Comments

  1. Chris Scott says:

    Somewhat chilling story and I agree with Heri’s comment. Even if many people were there just for a feel-good time, their presence legitimises the most extreme views expressed from the podium.
    Stunning photos, Ray.

  2. Heri T. says:

    While I enjoyed this feature and the analysis, I feel like the author is at pains to brush off the fact that the raison d’etre for 212 is based on a fundamentally racist and divisive premise.

    Anybody who participated in 212 or its reunion must at a baseline believe that Ahok committed blasphemy and should have been jailed for it. Now, one could argue that Ahok legitimately did blaspheme Islam with his reference to Al-Maidah 51 but remember all he said was that some people were using the verse to trick people. And the way that they were using it to trick people was to make them believe that the Koran commands them to not vote for non-Muslim leaders.

    Therefore the political exclusion of non-Muslims and the political primacy of Muslims is the central tenet of the 212 movement, a tenet that is constantly reinforced through actions such as getting followers to pledge not to vote for non-Muslims.

    Some, perhaps many of the people joining the 212 movement would not agree with politically excluding non-Muslims (indeed, surveys showed that the vast majority of people who believed that Ahok had committed blasphemy could not explain exactly how or in reference to what verse) but if so then that means that they are ignorant or have been duped about the movement’s underlying purpose.

    There can be beauty in piety and religious brotherhood, but the feeling of unity the author speaks of is only the unification of various factions within Indonesian Islam, under the banner of its most hateful and divisive ideologies.

    I’m sure there are some good people who were at Monas last Saturday or the year before, who wanted nothing more than to feel part of a great Islamic awakening. But I say that those good people have been terribly misled. This movement will only move Indonesia backwards. It is the most concrete manifestation of the race towards Islamic “puritanism” that is actively eroding the country’s once great sense of religious pluralism as well as indigenous Indonesian culture and democratic values.

    This is the goal that the Saudi’s have invested so much time and effort in, creating a new beachhead for Wahhabism is Asia, and the Aksi Bela Islam movement will only help spread it across Indonesia unless the entire idea is consistently opposed both politically and spiritually.

  3. Jeremy says:

    these are some good points of consideration, especially regarding the perspectives of Muslim’s inside and outside the ARMM. There was a survey a few years ago that revealed it was a greater percentage of Muslim outside the ARMM who wanted to push for political autonomy. For those inside, their greater concern was the implementation of Sharia law, which I think indicates that the desire for community stability, local security and accountability is more relevant to communities that bear the brunt of insurgency and counter-insurgency. My larger point however, is that if the Duterte administration is directly involved in and benefiting from the illegal drug trade, when combined with the high levels of violence, indicate a complete breakdown of governance and a descent into a narco-state, which simply produces more frustration and recruitment into armed revolutionary movement amongst a host of horrifying implications. This factor should be the overriding ethical and pragmatic consideration for policy makers. Imagine how many billions of pesos an administration can harvest from illegal drugs, when the organs of government itself are used to facilitate the trade. It is terrifying in it’s implications.

  4. Sam Deedes says:

    This is only half the picture. We can’t just go on visiting Myanmar as if nothing has happened. We need to visit in a targeted and strategic manner. That means avoiding hotels and the like with links to the Burmese military. Academics with contacts in Burma can assist in creating the necessary database. They can then relay this information to important travel organisations like Lonely Planet. The end result might be something akin to what is already in place regarding the Maldives.

    https://www.ethicalmaldives.com/

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  10. Iwan Sugiarto says:

    An insightful analysis, however, I have several questions and concerns for the author.

    To what extent does the urban and international nature of Marawai, signify something new, rather than a continuation of the decades-old cycle of insurgency and clan warfare? I don’t think the author adequately explained. The nature of the combatants and the fighting in Marawi resembles, in my opinion, the new type of insurgency as expressed in David Kilcullen’s piece “Counterinsurgency Redux”

    I question removing US Special Forces. First, isn’t that what Duterte wants? Secondly, I think one reason why there were increased hijackings in2016, was the ending of Operations Enduring Freedom, and draw down Of US Special Forces in Feb 2015. US Special Forces are important because they have access to US intelligence about returning SEA jihadist from the Middle East. The Philippines doesn’t have foreign intelligence capability.

    No Australia / US official is going to risk another Bali attack that might happen if the West pulls out its counterterrorism support from the Philippines. i understand your concerns about the lives of US/Australian Special Forces, but to Western political leaders, Special Forces are expandable, and that is why they are heavily used, At the moment, the drug campaign has stopped, I don’t see the usefulness of sanctioning the Philippines now. What is the purpose of sanctioning the Philippines’ in helping improve the situation in Mindanao?

    Just say if the West listen to your ideas, and actually sanctions the Philippines. Duterte is just going to turn to Russia and China and adopt Russian / Chinese counter-terrorism techniques. Do you want Filipino Muslims to become Chechens of Southeast Asia?

    Why are foreign jihadist attracted to the Philippines, and not Southern Thailand? Would Abu Sayyaf and Maute have seized Marawi without the expertise of foreign members who had experience in Urban warfare in the Middle East?

    How does one replace a political clan system, when much of the rest of the Philippines is also ruled by clans. All of the Philippines suffers from poor governance, in Mindanao, it is just worst.

    The author is not examining what challenges Muslim Filipino face in the Philippines, particularly the younger generation of Muslim Filipino. Pushing Bangsamoro will help, but Muslims Filipino are increasingly mobile and urban. Only 55% of Muslims live in the ARMM. To what extent does the ARMM matter for young Filipino Muslims and those outside the ARMM? The key factor that united Abu Sayyaf and Maute was the fact that they were Filipino Muslim, and Muslim in the Philippines is perceived as the other and face heavy discrimination within Filipino society. Muslim Filipino don’t see a problem communicating in Filipino (ie Tagalog). even the Maute brothers use it when communicating with Hapilon. Mindanao isn’t like Southern Thailand, where insurgents target teachers

    The Philippines’ state doesn’t do a good job of ensuring Filipino Muslim representation at the national level. Discrimination against Muslim is rampant in the private sector. There is a large divide between the rest of the Philippines and the Muslim Filipinos. Across the Philippines, there were victory parades for returning units, while Marawi lay in ruins.

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  12. Jeremy says:

    Those situations are best left to the MILF and other mainstream rebel groups. The more credibility they can get through successful peace negotiations that are honoured by the government, they will be better able to handle internal threats. American CIA, military, and law enforcement involvement has caused major problems in Mindanao, not only in specific situations like Mamasapano incident, but it reinforces accusations of meddling and neo-colonial interference, all the worse considering history of massacres perpetrated by US troops in early 1900s, which are not forgotten in Moro communities. Additionally, US military assistance is complicit in promoting the drug trade and human rights violations, which the Ampatuans were responsible for during the Arroyo years. I personally witnessed in 2006 US soldiers stationed in Phil. army camps and were part of a direct chain of support through training, supply and intelligence sharing via American Joint special operations task force Mindanao. There they trained the Armed Forces of Philippines which then trained and supplied the Ampatuan’s militias (aka CVOs) that were fighting the MILF. But that is a story for another essay.

  13. pearshaped says:

    Cautionary piece Jeremy. What’s your opinion on the impact of the FBI’s Rewards for Justice program in this unfolding tragedy?

    For what it’s worth, it seems that the bounty hunting approach to Marwan and Hapilon has perhaps distorted the strategic judgement of AFP and PNP leaders by providing a financial incentive, resulting in the Mamasapano disaster, and perhaps contributing to Marawi. They got both men, and have arguably made the strategic situation worse. Do you think the US would do better to provide different incentives at this point?

  14. Wolfram says:

    Yes, Abinales’ book was a good read. Good luck w the PhD

  15. Sandiaga uno says:

    Interesting view… Thanks for sharing…

  16. Jeremy says:

    Yes, they are very complex. A good historical account is “Making Mindanao” by Abinales. A Mindanao-centric history by Gloria, “History from Below: A view from the Philippine South” In regards to the drug trade, an excellent source is “Out of the Shadows” by Lara, and in terms of clan dynamics and politics in Lanao and Maguindanao, “Insurgents, clans and states” also by Lara.

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  18. Hart says:

    How misleading and deceitful this article could be.
    It’s not only people outside Buddhism could be labelled as beast, fools or madmen. In fact, even someone embrace the Buddhist belief, he/ she is still beast, fool or madman if he/she not attained enlightenment (at least sotapana).
    So, please stop saying outside Buddhism, all people are labelled as beast, fools oar madmen.
    As for the monk who said or incite violence toward other beings (not only human), then that monk is not suitable to be called a good disciple of Buddha. That monk, as most of people, is the beast, fool and madman.

    Do not write something you don’t really know. FYI, even not all monks are acknowledged as esteem in Buddhist community. For a very respectable monk like Sitagu Sayadaw, it doesn’t mean he is the role model of Buddha disciple.

  19. Hi Jeremy,

    Excellent post. Very nuanced and comprehensive.

    As a scholar who examines historical patterns of agrarian change on Palawan, i suspect that a deeper history of religious/ ethnic politics, uneven access to productive resources and deep poverty play a role here as elsewhere in Mindanao. As you’ll probably agree, these issues clearly go well beyond Duterte – past and present.

    Thoughts?

    I’d love to read a deeper historical take on the complexity of the very troubling issues unfolding in and around Marawi.

    Regards

    Wolfram