This is the limitation when you look Indonesia from the perspective of a western researcher. You only see a person such as Jokowi with your individualist lense. Therefore, you went wrong when explaining his reshuffle politics.
I think you have to see Indonesia as a collective society. You may not see Jokowi as the only main political leader. You need to see the roles of the other political leaders. Jokowi is only one part of a complex Indonesian political system. Thus you have to see holistically, such as the role of Ibu Megawati to guiding him.
To my understanding, you can use several western researcher’s lenses when understanding China. Their lenses when explaining China, I think, would be helpful to understand more about Indonesia and also Jokowi. What is the difference between Indonesia and China is China only has one political party (Communist Party) while Indonesia has many political parties. However, the way it works is mostly similar.
I agree with Max Lane that describing Jokowi as ‘middle class president’ is not very useful. Defining somebody as middle class needs the presence of an upper class for that definition to be set against. But Indonesia’s upper class, if it has one, is as amorphous as the middle class, which is indeed ‘heterogeneous and variegated’, as Max points out.
The Indonesian aristocracy has virtually disappeared. In any case, an aristocracy stands out most sharply against a middle class or bourgeoisie when it is a landholding class, but Indonesia’s various aristocracies have rarely been ‘latifundistas’. And it is hard to think of an Indonesian equivalent even of the Earl of Grantham.
The inadvisability of calling Jokowi a or the ‘middle class president’ seems apparent when one tries to assign class labels to his predecessors. Was SBY, for example, upper class? He certainly didn’t start his life in the lap of middle class comfort, let alone upper class privilege. Had he not fallen into the welcome embrace of Sarwo Edhie’s daughter, he might never have become president. But was even Sarwo upper class? Ibu Ani herself is no Countess of Grantham, whatever airs she puts on.
OK, so SBY is a hard case. But what about Sukarno, Soeharto, Habibie, Gus Dur and Megawati? I am at a loss to stick a class label on any of these. If such an attempt doesn’t work for them, it probably won’t work for the current incumbent of the presidency either.
A more general point is that sociology has been very much neglected in the last twenty or thirty years of academic study of Indonesia. This is a great misfortune.
Thailand’s “Good People” and Thai fascism on a roll….the Bangkok Whistle Blowers must be so proud to have brought the “Tryanny of Democracy” to an End in Thailand.
Thailand is not ‘suffering’ from lack of democracy. The absence of bickering, lying, thieving and incompetence that was ‘democracy’ is a welcome change for 80% of Thais who heartily approve of the current government and enjoy seeing some of the worst offenders prosecuted. They’re also enjoying the 1% unemployment rate. How many faux democracies can match that?
Like the dictatorships before it, this one is in power because they cheated on the last constitution. Their own record shows they could easily cheat on the referendum count, and the fact that they are not allowing proper independent scrutiny of the count shows that they have reserved the right to cheat if necessary. Only a solid victory for the Nos will indicate that they have counted honestly. A narrow victory for the Nos will suggest they may have counted honestly but could have cheated to make it look less bad for themselves. A victory for the Ayes will indicate that they have probably cheated.
Whereas a No-vote is a worth-while indication of lack of support for the dictatorship, a Yes-vote is worth almost nothing.
If it were the real top guys in front of the firing squad it may have some deterrent effect. But no. The big guys are laughing at the so-called war on drugs while sipping cocktails by the pool. The ones being executed are a combination of stupid, greedy, desperate, and vulnerable. And there are plenty more out there like that ready to risk their lives for a couple of thousand $. Shooting them has NO effect in curing Indonesia’s undoubtedly serious drug problem.
P.S. I also don’t think “middle class President” is the best labelling. He certainly is not part of the Conglomerate Elite layer, that is true. And he is certainly not a worker or peasant. So perhaps he is in the “middle”. But the middle class in Indonesia is, apart from being several million people, very heterogeneous and variegated. Not all those elements share all or most of Widodo’s outlook. I think though, he is probably very representative of the biggest section of the Indonesian capitalist class, namely the kabupaten capitalists.
“more comfortable in his uncomfortable political accommodations than we have previously imagined.” – Actually within Indonesia, and to some extent without, there were those that warned of this outcome. Some of the activist groups on the Left of the political spectrum used the slogan: “Jokowi tidak akan membawa perbaikan, Prabowi akan membawa perburukan.” (Jokowi will bring no improvements; Prabowo will make things worse.”
In addition, Jokowi’s record of uncomfortable accommodations both precedes his Presidency as well as was clearly espoused by him in his major TV appearances. His candidature for Governor of Jakarta was done in a coalition with Gerindra. Immediately on winning the Presidential election, he accepted Hanura under Wiranto into his coalition. His major national TV appearances during the campaign – the debates with Prabowo and his dialogue on TV with KADIN – also made things clear. In the debate with Prabowo he gave no priority whatsoever to human rights or socio-political democratic reforms. It was his supporters, in Indonesia and observers overseas, who played up the in-passing comments he made on these issues. In his nationally televised dialogue with KADIN during the campaign, he made it clear that deregulation of business regulations and finding funds for infrastructure projects would define his presidency.
While I agree closely with the general description of Widodo’s policies in this piece, I think the conceptualisation is wrong. I don’t at all think that Widodo can be called a “developmentalist”. The piece describes Widodo as both developmentalist and neo-liberal: I don’t think you can be both. Developmentalism implies some overall idea of development, however that is defined. Widodo is more a “private sector growthist” – business deregulation and state improvement of infrastructure is seen by him as what is needed to help business, especially kabupaten and provincial business, to grow. He appears to have no ideas regards economic development, let alone, social development. The BAPPENAS Ministry is no longer even the ornamentation it was during Suharto’s era.
The area were he has been most protected by politicos in Indonesia and some commentators is in the social welfare sector. In the national TV debates with Prabowo he held up his education and health cards to indicate what he would do. But all that as happened, as far as I can tell, is that the old cards issued under Yudhoyono may have been replaced. As the piece rightly indicates there has not been the additional funding that is needed to allow these cards to operate as they were perceived to operate in Solo. Furthermore, Widodo has just signed decisions that will cut welfare spending, including in health, education and public housing.
His cabinet reshuffle is aimed at shoring up a new economic team to get the government out of the crisis hole it is digging for itself: bringing in Sri Mulyani to help tighten budgetary controls and raise revenue; putting Luhut in charge of natural resources; and Thomas Lembong doing hands on management of investment management. Otherwise his transaksional politics, such as with Wiranto, Golkar and PAN, which he promised he would never do, is aimed at keeping everybody satisfied while he concentrates on what he thinks will boost the country: his infrastructure and business deregulation package.
But he must feel safe. The ‘opposition’ now is Gerindra, PKS, and PPP: a narrow spectrum.
A small correction. Jokowi did not ‘introduce’ the death penalty. Rather, he has used it much more frequently than his predecessor, who brought in something of a moratorium for a few years. Among other instances, SBY did preside over the execution of three Bali bombers and, as if to restore some distorted form of ecumenical balance, three Catholic militants as well.
It is interesting that Jokowi and Lord High Executioner Prasetyo have not targeted any terrorists on death row in their zeal for capital punishment. It is as if drug traffickers are the more dangerous enemies as the dread proxy war goes on.
As far as I know, it is still a mystery why ten traffickers due to be executed a couple of weeks ago were spared at virtually the last minute.
Yes, the only way to break this cycle of Coup’s is all involved must be held responsible.
– then you can send the military back to the barracks – where they belong
– design a Folk Constitution
– the state decentralize
– and put all under uniform legislation
The big question is how to achieve this without bloodshed.
Failing economy…collapse of FDI. …declining tourist numbers…think it can’t happen?…think again. I remember Romania in 1989..Caucescu..captured..trial..shot in a couple of hours.
I’m glad I got out when I did.
Abdication tattoos?
All attempts by pro-royalists to change the subject, decree the subject trivial, or attack the messengers to the contrary, I showed the pictures to a Thai businesswoman who has been resident in the United States for decades, and she was shocked, almost physically ill. She was more than aware of the sexual peccadilloes and the porn, acts of entitlement while on Thai soil, etc., but she was shocked and in disbelief: at first denying that the picture was genuine, then saying that the Thai people would not accept a king they could not respect.
This reaction was similar to that of a young Thai woman living in the UK, a Bhumibol loyalist who was so shocked that, for the first time, she questioned her pro-royalist beliefs.
As I wrote in my dissertation in 1986, when the sheer size of the Crown Properties became public knowledge, which it most certainly would, both king and institution would face serious questions. The sheer extent of the Crown Properties in 2016, and the Crown Prince’s property and entitlements abroad, direct reflection of the extent of that fortune, force even the most loyal subjects to ask where money comes from. Or, as the Thai businesswoman said, Whose money is this? It belongs to the Thai people, who are poor. What does that say about the reign of King Bhumibol, so visibly, selflessly sacrificing on behalf of his people?
To her, this wasn’t about the Crown Prince. It was about King Bhumibol. That’s why Matthew Phillips’ essay about the king’s carefully calibrated public and faux private presentations, modeled after British royalty, and the prince’s deliberate wreckage of his father’s life work is so critical.
The camera gaze has shifted. The prince, in this picture, is equivalent in dress to his female companion, meaning he is no longer the male subject of the camera gaze, the director, as it were, but rather the feminized object. This is not a photo of a semi-naked princess-consort crawling at his feet while the prince is fully dressed, or a naked woman sitting on his lap, adoring him sexually as in the standard pornographic poses which he favors. In this picture, he is feminized by the camera, and it is a genuine “ick” moment.
Again, as I wrote in “Wrecking Ball” on NM, modern social media have sent the Thai kingdom and it’s lese-majeste laws into shock. The authenticity of the Munich runway photos must have surely sent the Thai police into shock as well.
There is no chance of a rank and file rebellion in the Thai military. Their training in startling conditions with murder as a threat instils fear into any dissenter.
It would take great courage to challenge orders issued.
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Dim prospects for Thailand’s democracy
Sadly there will be yet more blood on the streetsof Bangkok before Thailand tastes Democracy 🙁
The middle class president
This is the limitation when you look Indonesia from the perspective of a western researcher. You only see a person such as Jokowi with your individualist lense. Therefore, you went wrong when explaining his reshuffle politics.
I think you have to see Indonesia as a collective society. You may not see Jokowi as the only main political leader. You need to see the roles of the other political leaders. Jokowi is only one part of a complex Indonesian political system. Thus you have to see holistically, such as the role of Ibu Megawati to guiding him.
To my understanding, you can use several western researcher’s lenses when understanding China. Their lenses when explaining China, I think, would be helpful to understand more about Indonesia and also Jokowi. What is the difference between Indonesia and China is China only has one political party (Communist Party) while Indonesia has many political parties. However, the way it works is mostly similar.
Elections without democracy in Southeast Asia
Good grief, Mr smarty pants professors.
Busy studying theory with theories, huh.
Go there, live there, work there, experience reality and then you would no longer “study”, but perhaps, “Act”.
And besides; what good do your study-theories do for the people there?
ZERO!
Value of your “observations and studies”?
ZERO!
Except, you may want to take your studies and get another DR or Prof..
Good grief.
The middle class president
I agree with Max Lane that describing Jokowi as ‘middle class president’ is not very useful. Defining somebody as middle class needs the presence of an upper class for that definition to be set against. But Indonesia’s upper class, if it has one, is as amorphous as the middle class, which is indeed ‘heterogeneous and variegated’, as Max points out.
The Indonesian aristocracy has virtually disappeared. In any case, an aristocracy stands out most sharply against a middle class or bourgeoisie when it is a landholding class, but Indonesia’s various aristocracies have rarely been ‘latifundistas’. And it is hard to think of an Indonesian equivalent even of the Earl of Grantham.
The inadvisability of calling Jokowi a or the ‘middle class president’ seems apparent when one tries to assign class labels to his predecessors. Was SBY, for example, upper class? He certainly didn’t start his life in the lap of middle class comfort, let alone upper class privilege. Had he not fallen into the welcome embrace of Sarwo Edhie’s daughter, he might never have become president. But was even Sarwo upper class? Ibu Ani herself is no Countess of Grantham, whatever airs she puts on.
OK, so SBY is a hard case. But what about Sukarno, Soeharto, Habibie, Gus Dur and Megawati? I am at a loss to stick a class label on any of these. If such an attempt doesn’t work for them, it probably won’t work for the current incumbent of the presidency either.
A more general point is that sociology has been very much neglected in the last twenty or thirty years of academic study of Indonesia. This is a great misfortune.
Dim prospects for Thailand’s democracy
Thailand’s “Good People” and Thai fascism on a roll….the Bangkok Whistle Blowers must be so proud to have brought the “Tryanny of Democracy” to an End in Thailand.
Elections without democracy in Southeast Asia
Thank you for sharing here in NM. Downloaded paper and look forward to reading. Thanks! -thomas
Dim prospects for Thailand’s democracy
Thailand is not ‘suffering’ from lack of democracy. The absence of bickering, lying, thieving and incompetence that was ‘democracy’ is a welcome change for 80% of Thais who heartily approve of the current government and enjoy seeing some of the worst offenders prosecuted. They’re also enjoying the 1% unemployment rate. How many faux democracies can match that?
A vicious cycle of coups and constitutions
Like the dictatorships before it, this one is in power because they cheated on the last constitution. Their own record shows they could easily cheat on the referendum count, and the fact that they are not allowing proper independent scrutiny of the count shows that they have reserved the right to cheat if necessary. Only a solid victory for the Nos will indicate that they have counted honestly. A narrow victory for the Nos will suggest they may have counted honestly but could have cheated to make it look less bad for themselves. A victory for the Ayes will indicate that they have probably cheated.
Whereas a No-vote is a worth-while indication of lack of support for the dictatorship, a Yes-vote is worth almost nothing.
Flawed justice on death row
If it were the real top guys in front of the firing squad it may have some deterrent effect. But no. The big guys are laughing at the so-called war on drugs while sipping cocktails by the pool. The ones being executed are a combination of stupid, greedy, desperate, and vulnerable. And there are plenty more out there like that ready to risk their lives for a couple of thousand $. Shooting them has NO effect in curing Indonesia’s undoubtedly serious drug problem.
The middle class president
P.S. I also don’t think “middle class President” is the best labelling. He certainly is not part of the Conglomerate Elite layer, that is true. And he is certainly not a worker or peasant. So perhaps he is in the “middle”. But the middle class in Indonesia is, apart from being several million people, very heterogeneous and variegated. Not all those elements share all or most of Widodo’s outlook. I think though, he is probably very representative of the biggest section of the Indonesian capitalist class, namely the kabupaten capitalists.
The middle class president
“more comfortable in his uncomfortable political accommodations than we have previously imagined.” – Actually within Indonesia, and to some extent without, there were those that warned of this outcome. Some of the activist groups on the Left of the political spectrum used the slogan: “Jokowi tidak akan membawa perbaikan, Prabowi akan membawa perburukan.” (Jokowi will bring no improvements; Prabowo will make things worse.”
In addition, Jokowi’s record of uncomfortable accommodations both precedes his Presidency as well as was clearly espoused by him in his major TV appearances. His candidature for Governor of Jakarta was done in a coalition with Gerindra. Immediately on winning the Presidential election, he accepted Hanura under Wiranto into his coalition. His major national TV appearances during the campaign – the debates with Prabowo and his dialogue on TV with KADIN – also made things clear. In the debate with Prabowo he gave no priority whatsoever to human rights or socio-political democratic reforms. It was his supporters, in Indonesia and observers overseas, who played up the in-passing comments he made on these issues. In his nationally televised dialogue with KADIN during the campaign, he made it clear that deregulation of business regulations and finding funds for infrastructure projects would define his presidency.
While I agree closely with the general description of Widodo’s policies in this piece, I think the conceptualisation is wrong. I don’t at all think that Widodo can be called a “developmentalist”. The piece describes Widodo as both developmentalist and neo-liberal: I don’t think you can be both. Developmentalism implies some overall idea of development, however that is defined. Widodo is more a “private sector growthist” – business deregulation and state improvement of infrastructure is seen by him as what is needed to help business, especially kabupaten and provincial business, to grow. He appears to have no ideas regards economic development, let alone, social development. The BAPPENAS Ministry is no longer even the ornamentation it was during Suharto’s era.
The area were he has been most protected by politicos in Indonesia and some commentators is in the social welfare sector. In the national TV debates with Prabowo he held up his education and health cards to indicate what he would do. But all that as happened, as far as I can tell, is that the old cards issued under Yudhoyono may have been replaced. As the piece rightly indicates there has not been the additional funding that is needed to allow these cards to operate as they were perceived to operate in Solo. Furthermore, Widodo has just signed decisions that will cut welfare spending, including in health, education and public housing.
His cabinet reshuffle is aimed at shoring up a new economic team to get the government out of the crisis hole it is digging for itself: bringing in Sri Mulyani to help tighten budgetary controls and raise revenue; putting Luhut in charge of natural resources; and Thomas Lembong doing hands on management of investment management. Otherwise his transaksional politics, such as with Wiranto, Golkar and PAN, which he promised he would never do, is aimed at keeping everybody satisfied while he concentrates on what he thinks will boost the country: his infrastructure and business deregulation package.
But he must feel safe. The ‘opposition’ now is Gerindra, PKS, and PPP: a narrow spectrum.
Dim prospects for Thailand’s democracy
This development is expected. The practice of civilian democracy is difficult if not possible in Thailand.
Elections without democracy in Southeast Asia
America should top Freedom House’s ‘Countries to watch in 2016’.
The middle class president
A small correction. Jokowi did not ‘introduce’ the death penalty. Rather, he has used it much more frequently than his predecessor, who brought in something of a moratorium for a few years. Among other instances, SBY did preside over the execution of three Bali bombers and, as if to restore some distorted form of ecumenical balance, three Catholic militants as well.
It is interesting that Jokowi and Lord High Executioner Prasetyo have not targeted any terrorists on death row in their zeal for capital punishment. It is as if drug traffickers are the more dangerous enemies as the dread proxy war goes on.
As far as I know, it is still a mystery why ten traffickers due to be executed a couple of weeks ago were spared at virtually the last minute.
Thailand’s referendum roadblock
Yes, the only way to break this cycle of Coup’s is all involved must be held responsible.
– then you can send the military back to the barracks – where they belong
– design a Folk Constitution
– the state decentralize
– and put all under uniform legislation
The big question is how to achieve this without bloodshed.
Elections without democracy in Southeast Asia
Great discovery!
The West Papua wrecking ball?
You need to read this one ==>> https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/07/west-papua-indonesia-independence-morning-star/
Thailand’s referendum roadblock
Failing economy…collapse of FDI. …declining tourist numbers…think it can’t happen?…think again. I remember Romania in 1989..Caucescu..captured..trial..shot in a couple of hours.
I’m glad I got out when I did.
Royal ink
Abdication tattoos?
All attempts by pro-royalists to change the subject, decree the subject trivial, or attack the messengers to the contrary, I showed the pictures to a Thai businesswoman who has been resident in the United States for decades, and she was shocked, almost physically ill. She was more than aware of the sexual peccadilloes and the porn, acts of entitlement while on Thai soil, etc., but she was shocked and in disbelief: at first denying that the picture was genuine, then saying that the Thai people would not accept a king they could not respect.
This reaction was similar to that of a young Thai woman living in the UK, a Bhumibol loyalist who was so shocked that, for the first time, she questioned her pro-royalist beliefs.
As I wrote in my dissertation in 1986, when the sheer size of the Crown Properties became public knowledge, which it most certainly would, both king and institution would face serious questions. The sheer extent of the Crown Properties in 2016, and the Crown Prince’s property and entitlements abroad, direct reflection of the extent of that fortune, force even the most loyal subjects to ask where money comes from. Or, as the Thai businesswoman said, Whose money is this? It belongs to the Thai people, who are poor. What does that say about the reign of King Bhumibol, so visibly, selflessly sacrificing on behalf of his people?
To her, this wasn’t about the Crown Prince. It was about King Bhumibol. That’s why Matthew Phillips’ essay about the king’s carefully calibrated public and faux private presentations, modeled after British royalty, and the prince’s deliberate wreckage of his father’s life work is so critical.
The camera gaze has shifted. The prince, in this picture, is equivalent in dress to his female companion, meaning he is no longer the male subject of the camera gaze, the director, as it were, but rather the feminized object. This is not a photo of a semi-naked princess-consort crawling at his feet while the prince is fully dressed, or a naked woman sitting on his lap, adoring him sexually as in the standard pornographic poses which he favors. In this picture, he is feminized by the camera, and it is a genuine “ick” moment.
Again, as I wrote in “Wrecking Ball” on NM, modern social media have sent the Thai kingdom and it’s lese-majeste laws into shock. The authenticity of the Munich runway photos must have surely sent the Thai police into shock as well.
Thailand’s referendum roadblock
There is no chance of a rank and file rebellion in the Thai military. Their training in startling conditions with murder as a threat instils fear into any dissenter.
It would take great courage to challenge orders issued.