Comments

So little understanding producing so many errors! To start, the author should read Timor-Leste’s Constitution, in particular Article 106. It may be an odd system that can privilege a party with a plurality, but it is certainly in keeping with the either/or aspect of the Article. Claims of a ‘coup’ last year were emotive and not based in fact; under the Constitution, the president could legally have removed the minority government and installed a Prime Minister and hence government from a majority bloc, but chose not to do so (no doubt given his party allegiances).

As for malnutrition and stunting, these are and have been well documented phenomena over several years. Many, perhaps most, people in Timor-Leste do not have access to adequate nutrition and, prior to the provision of subsidised rice, often went hungry – or starved – during the ‘hungry season’ from around February to April-May. Timor-Leste has very poor soil and is prone to sudden bursts of rainfall, both of which conspire to limit total food outputs and as well as diminish variety.

In terms of institutional capacity, it functions at a relatively low level in Dili and an even lower level in the districts, to the point where some services are not delivered. None of this is to suggest that Timor-Leste has not made huge strides over the last two decades; anyone who had seen the place prior to its destruction in 1999 and then the slow and painful rebuilding thereafter would agree that the country is in the best shape it’s been, at least in recent history. But this does not diminish its substantial problems, many of which seem to be stubbornly difficult to improve. Beyond that, the major challenge facing the country is how to start to balance its budget within the context of a sustainable spending program, which the in-coming PM seems reluctant to do.

Comparisons with failed states, which Timor-Leste is not (yet), does little to assist understanding of that remarkably complex small country.

Lots of interesting analysis that resonated with me, and I’m one of the researchers that doesn’t get out of Dili that much (always due to time constraints). Would like to be directed to anything longer that you have and share it with the Timor-Leste Studies Association. Is measurement of stunting so poor that short people get counted with no other indicators?

Dear Trevor, nice and balanced overview. Certainly more assistance to Rakhine state as a whole might offset some of the animosities against the Rohingya who are often perceived as getting help in contrast to other groups.
China is decidedly careful towards Myanmar, but I think it is now exerting ‘soft power’ to dominate the country, as I could see during a conference in Yangon where the Chinese presence was big, the contributions not always factual, and the attitude towards Myanmar scholars who questioned the Chinese standpoint decidedly ‘not amused’.

This is a timely article that raises a timely question — What’s up with the relationship of the NCPO junta and office of the Phra Sangkaraaj and why might that have recently changed? Do the recent arrests represent the start of a crackdown of some sort? Good questions. The author puts a lot of weight on the supposed Dhammakaya connections of five of the arrested monks, suspecting that the arrests perhaps signal a further attempt to shut down Dhammakaya.

Maybe that’s it. But the connections to Dhammakaya mentioned cited in the Manager article referenced by the writer (https://mgronline.com/specialscoop/detail/9610000039144) do not demonstrate that. The connections cited there relate to these monks Mahanikai status and their recent support for a Sangkaraaj candidate affiliated with Wat Paknam Phasiicaroen, the temple whose previous abbot, popularly known as Luang Pho Sod, was the originator of Dhammakaya practice. This dates back to at least 1945, long before Phra Dhammachayo and the Dammakaya temple in Prathumthani — although, yes, Dhammachayo began his practice at that temple, with that abbot. While it differs substantially from received Thai Buddhism, it has, so far as I know, never been labeled ‘heresy’. These monks are not Wat Paaknaam monks — who are anyway not uniform in their opinions about Thammachayo and Prathumthani. They are Mahanikai monks; and Mahanikai monks have always tended to stick together in the face of their Thammayut colleagues. It is a stretch to suggest that a preference for a Mahanikai Wat Paknam monk for the office of Sangkaraaj is a mark of Phrathumthani heresy, and, without that, the Dhammakaya connection for the recent arrests seems to melt away. So…yes, good question. What’s up?

I have several issues with the article. First, the writer places a lot of emphasis on liberalism and believing that it is intertwined with democracy. I believe it is not. Take for example sodomy. In 1960, Sodomy was illegal in Indonesia but it wasn’t in much of the West. Was the West any less democratic? The author tries to make amends in the later section, by emphasizing the elites embrace of electoral democracy, but I still think he does he isn’t critical enough.

The biggest issue I have is his uncritical use of the Economist rankings. The main issue I have with the Economist ranking is they don’t include the separation of power/balance of powers. Maybe its included under functioning of government, but nevertheless, not enough weight has been given too it. That is why Indonesia scores lower than Poland, Hungary, and Malaysia BN era, and not much better than Singapore and Hong Kong. How can Jokowi’s handling of the Ahok case which was the main reason why Indonesia dropped 30 points according to the Economist? Even Jokowi’s interference in political parties hasn’t stopped them from going against him in the Jakarta elections. Is it really worse than what Victor Orban did? Victor Orban is heading the way of Endrogan in Turkey, but does one really believe that Jokowi is head the way of Endrogan? Has he rigged the electoral system or the judiciary like Orban has done? Has Jokowi launched an aggressively anti-minority platform? Did Jokowi intervene in the Judicial system like Duterte? Did Jokowi interfere in the Setyo Novanto’s case? Western governments often want Indonesia Presidents to intervene in the judicial system when it suits their interest. Its the interference in independent institutions like the civil service, the electoral system, the judicial system that really marks the decline of a democracy, and so far Indonesian Presidents have been reluctant to do just that. Many politicians play dirty including Jokowi, but what separates Jokowi from an Orban is he hasn’t rigged the rules ie the electoral system and judicial system to favor himself and his party. The writer think that Indonesia is head toward a hybrid regime, because of the rankings?

Actually, Perlis is also still under a BN state government, besides Pahang and Sarawak.

The date of the Indonesian invasion was 7 December, not 17 December 1975. The UDT, Timorese Democratic Union’s position is not very well explained here. They preferred a longer term transition to independence. ‘Preferred continued relations with Lisbon’ is a hazy formulation in the article of the UDT position with regard to decolonisation.

For information on Advanced Research Projects Agency activities and projects in Thailand see https://www.gao.gov/assets/210/201228.pdf. The report was completed by the US GAO in Dec 1971.

Thanks, Patricia!