A very insightful article. But I have a couple questions. What is interesting is that Thai Buddhism has been deeply ingrained in the whole society, but why is the regime still seeking to strengthen it? Why is it that this type of Buddhism is so important to a hierarchical and authoritarian culture like Thailand? Will the myth of the resting princess disappear when the people still take it as literal in which worshiping is very common in this culture. Will the attempt to Buddhistify the myth only makes it more prominent in the society?
I wonder if perhaps we should wait a bit longer and gather more on the ground data from various perspectives before trying to read the cultural politics of this still unfolding event.
Hasn’t there in fact been a riot of religious-cum-ritual activity at the cave, led by monks, mediums, and other ritual virtuosos, all employing a diverse set of ritual techniques and cosmological frames? As well as, pursued and carried out by both locals and non-locals? Can we say that any one of these interpretive narratives has achieved actual dominance in (local) social practice and consciousness (rather than the inevitable discursive dominance of a modernist Buddhist framing in the national media)?
I wonder if the local community particularly cares that yet another ‘authority’ has denigrated their local religious beliefs as ‘superstitious.’ Surely they have heard that before. It will be interesting to see how belief and practice around the cave and oriented towards the mythic princess changes in the future given the unfolding of this event and the cacophony of various voices that have sought to shape interpretations of local history, ritual and meaning.
It is striking the extent to which the international media has ‘played’ this emotion-ladened rescue of young, male soccer players (and their young coach) while at the same time ignoring the now over four year old military coup’s denial of social democratic process. Surly, the international media are not hypocrites. Are they?
This is an excellent article. The author is to be congratulated for finely nuasced research on Islam and youth culture. That being said, Pemuda Hijrah is not as novel as the author suggests.
There are many music oriented groups throughout Indonesia — ballroom dance groups in Ambon, wandering street musicians in Yogyakarta who sing Beatles songs and waria (transgendered people) who sing by the road between Yogyakarta and Surakarta. Since the early 20th century Muhammadiyah, the largest and most influential Salafi movement in Indonesia, has used marches and other musical genre as dakwah.There also enormous groups of young people enthralled by the likes of Habib Syech who has transformed traditional poetic/musical performances into rock concert style events attracting hundreds of thousands.
Salafis make a point of declaring music to be haram (forbidden) precisely because it is such an important part of Indonesian (and Many more generally) cultures. The importance of music is one of the many reasons why most Indonesian find Salafism repulsive. One of my students at Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Kalijaga in Yogyakarta was attracted to the Salafi oriented Hizut Tahrir Indonesia but left after attending a few meetings because she was told she could not be “a singer in band” (English in the original).
Similarly, there have been, and most certainly will be, other Muslim social movements like this one in Indonesia. Some are local, such as ones I described in the 1970s, others are national. What I significant about Pemuda Hijrah is that it makes use of new technology to reach an audience who are not in face to face or on the ground contact. That is a matter requiring theoretical reflection.
[…] the heart of matters in 2014 was the need for the ancien regime to reassert its dominance, just as it had been concerned with losing power under prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra in […]
[…] criticisms also ignore that the actualisation and design of BRI projects depend on the dynamics of host-state elites. Large Chinese investments in the past have been cancelled or delayed due to domestic elite […]
Hi Judith, have you any luck contacting Bong’ family & how is Bong’s biography project? I have been using ‘Lao ruam samphan newspaper’ 1958-1961 for my research, the newspaper owned & ran by Bong – interesting & fascinating. I want to know more about the man himself, but could not find his biography. Thanks
I find capital punishment abhorrent, but I’m curious, was Teerasak’s crime particularly egregious? How long was he on death row? I wonder if, however improbable, Rama X believed he needed to submit a definitive answer to the petition for mercy.
This article also resonated with me for the reason that it provokes us to think more deeply about SOME of the common assumptions (and excuses) we make about the level and progress of ‘development’.
A couple of points that could benefit from further investigation:
1 – Regardless of the level of so-called ‘capacity’, I suspect many who have spent regular time in the field in TL have found that municipal service providers do a decent job with their limited resources and training opportunities, relative to their counterparts in Dili. Geography (distance), bad roads and bureaucratic/budgetary procedures are amongst the common excuses heard for Dili-based workers not going to the field for work purposes. Are these inhibitors as strong for Dili-based people during public holidays and tolerance days? Maybe geography been exaggerated as an inhibiting factor to progress. Has anyone investigated the interplay of cultural and ‘class’ factors with governance structures, for the country’s varying geographies?
2 – How can this lack of understanding of the regions by the centre (the national government as well as NGOs/international organizations) be remedied? Are there better approaches to engage the majority outside of the capital (e.g. beyond narrow survey forms that interrogate communities in a certain type of Tetum, heavily saturated with technical Portuguese terms, that even those asking the questions don’t really understand)?
3 – On the malnutrition issue (a super complex issue which can’t be covered in any comment or even thesis) and the specific point the author says:
“all too many of them [foreign-funded nutrition projects] assumed that the problem is a lack of food, which they then attempted to address through food distribution.”
I took this comment to refer to the current international development landscape, rather than to the famines of the Indonesian period or post-99 humanitarian situation. I tend to agree that a lack of knowledge/education are under-appreciated factors here, in addition to a lack of food during certain periods, depending on where in the country one is. It’s a varied picture no doubt. I would also add cultural norms like ‘lulik’ traditions where certain communities may not eat certain foods e.g. Oe-cusse coastal communities not eating fish or pregnant women in certain areas not eating beans.
I think many of the reasons people do or do not eat certain foods, and critically, how they eat (who cooks, who eats with whom, when etc.) are poorly understood. It’s quite common now to see kiosks full of children consuming plastic-wrapped biscuits, noodles and lollies right next to fallow fields and uneaten fruit falling from trees. Are there any reliable sources on people’s taste preferences and contemporary food choices in the context of a bombardment of TV, kiosk and social media advertising of processed, convenient and imported food imitations? Again, are loaded survey questions picking up the nuances of these vital, contemporary social realities?
Overall I found this an incisive, provocative and useful measure against some of the assumptions we all make about about TL, which reflect who we speak to, in what language and in what tone. I appreciate that the author speaks frankly based on his experiences in the field and would love to see a follow-up by others whose views may have evolved as a result of this contribution to the debate.
After holding back for two decades, King Bhumibol began allowing executions again in 1995, for no real clear reason, unless that his view changed with the rise of yaa ba. They went on for several years, though I don’t really know what happened in the early 2000s. Of course then you had Thaksin’s murderous war on drugs, which Bhumibol didn’t exactly speak out against. That makes the author’s point that they stopped again for his last decade all the more interesting.
So it would seem that there is more than likely to be a great deal of clandestine Chinese so-called, business activity in Burma.
Would this be connected to high ranking army officials that
aung san suu kyi is unable to influence?
Would that be a good reason why relations between China are as they are,
to keep illegal business activity under wraps?
There is another element to this phenomenon. Present surge in raising those spirits is an adaptation, modernization and possibly bastardization of traditional believes and practices. Many minorities traditionally raise ancestor spirits, such as in my wife’s Yuan clan, where designated clan mediums raise spirits of known and respected ancestors. They fulfill many functions, such as advisors in private and village affairs, or as mediators during arguments within the clan.
I agree very much with the author’s line of argument and his conclusions.
Might I comment on a point of detail? The 2014 Census in fact estimated the percentage of those of Islamic faith at 4.3%. See Page 4 of Volume 2-C of the 2014 Census released in July 2016. The figure of 2.3% represents 1,147,495 enumerated individuals and is not an estimate. The estimate of 4.3% is reached through the inclusion of estimates of unenumerated individuals, based presumably on annual house registration returns, which started under British rule in Arakan in 1829.
As the author makes clear, the Rohingya were overwhelmingly not enumerated, which reflects a quite remarkable solidarity no doubt based on the persuasive guidance of their local political and religious leaders, whoever they may be.
The (2nd) hypothesis that Issara’s arrest is to sow division contradicts the historical behavior of reactionary Thai governments. The strength of their support base, like right-wing bases worldwide, is in its quick and thorough compliance to the decreed narrative. (Witness how quickly Rama X has gained monolithic approval from the monarchy-dependent). Intentionally dividing their base reduces their control of the situation by confusing those who are already obedient. The first hypothesis, that Issara’s cult of personality has crossed into the forbidden Thaksin-Sondhi-Dhammaakaya Zone, seems more likely.
That the new king would purify the sangha, even of too-strong allies, is a given. The question is the ultimate parameters and limitations of the purge. Royal merit-making activities, particularly kathin luang, are not felicitous if the temples and their leadership are impure. On the other hand, a divided sangha, i.e. excessive or irremediable fragmentation, is a stain on the king’s barami. Purification of the sangha is royal prerogative par excellence. Woe to the politico who oversteps in an arena which is so heavily loaded re: questions of royal legitimacy, about which farang are generally clueless. Tricky territory, indeed, given His Majesty’s propensity for abrupt arrivals and departures from his kingdom. The arrivals timed for performance of the great rituals of state.
These views are not mutually incompatible. Clearly there is a purge that has been ordered by the palace, but that doesn’t mean that these senior monks are not highly corrupt.
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Myth and politics in Thailand’s cave rescue operation
And interestingly the team that found them were not Thai nor state related…
Myth and politics in Thailand’s cave rescue operation
A very insightful article. But I have a couple questions. What is interesting is that Thai Buddhism has been deeply ingrained in the whole society, but why is the regime still seeking to strengthen it? Why is it that this type of Buddhism is so important to a hierarchical and authoritarian culture like Thailand? Will the myth of the resting princess disappear when the people still take it as literal in which worshiping is very common in this culture. Will the attempt to Buddhistify the myth only makes it more prominent in the society?
Myth and politics in Thailand’s cave rescue operation
I wonder if perhaps we should wait a bit longer and gather more on the ground data from various perspectives before trying to read the cultural politics of this still unfolding event.
Hasn’t there in fact been a riot of religious-cum-ritual activity at the cave, led by monks, mediums, and other ritual virtuosos, all employing a diverse set of ritual techniques and cosmological frames? As well as, pursued and carried out by both locals and non-locals? Can we say that any one of these interpretive narratives has achieved actual dominance in (local) social practice and consciousness (rather than the inevitable discursive dominance of a modernist Buddhist framing in the national media)?
I wonder if the local community particularly cares that yet another ‘authority’ has denigrated their local religious beliefs as ‘superstitious.’ Surely they have heard that before. It will be interesting to see how belief and practice around the cave and oriented towards the mythic princess changes in the future given the unfolding of this event and the cacophony of various voices that have sought to shape interpretations of local history, ritual and meaning.
Myth and politics in Thailand’s cave rescue operation
It is striking the extent to which the international media has ‘played’ this emotion-ladened rescue of young, male soccer players (and their young coach) while at the same time ignoring the now over four year old military coup’s denial of social democratic process. Surly, the international media are not hypocrites. Are they?
Myth and politics in Thailand’s cave rescue operation
What do you think of the proclamations of the ‘maw duu ‘ about this case? How do they fit into your analysis?
UNESCO heritage-lists Indonesian wooden boat building
The huge vessel you are referring is Javanese djong. I just made the article about it in Wikipedia last month.
Shariah, dakwah, and rock ’n’ roll: Pemuda Hijrah in Bandung
This is an excellent article. The author is to be congratulated for finely nuasced research on Islam and youth culture. That being said, Pemuda Hijrah is not as novel as the author suggests.
There are many music oriented groups throughout Indonesia — ballroom dance groups in Ambon, wandering street musicians in Yogyakarta who sing Beatles songs and waria (transgendered people) who sing by the road between Yogyakarta and Surakarta. Since the early 20th century Muhammadiyah, the largest and most influential Salafi movement in Indonesia, has used marches and other musical genre as dakwah.There also enormous groups of young people enthralled by the likes of Habib Syech who has transformed traditional poetic/musical performances into rock concert style events attracting hundreds of thousands.
Salafis make a point of declaring music to be haram (forbidden) precisely because it is such an important part of Indonesian (and Many more generally) cultures. The importance of music is one of the many reasons why most Indonesian find Salafism repulsive. One of my students at Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Kalijaga in Yogyakarta was attracted to the Salafi oriented Hizut Tahrir Indonesia but left after attending a few meetings because she was told she could not be “a singer in band” (English in the original).
Similarly, there have been, and most certainly will be, other Muslim social movements like this one in Indonesia. Some are local, such as ones I described in the 1970s, others are national. What I significant about Pemuda Hijrah is that it makes use of new technology to reach an audience who are not in face to face or on the ground contact. That is a matter requiring theoretical reflection.
A state of madness
[…] the heart of matters in 2014 was the need for the ancien regime to reassert its dominance, just as it had been concerned with losing power under prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra in […]
The Philippines’ Chinese FDI boom: more politics than geopolitics
[…] criticisms also ignore that the actualisation and design of BRI projects depend on the dynamics of host-state elites. Large Chinese investments in the past have been cancelled or delayed due to domestic elite […]
Forced disappearance in Southeast Asia
Hi Judith, have you any luck contacting Bong’ family & how is Bong’s biography project? I have been using ‘Lao ruam samphan newspaper’ 1958-1961 for my research, the newspaper owned & ran by Bong – interesting & fascinating. I want to know more about the man himself, but could not find his biography. Thanks
Has Rama X revived Thailand’s death penalty?
I find capital punishment abhorrent, but I’m curious, was Teerasak’s crime particularly egregious? How long was he on death row? I wonder if, however improbable, Rama X believed he needed to submit a definitive answer to the petition for mercy.
I don’t envy the 517 remaining on death row.
Timor-Leste is no failing state
This article also resonated with me for the reason that it provokes us to think more deeply about SOME of the common assumptions (and excuses) we make about the level and progress of ‘development’.
A couple of points that could benefit from further investigation:
1 – Regardless of the level of so-called ‘capacity’, I suspect many who have spent regular time in the field in TL have found that municipal service providers do a decent job with their limited resources and training opportunities, relative to their counterparts in Dili. Geography (distance), bad roads and bureaucratic/budgetary procedures are amongst the common excuses heard for Dili-based workers not going to the field for work purposes. Are these inhibitors as strong for Dili-based people during public holidays and tolerance days? Maybe geography been exaggerated as an inhibiting factor to progress. Has anyone investigated the interplay of cultural and ‘class’ factors with governance structures, for the country’s varying geographies?
2 – How can this lack of understanding of the regions by the centre (the national government as well as NGOs/international organizations) be remedied? Are there better approaches to engage the majority outside of the capital (e.g. beyond narrow survey forms that interrogate communities in a certain type of Tetum, heavily saturated with technical Portuguese terms, that even those asking the questions don’t really understand)?
3 – On the malnutrition issue (a super complex issue which can’t be covered in any comment or even thesis) and the specific point the author says:
“all too many of them [foreign-funded nutrition projects] assumed that the problem is a lack of food, which they then attempted to address through food distribution.”
I took this comment to refer to the current international development landscape, rather than to the famines of the Indonesian period or post-99 humanitarian situation. I tend to agree that a lack of knowledge/education are under-appreciated factors here, in addition to a lack of food during certain periods, depending on where in the country one is. It’s a varied picture no doubt. I would also add cultural norms like ‘lulik’ traditions where certain communities may not eat certain foods e.g. Oe-cusse coastal communities not eating fish or pregnant women in certain areas not eating beans.
I think many of the reasons people do or do not eat certain foods, and critically, how they eat (who cooks, who eats with whom, when etc.) are poorly understood. It’s quite common now to see kiosks full of children consuming plastic-wrapped biscuits, noodles and lollies right next to fallow fields and uneaten fruit falling from trees. Are there any reliable sources on people’s taste preferences and contemporary food choices in the context of a bombardment of TV, kiosk and social media advertising of processed, convenient and imported food imitations? Again, are loaded survey questions picking up the nuances of these vital, contemporary social realities?
Overall I found this an incisive, provocative and useful measure against some of the assumptions we all make about about TL, which reflect who we speak to, in what language and in what tone. I appreciate that the author speaks frankly based on his experiences in the field and would love to see a follow-up by others whose views may have evolved as a result of this contribution to the debate.
Has Rama X revived Thailand’s death penalty?
After holding back for two decades, King Bhumibol began allowing executions again in 1995, for no real clear reason, unless that his view changed with the rise of yaa ba. They went on for several years, though I don’t really know what happened in the early 2000s. Of course then you had Thaksin’s murderous war on drugs, which Bhumibol didn’t exactly speak out against. That makes the author’s point that they stopped again for his last decade all the more interesting.
Mapping the Indonesian political spectrum
[…] research shows that all Indonesian political parties are ideologically alike. Their political and economic […]
China and Myanmar: Behind the headlines
So it would seem that there is more than likely to be a great deal of clandestine Chinese so-called, business activity in Burma.
Would this be connected to high ranking army officials that
aung san suu kyi is unable to influence?
Would that be a good reason why relations between China are as they are,
to keep illegal business activity under wraps?
Sceptres of instability: why spirit mediums haunt Thailand’s junta
There is another element to this phenomenon. Present surge in raising those spirits is an adaptation, modernization and possibly bastardization of traditional believes and practices. Many minorities traditionally raise ancestor spirits, such as in my wife’s Yuan clan, where designated clan mediums raise spirits of known and respected ancestors. They fulfill many functions, such as advisors in private and village affairs, or as mediators during arguments within the clan.
Assessing the Rohingya crisis
I agree very much with the author’s line of argument and his conclusions.
Might I comment on a point of detail? The 2014 Census in fact estimated the percentage of those of Islamic faith at 4.3%. See Page 4 of Volume 2-C of the 2014 Census released in July 2016. The figure of 2.3% represents 1,147,495 enumerated individuals and is not an estimate. The estimate of 4.3% is reached through the inclusion of estimates of unenumerated individuals, based presumably on annual house registration returns, which started under British rule in Arakan in 1829.
As the author makes clear, the Rohingya were overwhelmingly not enumerated, which reflects a quite remarkable solidarity no doubt based on the persuasive guidance of their local political and religious leaders, whoever they may be.
What’s behind the “purging” of the Thai sangha?
Thanks for the background on Mahanikai sect.
The (2nd) hypothesis that Issara’s arrest is to sow division contradicts the historical behavior of reactionary Thai governments. The strength of their support base, like right-wing bases worldwide, is in its quick and thorough compliance to the decreed narrative. (Witness how quickly Rama X has gained monolithic approval from the monarchy-dependent). Intentionally dividing their base reduces their control of the situation by confusing those who are already obedient. The first hypothesis, that Issara’s cult of personality has crossed into the forbidden Thaksin-Sondhi-Dhammaakaya Zone, seems more likely.
What’s behind the “purging” of the Thai sangha?
That the new king would purify the sangha, even of too-strong allies, is a given. The question is the ultimate parameters and limitations of the purge. Royal merit-making activities, particularly kathin luang, are not felicitous if the temples and their leadership are impure. On the other hand, a divided sangha, i.e. excessive or irremediable fragmentation, is a stain on the king’s barami. Purification of the sangha is royal prerogative par excellence. Woe to the politico who oversteps in an arena which is so heavily loaded re: questions of royal legitimacy, about which farang are generally clueless. Tricky territory, indeed, given His Majesty’s propensity for abrupt arrivals and departures from his kingdom. The arrivals timed for performance of the great rituals of state.
What’s behind the “purging” of the Thai sangha?
These views are not mutually incompatible. Clearly there is a purge that has been ordered by the palace, but that doesn’t mean that these senior monks are not highly corrupt.