Rakhine State, who prefer to identify themselves as ‘Arakanese Muslims’.
After Myanmar gained independence from Britain in 1948 civil war broke out when many ethnic nationalities and the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) took up arms against the central government headed by U Nu. In Rakhine State both Rakhine and Muslim groups formed armed opposition groups who fought against the government. It was only by the early 1960s that the tatmadaw, or Myanmar army, captured the main positions of these groups, and reached cease-fire agreements with the Muslim organisations.
The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) rejects the existence of a separate ethnic group called “Rohingya”. The vast majority of Rohingyas are not believed to possess Myanmar citizenship. Moreover they are not recognised as one of the 135 ‘national races’ by the Myanmar government:
“In actual fact, although there are (135) national races living in Myanmar today, the so-called Rohingya people is not one of them. Historically, there has never been a ‘Rohingya’ race in Myanmar. The very name Rohingya is a creation of a group of insurgents in the Rakhine State. Since the First Anglo-Myanmar War in 1824, people of Muslim Faith from the adjacent country illegally entered Myanmar Ngain-Ngan, particularly Rakhine State. Being illegal immigrants they do not hold immigration papers like other nationals of the country.”(6)
More recently in April 2004 in a response to questions by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, (7) the SPDC stated:
“The Government renders full and equal treatment to these people, as with other races, in matters relating to birth and death registration, education, health and social affairs.
In the official records, they are listed as a Bengali racial group of the Bengali race and are recognized as permanent residents within Myanmar.”(8)
However in practice the rights of the Rohingya population of northern Rakhine State are greatly restricted.
Rohingya armed opposition groups
Several Rohingya armed groups have been established during the last decades. These include the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), and the Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF), both of which in 1996 jointly formed the Rohingya National Alliance (RNA).(9) In 1998 two RSO factions and the ARIF merged into the Arakan Rohingya National Organisation (ARNO).(10) After the arrival of Rohingya Muslim refugees during 1991-92 in Bangladesh, some of the Rohingya armed groups became active in the refugee camps there, where they reportedly attempted to recruit people. Since then these groups have split into several small factions. They are reportedly operating from small bases in the Bangladesh-Myanmar border area, and do not appear to have a large number of troops, mostly a few dozen each.
There are also a number of other armed groups which remain active in the Bangladesh-Myanmar border areas. These include the National Unity Party of Arakan (NUPA) and the Arakan Army, both of which are mostly based among the Buddhist Rakhine population. Another force, the Communist Party of Burma (Arakan), has signed a cease-fire agreement with the SPDC and in some cases its followers have been resettled in “model villages” established by the Myanmar authorities. All of these groups, however, have a very limited number of troops and the conflict with the Myanmar army in the northern Rakhine State is believed to be extremely limited in scope.
Local security forces
The NaSaKa are the security forces most frequently cited by the Rohingyas as committing human rights violations against them. NaSaKa is the Bama acronym for “Nay-Sat Kut-kwey Ye”.(11) It is a border task force, consisting of the police, Military Intelligence (MI), the Lon Htein (internal security or riot police), customs officials, and the Immigration and Manpower Department (IMPD).(12) The NaSaKa was established in 1992, initially only in Northern Rakhine State, and is believed to be under the direct command of the SPDC, in this case the Western Military Command with its headquarters in Sittwe.
According to credible sources, there are nine NaSaKa Sectors, eight in Maungdaw Township and one in Buthidaung Township, starting with Sector 1 in northern Maungdaw, to the south all along the border to Sector 9 in Buthidaung. The latter sector also covers parts of Rathedaung Township. There are several NaSaKa camps within each sector.
Rohingyas have testified that the restriction on the freedom of movement and other abuses such as arbitrary taxation increased
WORLD ROHINGYA EDUCATIONAL & DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATION
Contact: [email protected]
World Rohingya Educational & Development Organization (WREDO). All news are copyright of the mentioned News Source. All logos other then WREDO are trademark of its respective organization or company. Most of the Pictures are of DevelopingImages.com . We have used here only for creating a link to them and to appreciate there help toward us. All other news, images and contents are of WREDO or problems, questions and inquiry regarding this web contact:[email protected]
> “Peace in Thailand seems to rely on the sacred institution of kingship”
Wrong…. It didn’t help in 1976 at all. And in 1973, he only stepped in well after the violence had stopped.
Besides, “kingship” is certainly not the thing – Bhumibol Adulyadej might be able to make peace, sometimes, if he so wishes. But it’s a joke to say that this is a general power of Kings. For instance, if Vajiralongkorn took sides, he would probably make any violence even worse.
So “peace” soley refers to certain situations of extreme political conflict, with identifiable elite actors and their followings. Why should it be seen as exceptional that there was little violence last year? What did this have to do with the king? As far as the protestors from the NGO scene are concerned, they merely reproduced their “non-violence” approach that they had adopted in 1992 already. This is not based on the king’s prescriptions, but on a supra-national civic discourse on non-violent political action. People–many, not all–hold what the king says and does as uncontestable (remember lese majeste?), not as sacred. Chamlong, Suchinda, Sondhi Lim and the PAD, the courts simply did not dare contesting the king’s words given the prevaling conditions. As one royalist once remarked, if the king intervenes, he must be absolutely sure that those involved would abide by his decision. Otherwise, his position as king would get into trouble–phrabaramee cannot be employed indiscriminately. Most ordinary people certainly largely ignore what the king says. His phraboromoratchowat are ceremonial matters, while they don’t reach people’s daily lives. And why should it be otherwise, in practical terms? However, I sometimes wished that it could be otherwise, e.g. when we think about the king’s advice about keeping bad people away from public office (politicians, soldiers, bureaucrats, etc), or of not allowing corruption. But as things stand, society cannot be governed by an individual of superior status. Instead, it must develop its own structures.
[…] Given the recent conversations here on New Mandala about sufficiency economy and the Crown Property Bureau┬ the letter is┬ worth reading in full.┬ Thompson writes: Wednesday’s edition of the Bangkok […]
> “Peace in Thailand seems to rely on the sacred institution of kingship”
People hold what HMK says and does as sacred and uncontestable, which makes HMK the perfect final arbiter of disputes, for example during the 1991-1992 political turmoil. What still seems exceptional to me is that in Bangkok during the political turmoil last year there was little if any violence.
Jon: Thanks for your list of publications. I asked the question, because, to me, the implication was quite obvious. Also, we don’t talk here about any past religio-ideological constructions that ancient kings came up with to justify their claim to power and their suppression of the people, but about the political construction of the Thai Monarchy after 1932, especially with Sarit, and the implications this had for the possibility of developing an independent democratic citizenship.
“Peace in Thailand seems to rely on the sacred institution of kingship” > I would appreciate if you could explain this a little further, because this hypothesis looks bizarre to me.
At the university I worked at though, the president did style himself almost as a member of royalty though. There was a huge Versaille like garden and perched at the top of it all was the “Office of the President” There were annual “Tam Hua” ceremonies where all the university staff were required to formally kow-tow to him, there were “Brahmanistic” ceremonies with the sprinkling of water that the missionary teachers steadfastedly refused to participate in. Information from outside the university was suppressed and there were definitely no political events, except perhaps the proseltyzing of the western missionary teachers. Like the post-1988 Burmese universities, this university was located far away from the town in a remote and isolated place. The place seemed more of post-2000 Thaksin Thailand than the nearby Rajaphat which resembled the politically rambunctious 1980s more. Rajaphat had the fine arts and humanities. The university I taught at had neither and even lacked traditional stalwarts of a liberal arts education like a proper mathematics department.
Overall, I would say that it would be members of the Thai elite who want to employ the longstanding sacred institutions of kingship to, in turn, make themselves sacred that is the real danger. This is also nothing new and can be seen in the 19th century Konbaung court culture of Burma, for instance, in Koenig’s classic study or Michael Charney’s recent book. Lese majeste laws do not apply to these elites, even though I’m sure they would like them to.
“Does this imply that you think that the Thai king is equal to a god, and to Mohammed?”
Nowhere did I say that, or equate the examples of the sacred that I gave. They are, however, all examples of sacred institutions, practices, or figures.
However, kingship in Southeast Asia, and this includes Burma and the ancient Mon kings as well, certainly has always had a sacred dimension to it.
I reach this general conclusion based on having written many papers on the topic, and a near complete translation of the Burmese chronicle (c. 1350-1650) in which kingship as a sacred insitution is a prominent theme:
Fernquest, Jon (2005). “The Flight of Lao War Captives From Burma Back to Laos in 1596: A Comparison of Historical Sources”, SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research, Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 2005, pp. 1-26. [http://web.soas.ac.uk/burma/pdf/Ferquist1.pdf]
Fernquest, Jon (2005b). “Min-gyi-nyo, the Shan Invasions of Ava (1524-27), and the Beginnings of Expansionary Warfare in Toungoo Burma: 1486-1539,” SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research, Vol. 3, No. 2, Autumn 2005
[http://web.soas.ac.uk/burma/3.2files/02Mingyinyo2.pdf]
Fernquest, Jon (2005c). “Addendum to Min-gyi-nyo, the Shan Invasions of Ava (1524-27), and the Beginnings of Expansionary Warfare in Toungoo Burma:
1486-1539,” SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research, Vol. 3, No. 2, Autumn 2005
[http://web.soas.ac.uk/burma/3.2files/Addendum.pdf]
Fernquest, Jon (2006). “Rajadhirat’s Mask of Command: Military Leadership in Burma (c. 1348-1421)”, SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research, Vol. 4, No. 1, Spring 2006. [http://web.soas.ac.uk/burma/4.1files/4.1fernquest.pdf]
Fernquest, Jon (2006b). Banya Thau [Shin Saw Bu]. Wikipedia.
Fernquest, Jon (2006c) “Crucible of War: Burma and the Ming in the Tai Frontier Zone (1382-1454) ,” SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research, Vol. 4, No. 1, Spring 2006. http://web.soas.ac.uk/burma/SBBR4.2/4.2Fernquest.pdf
Furthermore, peace in Thailand seems to rely on the sacred institution of kingship. I’m not asserting this, merely proposing it as a hypothesis.
Tosakan, if you can make it to Cornell on the 27th of March, you can see Handley, McCargo, and Kevin Hewison (of UNC) in a mini-symposium, one of the topics of which will be “THE THAI MONARCHY AND POLITICS: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE DON’T”.
McCargo will focus on the South, and Hewison will focus on constitutionalism.
This reminds me of the border aroud Mae Sai. I was once in a paddy field a little out of town and the border is literally a stream about 2 metres wide. Shan women were wading the stream with baskets of vegetables on their heads.
If you go up to the official checkpoint there are men with guns but wander down the border a little and you wouldn’t even know there were 2 different countries involved.
Back in 1990 I bought a short sleeve Ralph Lauren “Polo” shirt fake off of Silom Road in Bangkok. I really liked that shirt. I wonder where the fakes were being made in those days. And then there were all those cassette tapes I bought in Chiang Mai…
I think the original post and the reader’s statement says it all.
It will be nothing but a festival of yellow and a conference of sycophants and sell outs who will do nothing but sing the king’s praises.
I would hate to go as an “academic” but if there are any bomb throwers who will have the courage to rock the boat then that is something that shouldn’t be missed. It might be worth going just for that possibility.
But my feeling is that it will be a sea of yellow shirts and the Thai conferees will do everything in their power to make sure that nobody will disrupt the lovefest.
But a fun conference for me would be to have a panel made up
of Sulak, Paul Handley, Duncan McCargo, Thongchai Winichaikul
Giles Ungphakorn, Thaksin and Prem having a free wheeling discussion on the monarchy with audience participation.
But I’m sure that would be the organizers worst nightmare.
this “Update”-magazine issue is in my opinion the work of a specific form of Lao cultural postmodernism. The fact that update “contains a special report on the Lao PDR National Assembly and the new government” (check the pictures and the layout – looks like straight from the 1970s just recoloured – hillarious!) is so interesting. The combination of sexy cover-girls and grim party-cadres in the inside is at least curious, funny or just bizarre. Is that just a crack in my perception? What do the Lao and falang readers think about that? Consumer society, fashion, life-style and the party-cadre united. This is truly the end of the grand narratives and the beginning of something new 😉
It seems to me there are lots of distinct but related issues at hand here which threaten to collapse into each other in the emerging discussion. How constrained is academic freedom in Thailand, for local and foreign scholars in general? How constrained will it be at the conference per se? Will the censorship be self-imposed or instituted by adminstrators? What is the proper way to ensure and/ or maximize academic freedom? What good would a boycott do in the service of that end? How should one address the question of the political uses of academic scholarship in this particular case given the stated larger laudatory puropose of the conference? Is the conference supposed to be about making statements beyond academic communication, and if so, could it reasonably achieve any ends and if so, which ones?
Linking all of this too easily and quickly up to the larger political issues of the moment and the wider questions of political socialization, the political role of the monarchy in contemporary Thai society and military rule, etc only leads to debates about those issues and away from the narrower ones focused on the conference, academic freedom, the legitimating uses of (foreign) academics and other questions that seem to me worth engaging more directly first.
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A Thai Studies boycott?
Jon: “HMK (is) the perfect final arbiter of disputes, for example during the 1991-1992 political turmoil.”
But whenever he is part of turmoil himself, could he still be an arbiter? Or is he a perpetrator? Example: 1976 MASSACRE.
Is there a way we can stop him from being an “arbiter” in case we do not want because he is not impartial? Examples: the 25 Apr 2006 intervention and the Sept 2006 coup.
So much talking about him as an arbiter. So little about him as a crucial party in a conflict itself, let alone a perpetrator.
Rohingya in Phang Nga
The Rohingya Minority:
Fundamental Rights Denied
I. Introduction
The Muslim ethnic minority, generally known as the Rohingyas, who live in northern Rakhine State, western Myanmar, continue to suffer from several forms of restrictions and human rights violations. The Rohingyas’ freedom of movement is severely restricted and the vast majority of them have effectively been denied Myanmar citizenship. They are also subjected to various forms of extortion and arbitrary taxation; land confiscation; forced eviction and house destruction; and financial restrictions on marriage. Rohingyas continue to be used as forced labourers on roads and at military camps, although the amount of forced labour in northern Rakhine State has decreased over the last decade.
These practices, in addition to violating other basic human rights of the Rohingyas, are discriminatory towards the Rohingya population as they do not appear to be imposed in the same manner and at the same level on other ethnic nationalities in Rakhine State, or in the country as a whole. These restrictions and abuses, and the general discrimination against them, also amount to violations of the right to an adequate standard of living for many Rohingyas. As a consequence tens of thousands have fled to neighbouring Bangladesh and other countries.
This report is based on almost 50 testimonies taken from Rohingyas which were made available to Amnesty International during the last year. These interviews were conducted in private and in confidence in accordance with the organization’s general terms of reference for primary research. Information from other reliable and credible sources is also used to corroborate these testimonies. In order to protect the safety of those interviewed, all details which could identify individuals have been deleted, but information obtained from public sources is cited where appropriate.
Myanmar is not state party to most international human rights treaties. Amnesty International has consistently urged the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC, Myanmar’s government) to accede to these treaties. However, the fact that the SPDC has not done so does not release it from its obligation to respect fundamental human rights which, being provided for under customary international law, are binding on all states.
II. Background
Approximately one third of Myanmar’s population consists of ethnic minority groups; the seven ethnic minority states take their names from the Shan, Kachin, Chin, Kayin, Kayah, Mon, and Rakhine nationalities. These states surround the central plains of Myanmar, where most of the majority Bama (Burman) people live in the seven Divisions. However every State and Division comprises a mixture of ethnic nationalities; for example thousands of Kayin people live in the Ayeyarwaddy Division.
Since 1988 Amnesty International has documented human rights violations by the military against civilian members of ethnic minorities, most commonly in the context of counter-insurgency operations. These include forced labour; forcible relocation with no compensation; torture and ill-treatment; and extrajudicial executions. The organization published reports on violations against the Rohingyas in 1992 shortly after their second mass exodus to Bangladesh; and again in 1997, as refugee flows to Bangladesh continued.(1)
The vast majority of Rohingyas live in the Rakhine State, a geographically isolated area in western Myanmar, consisting of coastal plains; a network of streams and rivers; and a mountain range separating it from central Myanmar. The Naaf River marks part of the border between Bangladesh and Myanmar.
The Rakhine State (historically known as Arakan), is one of seven ethnic minority states which were formed under the constitution of 1974. The Rohingya population is mostly concentrated in the three northern townships: Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung. The Rohingyas speak a Bengali dialect similar to what is spoken in the Chittagong region of Bangladesh, mixed primarily with words from the Urdu, Hindi and Arabic languages, but also from the Bama and English languages. The first Muslims who settled in this region were believed to be Arab mariners and traders that arrived on the Rakhine coast in the 8th and 9th centuries. Other Muslims who came to the area in later centuries include Persians, Moghuls, Turks, Pathans and Bengalis. During the British colonial period from 1824-5 until 1948(2) there was also massive migration from Chittagong to what is now the Rakhine State.(3)
Apart from the Muslim population, the other major ethnic group is the Rakhine, who are Buddhists. They speak a related form of Bama, but claim separate political and nationality traditions from the ethnic Bama majority of Myanmar. The Rakhine people established independent kingdoms from central Myanmar; the last one was founded in the 15th century with its royal capital at Myo Haung (Mrauk-U). This kingdom was conquered by the Myanmar king Bodawpaya in 1784.(4)
The population of Rakhine State is estimated at some three million people. Apart from the majority Rakhine population, there are between 700,000 and 1┬╜ million Muslims, most of them Rohingyas from northern Rakhine State. (5) There are also a number of smaller ethnic minority groups, including the Mro, Daignet, Kamein, Thet, and also some Chin. The population of Northern Rakhine State (Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung) is estimated at some 800,000 people, of which 80% are Muslims.
The total Muslim population in Myanmar, the majority of whom live in urban areas throughout the country, is estimated at between 4 – 5% of the total population. The word Rohingya refers to the Muslim population in northern Rakhine State, who have developed a distinct culture and dialect. There are also other Muslim communities in Rakhine State, who prefer to identify themselves as ‘Arakanese Muslims’.
After Myanmar gained independence from Britain in 1948 civil war broke out when many ethnic nationalities and the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) took up arms against the central government headed by U Nu. In Rakhine State both Rakhine and Muslim groups formed armed opposition groups who fought against the government. It was only by the early 1960s that the tatmadaw, or Myanmar army, captured the main positions of these groups, and reached cease-fire agreements with the Muslim organisations.
The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) rejects the existence of a separate ethnic group called “Rohingya”. The vast majority of Rohingyas are not believed to possess Myanmar citizenship. Moreover they are not recognised as one of the 135 ‘national races’ by the Myanmar government:
“In actual fact, although there are (135) national races living in Myanmar today, the so-called Rohingya people is not one of them. Historically, there has never been a ‘Rohingya’ race in Myanmar. The very name Rohingya is a creation of a group of insurgents in the Rakhine State. Since the First Anglo-Myanmar War in 1824, people of Muslim Faith from the adjacent country illegally entered Myanmar Ngain-Ngan, particularly Rakhine State. Being illegal immigrants they do not hold immigration papers like other nationals of the country.”(6)
More recently in April 2004 in a response to questions by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, (7) the SPDC stated:
“The Government renders full and equal treatment to these people, as with other races, in matters relating to birth and death registration, education, health and social affairs.
In the official records, they are listed as a Bengali racial group of the Bengali race and are recognized as permanent residents within Myanmar.”(8)
However in practice the rights of the Rohingya population of northern Rakhine State are greatly restricted.
Rohingya armed opposition groups
Several Rohingya armed groups have been established during the last decades. These include the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), and the Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF), both of which in 1996 jointly formed the Rohingya National Alliance (RNA).(9) In 1998 two RSO factions and the ARIF merged into the Arakan Rohingya National Organisation (ARNO).(10) After the arrival of Rohingya Muslim refugees during 1991-92 in Bangladesh, some of the Rohingya armed groups became active in the refugee camps there, where they reportedly attempted to recruit people. Since then these groups have split into several small factions. They are reportedly operating from small bases in the Bangladesh-Myanmar border area, and do not appear to have a large number of troops, mostly a few dozen each.
There are also a number of other armed groups which remain active in the Bangladesh-Myanmar border areas. These include the National Unity Party of Arakan (NUPA) and the Arakan Army, both of which are mostly based among the Buddhist Rakhine population. Another force, the Communist Party of Burma (Arakan), has signed a cease-fire agreement with the SPDC and in some cases its followers have been resettled in “model villages” established by the Myanmar authorities. All of these groups, however, have a very limited number of troops and the conflict with the Myanmar army in the northern Rakhine State is believed to be extremely limited in scope.
Local security forces
The NaSaKa are the security forces most frequently cited by the Rohingyas as committing human rights violations against them. NaSaKa is the Bama acronym for “Nay-Sat Kut-kwey Ye”.(11) It is a border task force, consisting of the police, Military Intelligence (MI), the Lon Htein (internal security or riot police), customs officials, and the Immigration and Manpower Department (IMPD).(12) The NaSaKa was established in 1992, initially only in Northern Rakhine State, and is believed to be under the direct command of the SPDC, in this case the Western Military Command with its headquarters in Sittwe.
According to credible sources, there are nine NaSaKa Sectors, eight in Maungdaw Township and one in Buthidaung Township, starting with Sector 1 in northern Maungdaw, to the south all along the border to Sector 9 in Buthidaung. The latter sector also covers parts of Rathedaung Township. There are several NaSaKa camps within each sector.
Rohingyas have testified that the restriction on the freedom of movement and other abuses such as arbitrary taxation increased
Rohingya in Phang Nga
WORLD ROHINGYA EDUCATIONAL & DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATION
Contact: [email protected]
World Rohingya Educational & Development Organization (WREDO). All news are copyright of the mentioned News Source. All logos other then WREDO are trademark of its respective organization or company. Most of the Pictures are of DevelopingImages.com . We have used here only for creating a link to them and to appreciate there help toward us. All other news, images and contents are of WREDO or problems, questions and inquiry regarding this web contact:[email protected]
Arrest warrant issued for a man with limp …
Heard about the new male contraceptive? Put it in one shoe and it makes you limp!
A Thai Studies boycott?
> “Peace in Thailand seems to rely on the sacred institution of kingship”
Wrong…. It didn’t help in 1976 at all. And in 1973, he only stepped in well after the violence had stopped.
Besides, “kingship” is certainly not the thing – Bhumibol Adulyadej might be able to make peace, sometimes, if he so wishes. But it’s a joke to say that this is a general power of Kings. For instance, if Vajiralongkorn took sides, he would probably make any violence even worse.
A Thai Studies boycott?
So “peace” soley refers to certain situations of extreme political conflict, with identifiable elite actors and their followings. Why should it be seen as exceptional that there was little violence last year? What did this have to do with the king? As far as the protestors from the NGO scene are concerned, they merely reproduced their “non-violence” approach that they had adopted in 1992 already. This is not based on the king’s prescriptions, but on a supra-national civic discourse on non-violent political action. People–many, not all–hold what the king says and does as uncontestable (remember lese majeste?), not as sacred. Chamlong, Suchinda, Sondhi Lim and the PAD, the courts simply did not dare contesting the king’s words given the prevaling conditions. As one royalist once remarked, if the king intervenes, he must be absolutely sure that those involved would abide by his decision. Otherwise, his position as king would get into trouble–phrabaramee cannot be employed indiscriminately. Most ordinary people certainly largely ignore what the king says. His phraboromoratchowat are ceremonial matters, while they don’t reach people’s daily lives. And why should it be otherwise, in practical terms? However, I sometimes wished that it could be otherwise, e.g. when we think about the king’s advice about keeping bad people away from public office (politicians, soldiers, bureaucrats, etc), or of not allowing corruption. But as things stand, society cannot be governed by an individual of superior status. Instead, it must develop its own structures.
The tawdry cloak of sufficiency
[…] Given the recent conversations here on New Mandala about sufficiency economy and the Crown Property Bureau┬ the letter is┬ worth reading in full.┬ Thompson writes: Wednesday’s edition of the Bangkok […]
A Thai Studies boycott?
> “Peace in Thailand seems to rely on the sacred institution of kingship”
People hold what HMK says and does as sacred and uncontestable, which makes HMK the perfect final arbiter of disputes, for example during the 1991-1992 political turmoil. What still seems exceptional to me is that in Bangkok during the political turmoil last year there was little if any violence.
A Thai Studies boycott?
patiwat-
I’m in Thailand, so I can’t make it.
But I hope somebody videotapes that session and throws it up on You Tube.
A Thai Studies boycott?
Jon: Thanks for your list of publications. I asked the question, because, to me, the implication was quite obvious. Also, we don’t talk here about any past religio-ideological constructions that ancient kings came up with to justify their claim to power and their suppression of the people, but about the political construction of the Thai Monarchy after 1932, especially with Sarit, and the implications this had for the possibility of developing an independent democratic citizenship.
“Peace in Thailand seems to rely on the sacred institution of kingship” > I would appreciate if you could explain this a little further, because this hypothesis looks bizarre to me.
A Thai Studies boycott?
At the university I worked at though, the president did style himself almost as a member of royalty though. There was a huge Versaille like garden and perched at the top of it all was the “Office of the President” There were annual “Tam Hua” ceremonies where all the university staff were required to formally kow-tow to him, there were “Brahmanistic” ceremonies with the sprinkling of water that the missionary teachers steadfastedly refused to participate in. Information from outside the university was suppressed and there were definitely no political events, except perhaps the proseltyzing of the western missionary teachers. Like the post-1988 Burmese universities, this university was located far away from the town in a remote and isolated place. The place seemed more of post-2000 Thaksin Thailand than the nearby Rajaphat which resembled the politically rambunctious 1980s more. Rajaphat had the fine arts and humanities. The university I taught at had neither and even lacked traditional stalwarts of a liberal arts education like a proper mathematics department.
Overall, I would say that it would be members of the Thai elite who want to employ the longstanding sacred institutions of kingship to, in turn, make themselves sacred that is the real danger. This is also nothing new and can be seen in the 19th century Konbaung court culture of Burma, for instance, in Koenig’s classic study or Michael Charney’s recent book. Lese majeste laws do not apply to these elites, even though I’m sure they would like them to.
A Thai Studies boycott?
“Does this imply that you think that the Thai king is equal to a god, and to Mohammed?”
Nowhere did I say that, or equate the examples of the sacred that I gave. They are, however, all examples of sacred institutions, practices, or figures.
However, kingship in Southeast Asia, and this includes Burma and the ancient Mon kings as well, certainly has always had a sacred dimension to it.
I reach this general conclusion based on having written many papers on the topic, and a near complete translation of the Burmese chronicle (c. 1350-1650) in which kingship as a sacred insitution is a prominent theme:
Fernquest, Jon (2005). “The Flight of Lao War Captives From Burma Back to Laos in 1596: A Comparison of Historical Sources”, SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research, Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 2005, pp. 1-26. [http://web.soas.ac.uk/burma/pdf/Ferquist1.pdf]
Fernquest, Jon (2005b). “Min-gyi-nyo, the Shan Invasions of Ava (1524-27), and the Beginnings of Expansionary Warfare in Toungoo Burma: 1486-1539,” SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research, Vol. 3, No. 2, Autumn 2005
[http://web.soas.ac.uk/burma/3.2files/02Mingyinyo2.pdf]
Fernquest, Jon (2005c). “Addendum to Min-gyi-nyo, the Shan Invasions of Ava (1524-27), and the Beginnings of Expansionary Warfare in Toungoo Burma:
1486-1539,” SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research, Vol. 3, No. 2, Autumn 2005
[http://web.soas.ac.uk/burma/3.2files/Addendum.pdf]
Fernquest, Jon (2006). “Rajadhirat’s Mask of Command: Military Leadership in Burma (c. 1348-1421)”, SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research, Vol. 4, No. 1, Spring 2006. [http://web.soas.ac.uk/burma/4.1files/4.1fernquest.pdf]
Fernquest, Jon (2006b). Banya Thau [Shin Saw Bu]. Wikipedia.
Fernquest, Jon (2006c) “Crucible of War: Burma and the Ming in the Tai Frontier Zone (1382-1454) ,” SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research, Vol. 4, No. 1, Spring 2006.
http://web.soas.ac.uk/burma/SBBR4.2/4.2Fernquest.pdf
Furthermore, peace in Thailand seems to rely on the sacred institution of kingship. I’m not asserting this, merely proposing it as a hypothesis.
A Thai Studies boycott?
Tosakan, if you can make it to Cornell on the 27th of March, you can see Handley, McCargo, and Kevin Hewison (of UNC) in a mini-symposium, one of the topics of which will be “THE THAI MONARCHY AND POLITICS: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE DON’T”.
McCargo will focus on the South, and Hewison will focus on constitutionalism.
A Sino-Burmese border hop
This reminds me of the border aroud Mae Sai. I was once in a paddy field a little out of town and the border is literally a stream about 2 metres wide. Shan women were wading the stream with baskets of vegetables on their heads.
If you go up to the official checkpoint there are men with guns but wander down the border a little and you wouldn’t even know there were 2 different countries involved.
Khmer Krom
If you wanted to know about the Khmer Krom people and the issues, I would encourage to visit http://www.khmerkrom.net or http://www.khmerkrom.org
Fakin’ it for the Thai market in Yunnan
Back in 1990 I bought a short sleeve Ralph Lauren “Polo” shirt fake off of Silom Road in Bangkok. I really liked that shirt. I wonder where the fakes were being made in those days. And then there were all those cassette tapes I bought in Chiang Mai…
Fakin’ it for the Thai market in Yunnan
‘р╕Вр╕нр╕Ър╕Др╕╕р╕Ур╕Бр╣Ир╕нр╕Щр╣Ир╣Йр╕Щр╕░р╕╢р╕Др╕гр╕▒р╕Ъ’
interesting transliteration.
A Thai Studies boycott?
I think the original post and the reader’s statement says it all.
It will be nothing but a festival of yellow and a conference of sycophants and sell outs who will do nothing but sing the king’s praises.
I would hate to go as an “academic” but if there are any bomb throwers who will have the courage to rock the boat then that is something that shouldn’t be missed. It might be worth going just for that possibility.
But my feeling is that it will be a sea of yellow shirts and the Thai conferees will do everything in their power to make sure that nobody will disrupt the lovefest.
But a fun conference for me would be to have a panel made up
of Sulak, Paul Handley, Duncan McCargo, Thongchai Winichaikul
Giles Ungphakorn, Thaksin and Prem having a free wheeling discussion on the monarchy with audience participation.
But I’m sure that would be the organizers worst nightmare.
Old fashioned unofficial teach in anyone?
Book Zone – Lao popular culture
this “Update”-magazine issue is in my opinion the work of a specific form of Lao cultural postmodernism. The fact that update “contains a special report on the Lao PDR National Assembly and the new government” (check the pictures and the layout – looks like straight from the 1970s just recoloured – hillarious!) is so interesting. The combination of sexy cover-girls and grim party-cadres in the inside is at least curious, funny or just bizarre. Is that just a crack in my perception? What do the Lao and falang readers think about that? Consumer society, fashion, life-style and the party-cadre united. This is truly the end of the grand narratives and the beginning of something new 😉
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A Thai Studies boycott?
It seems to me there are lots of distinct but related issues at hand here which threaten to collapse into each other in the emerging discussion. How constrained is academic freedom in Thailand, for local and foreign scholars in general? How constrained will it be at the conference per se? Will the censorship be self-imposed or instituted by adminstrators? What is the proper way to ensure and/ or maximize academic freedom? What good would a boycott do in the service of that end? How should one address the question of the political uses of academic scholarship in this particular case given the stated larger laudatory puropose of the conference? Is the conference supposed to be about making statements beyond academic communication, and if so, could it reasonably achieve any ends and if so, which ones?
Linking all of this too easily and quickly up to the larger political issues of the moment and the wider questions of political socialization, the political role of the monarchy in contemporary Thai society and military rule, etc only leads to debates about those issues and away from the narrower ones focused on the conference, academic freedom, the legitimating uses of (foreign) academics and other questions that seem to me worth engaging more directly first.