Thank you very much for your comment. In response to the question on whether there is any conflict between Democrats/PAD and local pak-puak, I have not known any in Songkhla yet. From what I know, at the moment, two important government personnel in Songkhla; 1) the Governor of Hadyai; and 2) the Governor of Songkhla Provincial Administrative Organisation, all have close connection with the Democrats.
However, I don’t know how close are the connections between TAO’s (Tambon Administrative Organisation) governors and the Democrats. I have met some of the TAOs’ officers, and interviewed villagers about TAO politics. Interestingly, they rarely mentioned about the ties with the Democrats at the Tambon level.
Des- I never listened to such ill informed views in my life: Saedaeng trained security personnel around the barricades: they were all unarmed (even as he was). As for the army having no choice but a massacre of innocent folk? this borders on criminality! Let me say, people like Des must talk to the protestors and understand from them what happened not useless conjecture on the integrity of the army! (sounds like another military specialist, Abhisit’s mouth: Panitan)
Let me say, if Des can’t be there, then he should read new critical voices like Matichon where I translate below from an article last week:
The article stated that it was clear who was behind the recent massacres in Bangkok. Abhisit aggressively and stridently gave the order in the evening of 18 April to the army and airforce commandos saying: “I will not give ‘it’ [р╕бр╕▒р╕Щ – a derogatory word; meaning the Red Shirts] any more time” (р╕Ьр╕бр╕Ир╕░р╣Др╕бр╣Ир╣Гр╕лр╣Йр╣Ар╕зр╕ер╕▓р╕Юр╕зр╕Бр╕бр╕▒р╕Щр╕нр╕╡р╕Бр╣Бр╕ер╣Йр╕з). He stated also that “negotiations finished long time back (р╕Бр╕▓р╕гр╣Ар╕Ир╕гр╕Ир╕▓р╕Ир╕Ър╣Др╕Ыр╕Щр╕▓р╕Щр╣Бр╕ер╣Йр╕з). He then asked hardcore general, vice army chief Prayut Jan-ochaa (р╕Юр╕е.р╕н.р╕Ыр╕гр╕░р╕вр╕╕р╕Чр╕Шр╣М р╕Ир╕▒р╕Щр╕Чр╕гр╣Мр╣Вр╕нр╕Кр╕▓ р╕гр╕нр╕З р╕Ьр╕Ъ.р╕Чр╕Ъ) to take charge because Anupong was not having anything to do with this because he is retiring end of September. Prayut is in line and wanted to please the government. The article shows unambiguously the cruelty of both Abhisit (who refuses to take responsibility for the order to kill) and Prayut as the most senior officer in arranging the massacre of innocent protestors. The problem is the army was split: one wanted to go ahead with the killing, the other did not. At this point Abhisit turned to the hardcore killers under Prayut who gave the order and saw this as the last chance to bring both army and airforce together, a task not easy at the best of times. Prayut’s criminal counterpart was an equally hardcore junior Lt. General Daopong Rattansuwan (р╕Юр╕е.р╕Ч.р╕Фр╕▓р╕зр╣Мр╕Юр╕Зр╕йр╣М р╕гр╕▒р╕Хр╕Щр╕кр╕╕р╕зр╕гр╕гр╕У р╕гр╕нр╕З р╣Ар╕кр╕Ш.р╕Чр╕Ъ) who was involved in the “Bloody May” 1992 killings. Both have to please Abhisit because they are in line for the top job, though Prayut will be “first cab off the rank”. Both were hailed as heroes by the Democrat Party alliance after their killing spree of innocent protestors.
Abhisit called in Special Operations Commando Unit from Airforce to take the elevated positions (above the ground is the responsibility of the airforce commandos) on BTS line and asked them to coordinate with the BTS company to stop overhead rail traffic while they positioned many snipers at different points. The army’s infantry took the ground positions and used APC T85 troop carrier to break through the barricades from the Saladaeng Intersection. There were three troops involved:
р╕Др╕╖р╕н р╕Бр╕нр╕Зр╕Юр╕ер╕Чр╕лр╕▓р╕гр╕бр╣Йр╕▓р╕Чр╕╡р╣И 2 р╕гр╕▒р╕Бр╕йр╕▓р╕Юр╕гр╕░р╕нр╕Зр╕Др╣М (р╕Юр╕е.р╕б.2 р╕гр╕н.) р╕Чр╕╡р╣Ир╕Ър╕Чр╕лр╕Щр╕▒р╕Бр╕кр╕╕р╕Ф р╕Ър╕╕р╕Бр╕Хр╕░р╕ер╕╕р╕вр╕кр╕зр╕Щр╕ер╕╕р╕бр╕Юр╕┤р╕Щр╕╡ р╕Фр╣Ир╕▓р╕Щр╕ир╕▓р╕ер╕▓р╣Бр╕Фр╕З р╕Лр╕╢р╣Ир╕Зр╣Ар╕Др╕вр╣Ар╕Ыр╣Зр╕Щр╕Рр╕▓р╕Щр╕Чр╕╡р╣Ир╕бр╕▒р╣Ир╕Щр╕Вр╕нр╕З р╣Ар╕кр╕Ш.р╣Бр╕Фр╕З р╕Бр╕нр╕Зр╕Юр╕ер╕Чр╕лр╕▓р╕гр╕гр╕▓р╕Ър╕Чр╕╡р╣И 9 (р╕Юр╕е.р╕г.9) р╕Ър╕╕р╕Бр╕Фр╣Йр╕▓р╕Щр╣Ар╕Юр╕ер╕┤р╕Щр╕Ир╕┤р╕Х р╕Кр╕┤р╕Фр╕ер╕б р╣Бр╕ер╕░р╕Бр╕нр╕Зр╕Юр╕ер╕Чр╕╡р╣И 1 р╕гр╕▒р╕Бр╕йр╕▓р╕Юр╕гр╕░р╕нр╕Зр╕Др╣М (р╕Юр╕е.1 р╕гр╕н.) р╕Ър╕╕р╕Бр╣Ар╕Вр╣Йр╕▓р╕Чр╕▓р╕Зр╕Ыр╕Чр╕╕р╕бр╕зр╕▒р╕Щ
They were order to shoot any Red Shirt guards, agitators and of course core leaders on sight (like ducks at a fairground). They were told that Red Shirts were not trained to fight so it would be easy for them. It appeared from these accounts that the soldiers and commandos had great enjoyment in their killing spree. They enjoyed their work which was exciting for them using real targets (I think those of us who saw the many video-clips will agree with this statement; in fact I was going to post a link showing soldiers kicking the devil out a protestor on the ground but it has been blocked). They even kept body counts among themselves. They had their heads programmed by the government that these are “terrorists” who intended to abolish the monarchy.
So who acually arranged for the snipers? This was sanctioned by Abhisit and delegated to ruthless Lt.General Podok Bunnak (р╕Юр╕е.р╕Ч.р╣Вр╕Ыр╕Ор╕Б р╕Ър╕╕р╕Щр╕Щр╕▓р╕Д р╕Ьр╕Ъ.р╕Щр╕кр╕и) who also arranged for the killings inside Wat Pathum. Lt.General Surasak Kanjanarat (р╕Юр╕е.р╕Ч.р╕кр╕╕р╕гр╕ир╕▒р╕Бр╕Фр╕┤р╣М р╕Бр╕▓р╕Нр╕Ир╕Щр╕гр╕▒р╕Хр╕Щр╣М р╕Ьр╕К.р╣Ар╕кр╕Ш.р╕Чр╕Ъ) was given responsibility by Abhisit for the equally deplorable behaviour of ensuring a steady flow of propaganda sent to the media (clearly not able to control international media). The media, as failed civil society in Thailand generally, were complicit in this stage managed affair.
The government expected a kill of about 200-300 persons. So they expressed thanks to Prayut and Daopong (both, vice army chiefs) for their results. They are sure to be in favour now for September promotions round and now, as the article states, lauded as the heroes of the Democrat Party (because the last thing Abhisit wanted was an election). Worryingly, Prayut would be army commander in chief from September 2010 until 2014.
Matichon finally notes that all Thais should be very fearful that the country will henceforth be controlled by such cruel individuals which Des cheers.
Ball is just another one of the type that believes political power does and should come out of the barrel of a gun. The Thai military is a criminal organisation. This is inevitable when the military controls the lawmakers, and the laws are either manipulated to suit whatever requirement the men with guns might have, or simply ignored by them. The Thai military/Democrat Party are closely equivalent to the Indonesian military/Golkar Party who are making a successful comeback. The power that comes from them is corruption itself. I don’t know whether to be relieved or to cry, when I contemplate the fact that both these organisations use violence and intimidation almost exclusively against their own people.
Cheers Peta, interesting perspective. Frank and others – you’re wrong to assume that government thinking is monolithic with regard to the future of development in this country. The debate is not over – like Peta says, plenty of people are worried about Chinese investment, and enough in government for them to step back and re-evaluate the plans for Beung That Luang.
As for those that argue that bringing human rights and ‘feminist’ ideas to Laos is a waste of time. There are plenty of girls, women, ethnic and disabled people and children here who appreciate the solidarity. It’s all about access to resources and power, and perpetuating the Lao male dominance is not doing anyone any favours as the country opens up. Many people have already commented on the huge social changes going on in Laos at the moment, including the rapidly increasing wealth gap. Laos is struggling to adapt on so many levels, and the NGOs and others bring a measure of experience with helping communities to adjust in an equitable and socially sustainable way.
THOMAS PAINE pointed out in The Rights of Man, printed in 1791-2, the idea of any hereditary public positions is as inconsistent and absurd as that of the idea of hereditary mathematicians or poets….“its an office which could be filled by any child or idiot. It requires some talents to be a common mechanic; but to be a king requires only the animal figure of a man”.
As a once professional soldier, I agree with Professor Ball, but you have to listen what he says carefully and understand the mindset of the soldiers involved.
The two units involved have been intensively indoctrinated to believe they are working directly for the monarchy, add that to the fact that many, if not most of them are conscripts, their communications poor, their equipment old and the lack of close supervision by veteran NCO’s and Officers and you have a recipe for disaster.
You may consider the 80 ++ dead and hundreds injured to be a major blemish on the Thai military, when in actual fact, Professor Ball tells us it could have been far, far worse, for the above reasons.
I recall two incidences in Viet Nam; The first was the first contact where hundreds of rounds were expended by us against just 2 VC. The second was some months later during TET when the soldiers had gotten over the first combat jitters. With two dead Australians and wounded laying on the ground, gunships and Dustoff overhead and hundreds of rounds were being fired, the CSM of C Coy 2RAR yelled “cease fire”. The reply was. “None of us are firing”.
The Thai Armed forces need a total rethink, national service should be stopped, over half the generals should be sacked, the Thai army is top heavy and the money spent on troops could be better served on modern, top of the line equipment and training.
The Border Patrol Police are part of the Thai Police. They speak at least two languages, they read newspapers daily and their training is excellent, they are the cream of Thai troops.
However, the fact that the Thai army was used at all, when millions of baht has been spent on riot gear for the police, appalls me. I also wonder why millions of baht was allocated to the Thai army for riot gear, when the job falls, or should fall to the Thai police and also where that riot gear actually is and why it wasn’t used.
The Thai government better start asking serious questions, but as usual they won’t, it will all be glossed over and the military “wish list” will get the nod, or at least most of it.
Regarding the “tightening of the noose” you speak of, I don’t think that the army acted recklessly. I live on Ratchwetii, the road that turns into Din Daeng, and my street along with Ratchaprop, were basically under martial law for several days, the “live fire zone.” Everyone was warned, everyone knew that you simply didn’t go out on those streets, especially at night or you were going to get hit. It was as simple as that. Especially Ratchaprarop, the road leading into the Ratchaprasong protest area. Soldiers would shoot at things to make their presence known and to send a message. Ratchweti was shut down after a mob had broken into Central 1 and several other buildings at Victory Monument. The army came in later in the evening and fired from a flyover after the government turned off the electricity in the area. It was classic mob control.
Perhaps it’s my background being a son of a career military man. When someone tells me, “Don’t go out there or you’re going to get shot,” I listen.
Anybody who got shot on Ratchaprarop (and most likely these other areas like Rama IV) were shot because they were taunting the soldiers. I personally lived through the crackdown on Ratchweti and I was there watching during the day the events on Ratchaprarop.
Of course when I speak of the restraint of the military I am speaking from a tactical point of view, not a political one. I wanted the red shirts to come to town and throw out the current government.
The simple fact is that Anupong was reluctant to get involved and from the outset he argued that this protest was a political issue not a military one. The military was patient, so patient that I have previously posted my suspicions that Anupong was directly subverting Abhisit.
The red shirts lost their initiative politically when they started spending too much time on investigating deaths when they could have done an end run around the government and claimed that the red shirt protesters AND the soldiers were victims of the system thus pitting the military against the government/monarchy. They could have asked the question of why, if the monarchy is supposed to be “above politics,” do we even have a “Royal Queen’s or King’s Guard”? The military serves the people not a family etc…
As for the Wat that was shot at, I simply don’t know. But from what I have seen firsthand I would not suspect military involvement. (And remember, I am not a supporter of the current government!!)
Darren Nelson:
I don’t need reporting/video from the news as I was my own correspondent in my own neighborhood and I knew more than most of these journalists who flew in for a few weeks. I speak intermediate Thai, I’ve lived here etc….We (and the red shirt leadership) needs to keep hammering away at the larger issues here in Thailand…
Can I suggest to ANU, that during their next interview,they broadcast recovered vdo footage of “live fire zone” incidents and then ask for comments regarding military operations and its professionalism including”sniper” incidents,for I do not believe you will find Proffesor Ball saying that the military”acted by and large very profesionally” then repeat the question to Proffessor Des Ball.
Dr Des Ball who has “regular contact” with top military and police personnel ommited to mention the “live fire zone” where numerous vdo’s has apparently shown goverment snipers taking pot-shots at unarmed protesters. he says the security forces “acted by and large very proffesionally” he would not critisise the crackdown.Again ommiting to acknowlege there should have been a political solution to this crisis.
Proffesor Des Ball ? have I missed something,or has Proffesor Ball missed something? Certainly this ANU broadcast must have missed something.MIB (Seh Daeng connection) yes all very probable…BUT HANG ON !! absolutely no mention of Goverment snipers. Amnesia or what?
hi,
Thank you for the insightful discussion
I agree with Prof. Des that the casualties could been much higher. However, labeling that the army had been acting with professionalism does not convince me for the following reasons.
1. The 10th April incident was at best a debacle. Any professionals would have tried to avoid being in such place at night (small in number and encircled by sea of protesters). They should have knowed too well that armed element within the protesters existed (there had been misterious bombings 2 weeks before the incident in various places. Positioned themselves there was highly susceptible to attacks.
2 during the period of tightening the noose at various checkpoints(Bon Ki, Samheim Din Dang, Soi Ngam Du Plee etc), many innocents protesters and bystanders had been shot dead. All of them appeared to possess nothing more than slingshots and fire works. Vedio footages of various news agencies, pictures including that of Nick Nostitz seem to confirm that the soldiers had been given ordered to shoot whatever moving into the soldier line or behind the tires barricades. This is careless not professional dealing with protesters.
3 The killing at temple Pratum Vanaram was the clearest example against the case that the army had acted professionally. I don’t think that the top level army echelon order that. But it doesn’t seem to be a difficult job to give stick instrutions that civilians mustn’t be killed.
4. Last point, now evidence have emerged that on the army side, they also employed/worked with Men in Black as well. http://bit.ly/apzJUc show two sets of picutures both see gun men who didnot wear uniforms or wear black head scarf. They were obiviously in the same operation with the soldier. Are these things repersent professionalism?
It’s true that number of casualties could have risen much higher very easily. But this should not be taken to exonerate the reckless use of force at various points, much less appropiate to credit them with professionalism. In orther words, the number could have been even lower had they really acted professionally.
Where’s the evidence that the people being referred to under the label Ronin really ‘have no lord or master’? Or is the term being used in the far broader sense implying no loyalty to the King? Maybe that’s just what we’d like to see? From what I saw, they didn’t strike me as a loose group of Thai James Deans – but that’s just what I saw. Is the terms use justified? Wouldn’t want to be applying false labels/descriptors to people. That’s the job of the government!
v interesting summary of the Indonesian situation and extremely important observations regarding the out of control Thai military
as he said the Thai military are used by the elites in Thailand to maintain their power
an important art of Democracy is to keep the military forces accountable to the civilian elected government and to maintain their external role
in Thailand the military are not only a tool for forceful intervention but they are also embedded in the elites, major players in politics and legal and illegal businesses
the military are significant reasons for the unrest in the south of Thailand which to my mind really reflects the same dissatisfactions as expressed by the redshirts
remove the military from Thai internal affairs, the elites, politicians and the people will have to sit down and sort out their issues like human beings rather than some animals with guns and bombs repressing more civilised people attempting to live in normal human equality with each other
I found resonance with Andrew’s comments in No.1 when he pointed out that 90% of Thais are not poor but then his analysis that the the main motivator of the Red Shirt movement is that apparently overwhelming Thai trait of ” I Char ” – jealousy, did surprise.
Considering the sickening TV culture it is no wonder.
However Andrew’s characterisation of Bangkok Thais having higher living standards of the rural folk makes me shudder.
Yes by Bangkok Post standards, when they celebrated a return to normal life in the metropolis with a picture of traffic jam, Andrew may be right.
But compared with lovely Canberra, with its easy bike riding, parks galore, fresh air and fair access to cultural activities, or rural Issan, Bangkok is plain Hell. Why does Andrew uphold Bangkok Post values?
Show No.2 Does raise some questions about how much one should believe when academics speak.
Des Ball appears to have many friends in the military in Thailand and his comments seem much less forthright than Marcus who works on Indonesian issues.
Des seems to think that 88 dead during the protests was not a problem. Certainly compared with one would expect from the Israeli military one would agree. But why did Nick the interviewer, not refer Des to the many New Mandala comments and reports about the military shooting, when it had not even tried conventional crowd control measures?
During the Suharto dictatorship I heard criticism of Australian academics who went soft on his human rights abuses and it seems to me we are seeing the same from Des. Only today a group of Thai lawyers filed a complaint, reported in the Bangkok Post believe it or not, about the heavy handedness of the military crackdown.
I found it interesting that Marcus, who not having to protect his cosy relationship with the Thai military, could be so forthright as to point out the similar effect the Thai King has on the polity with that of the former Indonesian dictator, and wishing for his early disappearance. No Long Live the King remark from Marcus.
On the other hand I would have found it interesting if Marcus had compared the ethnic make-up of the political elites in Thailand and Indonesia. To what extent has Indonesia benefited from the great massacres of Chinese after Suharto’s coup and how does the Chinese Thai political and commercial elite relate to the military & Royal elite factions ?
Maybe it is still not safe for an academic to raise these matters if his field is Indonesian politics?
I find Des Ball’s comments very interesting, & it’s valuable to have analysis from someone who has done in-depth study of the military, militias and police over many years. Is there any chance of a more expansive post from him on NM?
couple of points and questions regarding Des Balls commentary
firstly:
Des placed the Thai Border Patrol Police as an agency of the Thai Police whereas I had the impression that they are under the military command hierarchy. Notable on the Thai websites the BPP appears on both the military and police structures
Historically I understand (from the King Never Smiles and Vasit’s ? book the BPP owed their allegiance and perhaps were commanded by the Palace, perhaps this is still true and overrides any overt line of command
in much reporting and seems even in reality where now the Police are issuing arrest warrants and arresting redshirts that are being held by the army seems to me there is a deliberate obfuscation of military and police roles managed by the military for maintaining their action with impunity
secondly:
the CRES announced that snipers would be deployed with the troops for the purpose of “taking out terrorist elements”, and we assume these snipers would be from Lopburi.
also I have yet to see any evidence that the government/CRES/military command actually issued the snipers with rules of engagement that included how to identify terrorists, which explains why they seemed to free fire
and only two soldiers (1 airforce + Sae Daeng)) were killed, all the rest of the 80+ (growing because more are dying in hospital) were medicos, journalists, redshirt and non-redshirt civilians
so why does Des suggest the the snipers were likely associated with Sae Daeng (who was shot by a sniper) and the redshirts?
I have ordered a copy of Des book on the Ronins through the library service but think Des should research more deeply and justify his remarks in this case
Andrew Walker has some good points, but mere analysis of the events like a ‘play-by-play commentator’ rather than a ‘colour man’ doesn’t really educate or offer deeper insight into the political intrigue of Thaksin and The Monarchy.
I repeatedly read how Thaksin played the political game well, but nothing about the actual crippling effects of his policies on the rural people. The million baht village fund was essentially easy money for all the needy to access, but the program was administered without oversight. Of course micro-loan programs in Africa and India have been successful, but only when properly administered. This critical fact was, I believe, intentionally omitted by Thaksin for his own gain.
First, it bought a bunch of loyal followers who now knew about having money (read: Thaksin good) but little about unmanageable debt (read: Thaksin bad). In the end the Thai ‘s simply borrowed the money which the majority of them spent, unfortunately but highly predictably, quite foolishly.
For example, aside from a new scooter, almost all purchased a new cell phone. And the cellular industry was Thaksin’s forte, so it naturally worked most favourably for Thaksin’s personal interests in the communications business.
In the end, instead of the money going into proper development of farms or small/medium business ventures, the money was pissed away and left the majority of the rural borrowers twice as indebted today as when Thaksin became PM in 2001.
In short, Thaksin took the country out of the IMF crisis, which works to invite stable foreign investment, and put the Thai people into debt. He now has his cheap and compliant labour pool for his soon to appear, industry capitalist friends. This was evidenced by his opening the door via his ‘free trade’ negotiations with America and the Asean community, and his development of the transportation routes through Northern Thailand into Laos and China. And once one appreciates a Free Trade Agreement is no more than a ‘International Corporate Rights Agreement, Thaksinomics becomes astonishingly clear. Indebt the workers to spawn a docile labour pool which will work to enrich himself and his international, global cohorts.
Thaksin always left the people thinking there was hope, but hope doesn’t feed your children. And when Thaksin was ousted, Abhisit was the fall-guy for the demise of ‘hope’. Intriguingly, which Thaksin under-estimated, was the mere threat of ‘hope’ for the underclass butted heads with the Monarchy’s promotion of a ‘sufficiency economy’. In short, the people must know their place; ‘hope’ simply undercut the long-established political order and something had to be done. And it was.
So how about we get some ‘colour analysis’ of the politics rather than simply play-by-play?
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Report from the South: From the day of Prong-Dong (Harmony) to the day of Prab-Pram (Suppression)
Khun Mai and Khun Michael,
Thank you very much for your comment. In response to the question on whether there is any conflict between Democrats/PAD and local pak-puak, I have not known any in Songkhla yet. From what I know, at the moment, two important government personnel in Songkhla; 1) the Governor of Hadyai; and 2) the Governor of Songkhla Provincial Administrative Organisation, all have close connection with the Democrats.
However, I don’t know how close are the connections between TAO’s (Tambon Administrative Organisation) governors and the Democrats. I have met some of the TAOs’ officers, and interviewed villagers about TAO politics. Interestingly, they rarely mentioned about the ties with the Democrats at the Tambon level.
Thailand in crisis – Episode 2
Jim Taylor, is this the pen name for Giles? I start to see the similarities in style now. BTW what school did you go to Giles? Just interested is all.
And yes Andrew I use a pen name also, but I’m still in Thailand while Giles isn’t.
Thailand in crisis – Episode 2
Des- I never listened to such ill informed views in my life: Saedaeng trained security personnel around the barricades: they were all unarmed (even as he was). As for the army having no choice but a massacre of innocent folk? this borders on criminality! Let me say, people like Des must talk to the protestors and understand from them what happened not useless conjecture on the integrity of the army! (sounds like another military specialist, Abhisit’s mouth: Panitan)
Let me say, if Des can’t be there, then he should read new critical voices like Matichon where I translate below from an article last week:
The article stated that it was clear who was behind the recent massacres in Bangkok. Abhisit aggressively and stridently gave the order in the evening of 18 April to the army and airforce commandos saying: “I will not give ‘it’ [р╕бр╕▒р╕Щ – a derogatory word; meaning the Red Shirts] any more time” (р╕Ьр╕бр╕Ир╕░р╣Др╕бр╣Ир╣Гр╕лр╣Йр╣Ар╕зр╕ер╕▓р╕Юр╕зр╕Бр╕бр╕▒р╕Щр╕нр╕╡р╕Бр╣Бр╕ер╣Йр╕з). He stated also that “negotiations finished long time back (р╕Бр╕▓р╕гр╣Ар╕Ир╕гр╕Ир╕▓р╕Ир╕Ър╣Др╕Ыр╕Щр╕▓р╕Щр╣Бр╕ер╣Йр╕з). He then asked hardcore general, vice army chief Prayut Jan-ochaa (р╕Юр╕е.р╕н.р╕Ыр╕гр╕░р╕вр╕╕р╕Чр╕Шр╣М р╕Ир╕▒р╕Щр╕Чр╕гр╣Мр╣Вр╕нр╕Кр╕▓ р╕гр╕нр╕З р╕Ьр╕Ъ.р╕Чр╕Ъ) to take charge because Anupong was not having anything to do with this because he is retiring end of September. Prayut is in line and wanted to please the government. The article shows unambiguously the cruelty of both Abhisit (who refuses to take responsibility for the order to kill) and Prayut as the most senior officer in arranging the massacre of innocent protestors. The problem is the army was split: one wanted to go ahead with the killing, the other did not. At this point Abhisit turned to the hardcore killers under Prayut who gave the order and saw this as the last chance to bring both army and airforce together, a task not easy at the best of times. Prayut’s criminal counterpart was an equally hardcore junior Lt. General Daopong Rattansuwan (р╕Юр╕е.р╕Ч.р╕Фр╕▓р╕зр╣Мр╕Юр╕Зр╕йр╣М р╕гр╕▒р╕Хр╕Щр╕кр╕╕р╕зр╕гр╕гр╕У р╕гр╕нр╕З р╣Ар╕кр╕Ш.р╕Чр╕Ъ) who was involved in the “Bloody May” 1992 killings. Both have to please Abhisit because they are in line for the top job, though Prayut will be “first cab off the rank”. Both were hailed as heroes by the Democrat Party alliance after their killing spree of innocent protestors.
Abhisit called in Special Operations Commando Unit from Airforce to take the elevated positions (above the ground is the responsibility of the airforce commandos) on BTS line and asked them to coordinate with the BTS company to stop overhead rail traffic while they positioned many snipers at different points. The army’s infantry took the ground positions and used APC T85 troop carrier to break through the barricades from the Saladaeng Intersection. There were three troops involved:
р╕Др╕╖р╕н р╕Бр╕нр╕Зр╕Юр╕ер╕Чр╕лр╕▓р╕гр╕бр╣Йр╕▓р╕Чр╕╡р╣И 2 р╕гр╕▒р╕Бр╕йр╕▓р╕Юр╕гр╕░р╕нр╕Зр╕Др╣М (р╕Юр╕е.р╕б.2 р╕гр╕н.) р╕Чр╕╡р╣Ир╕Ър╕Чр╕лр╕Щр╕▒р╕Бр╕кр╕╕р╕Ф р╕Ър╕╕р╕Бр╕Хр╕░р╕ер╕╕р╕вр╕кр╕зр╕Щр╕ер╕╕р╕бр╕Юр╕┤р╕Щр╕╡ р╕Фр╣Ир╕▓р╕Щр╕ир╕▓р╕ер╕▓р╣Бр╕Фр╕З р╕Лр╕╢р╣Ир╕Зр╣Ар╕Др╕вр╣Ар╕Ыр╣Зр╕Щр╕Рр╕▓р╕Щр╕Чр╕╡р╣Ир╕бр╕▒р╣Ир╕Щр╕Вр╕нр╕З р╣Ар╕кр╕Ш.р╣Бр╕Фр╕З р╕Бр╕нр╕Зр╕Юр╕ер╕Чр╕лр╕▓р╕гр╕гр╕▓р╕Ър╕Чр╕╡р╣И 9 (р╕Юр╕е.р╕г.9) р╕Ър╕╕р╕Бр╕Фр╣Йр╕▓р╕Щр╣Ар╕Юр╕ер╕┤р╕Щр╕Ир╕┤р╕Х р╕Кр╕┤р╕Фр╕ер╕б р╣Бр╕ер╕░р╕Бр╕нр╕Зр╕Юр╕ер╕Чр╕╡р╣И 1 р╕гр╕▒р╕Бр╕йр╕▓р╕Юр╕гр╕░р╕нр╕Зр╕Др╣М (р╕Юр╕е.1 р╕гр╕н.) р╕Ър╕╕р╕Бр╣Ар╕Вр╣Йр╕▓р╕Чр╕▓р╕Зр╕Ыр╕Чр╕╕р╕бр╕зр╕▒р╕Щ
They were order to shoot any Red Shirt guards, agitators and of course core leaders on sight (like ducks at a fairground). They were told that Red Shirts were not trained to fight so it would be easy for them. It appeared from these accounts that the soldiers and commandos had great enjoyment in their killing spree. They enjoyed their work which was exciting for them using real targets (I think those of us who saw the many video-clips will agree with this statement; in fact I was going to post a link showing soldiers kicking the devil out a protestor on the ground but it has been blocked). They even kept body counts among themselves. They had their heads programmed by the government that these are “terrorists” who intended to abolish the monarchy.
So who acually arranged for the snipers? This was sanctioned by Abhisit and delegated to ruthless Lt.General Podok Bunnak (р╕Юр╕е.р╕Ч.р╣Вр╕Ыр╕Ор╕Б р╕Ър╕╕р╕Щр╕Щр╕▓р╕Д р╕Ьр╕Ъ.р╕Щр╕кр╕и) who also arranged for the killings inside Wat Pathum. Lt.General Surasak Kanjanarat (р╕Юр╕е.р╕Ч.р╕кр╕╕р╕гр╕ир╕▒р╕Бр╕Фр╕┤р╣М р╕Бр╕▓р╕Нр╕Ир╕Щр╕гр╕▒р╕Хр╕Щр╣М р╕Ьр╕К.р╣Ар╕кр╕Ш.р╕Чр╕Ъ) was given responsibility by Abhisit for the equally deplorable behaviour of ensuring a steady flow of propaganda sent to the media (clearly not able to control international media). The media, as failed civil society in Thailand generally, were complicit in this stage managed affair.
The government expected a kill of about 200-300 persons. So they expressed thanks to Prayut and Daopong (both, vice army chiefs) for their results. They are sure to be in favour now for September promotions round and now, as the article states, lauded as the heroes of the Democrat Party (because the last thing Abhisit wanted was an election). Worryingly, Prayut would be army commander in chief from September 2010 until 2014.
Matichon finally notes that all Thais should be very fearful that the country will henceforth be controlled by such cruel individuals which Des cheers.
Thailand in crisis – Episode 2
Ball is just another one of the type that believes political power does and should come out of the barrel of a gun. The Thai military is a criminal organisation. This is inevitable when the military controls the lawmakers, and the laws are either manipulated to suit whatever requirement the men with guns might have, or simply ignored by them. The Thai military/Democrat Party are closely equivalent to the Indonesian military/Golkar Party who are making a successful comeback. The power that comes from them is corruption itself. I don’t know whether to be relieved or to cry, when I contemplate the fact that both these organisations use violence and intimidation almost exclusively against their own people.
The Western aid sector in Laos – days numbered?
Cheers Peta, interesting perspective. Frank and others – you’re wrong to assume that government thinking is monolithic with regard to the future of development in this country. The debate is not over – like Peta says, plenty of people are worried about Chinese investment, and enough in government for them to step back and re-evaluate the plans for Beung That Luang.
As for those that argue that bringing human rights and ‘feminist’ ideas to Laos is a waste of time. There are plenty of girls, women, ethnic and disabled people and children here who appreciate the solidarity. It’s all about access to resources and power, and perpetuating the Lao male dominance is not doing anyone any favours as the country opens up. Many people have already commented on the huge social changes going on in Laos at the moment, including the rapidly increasing wealth gap. Laos is struggling to adapt on so many levels, and the NGOs and others bring a measure of experience with helping communities to adjust in an equitable and socially sustainable way.
Sondhi – return parliamentary powers to the king
THOMAS PAINE pointed out in The Rights of Man, printed in 1791-2, the idea of any hereditary public positions is as inconsistent and absurd as that of the idea of hereditary mathematicians or poets….“its an office which could be filled by any child or idiot. It requires some talents to be a common mechanic; but to be a king requires only the animal figure of a man”.
Thailand in crisis – Episode 2
As a once professional soldier, I agree with Professor Ball, but you have to listen what he says carefully and understand the mindset of the soldiers involved.
The two units involved have been intensively indoctrinated to believe they are working directly for the monarchy, add that to the fact that many, if not most of them are conscripts, their communications poor, their equipment old and the lack of close supervision by veteran NCO’s and Officers and you have a recipe for disaster.
You may consider the 80 ++ dead and hundreds injured to be a major blemish on the Thai military, when in actual fact, Professor Ball tells us it could have been far, far worse, for the above reasons.
I recall two incidences in Viet Nam; The first was the first contact where hundreds of rounds were expended by us against just 2 VC. The second was some months later during TET when the soldiers had gotten over the first combat jitters. With two dead Australians and wounded laying on the ground, gunships and Dustoff overhead and hundreds of rounds were being fired, the CSM of C Coy 2RAR yelled “cease fire”. The reply was. “None of us are firing”.
The Thai Armed forces need a total rethink, national service should be stopped, over half the generals should be sacked, the Thai army is top heavy and the money spent on troops could be better served on modern, top of the line equipment and training.
The Border Patrol Police are part of the Thai Police. They speak at least two languages, they read newspapers daily and their training is excellent, they are the cream of Thai troops.
However, the fact that the Thai army was used at all, when millions of baht has been spent on riot gear for the police, appalls me. I also wonder why millions of baht was allocated to the Thai army for riot gear, when the job falls, or should fall to the Thai police and also where that riot gear actually is and why it wasn’t used.
The Thai government better start asking serious questions, but as usual they won’t, it will all be glossed over and the military “wish list” will get the nod, or at least most of it.
Thailand in crisis – Episode 2
findnut 13,
Regarding the “tightening of the noose” you speak of, I don’t think that the army acted recklessly. I live on Ratchwetii, the road that turns into Din Daeng, and my street along with Ratchaprop, were basically under martial law for several days, the “live fire zone.” Everyone was warned, everyone knew that you simply didn’t go out on those streets, especially at night or you were going to get hit. It was as simple as that. Especially Ratchaprarop, the road leading into the Ratchaprasong protest area. Soldiers would shoot at things to make their presence known and to send a message. Ratchweti was shut down after a mob had broken into Central 1 and several other buildings at Victory Monument. The army came in later in the evening and fired from a flyover after the government turned off the electricity in the area. It was classic mob control.
Perhaps it’s my background being a son of a career military man. When someone tells me, “Don’t go out there or you’re going to get shot,” I listen.
Anybody who got shot on Ratchaprarop (and most likely these other areas like Rama IV) were shot because they were taunting the soldiers. I personally lived through the crackdown on Ratchweti and I was there watching during the day the events on Ratchaprarop.
Of course when I speak of the restraint of the military I am speaking from a tactical point of view, not a political one. I wanted the red shirts to come to town and throw out the current government.
The simple fact is that Anupong was reluctant to get involved and from the outset he argued that this protest was a political issue not a military one. The military was patient, so patient that I have previously posted my suspicions that Anupong was directly subverting Abhisit.
The red shirts lost their initiative politically when they started spending too much time on investigating deaths when they could have done an end run around the government and claimed that the red shirt protesters AND the soldiers were victims of the system thus pitting the military against the government/monarchy. They could have asked the question of why, if the monarchy is supposed to be “above politics,” do we even have a “Royal Queen’s or King’s Guard”? The military serves the people not a family etc…
As for the Wat that was shot at, I simply don’t know. But from what I have seen firsthand I would not suspect military involvement. (And remember, I am not a supporter of the current government!!)
Darren Nelson:
I don’t need reporting/video from the news as I was my own correspondent in my own neighborhood and I knew more than most of these journalists who flew in for a few weeks. I speak intermediate Thai, I’ve lived here etc….We (and the red shirt leadership) needs to keep hammering away at the larger issues here in Thailand…
Thailand in crisis – Episode 2
Can I suggest to ANU, that during their next interview,they broadcast recovered vdo footage of “live fire zone” incidents and then ask for comments regarding military operations and its professionalism including”sniper” incidents,for I do not believe you will find Proffesor Ball saying that the military”acted by and large very profesionally” then repeat the question to Proffessor Des Ball.
Thailand in crisis – Episode 2
Dr Des Ball who has “regular contact” with top military and police personnel ommited to mention the “live fire zone” where numerous vdo’s has apparently shown goverment snipers taking pot-shots at unarmed protesters. he says the security forces “acted by and large very proffesionally” he would not critisise the crackdown.Again ommiting to acknowlege there should have been a political solution to this crisis.
Thailand in crisis – Episode 2
“Live fire zone” snipers I mean of course.
Thailand in crisis – Episode 2
Proffesor Des Ball ? have I missed something,or has Proffesor Ball missed something? Certainly this ANU broadcast must have missed something.MIB (Seh Daeng connection) yes all very probable…BUT HANG ON !! absolutely no mention of Goverment snipers. Amnesia or what?
Thailand in crisis – Episode 2
hi,
Thank you for the insightful discussion
I agree with Prof. Des that the casualties could been much higher. However, labeling that the army had been acting with professionalism does not convince me for the following reasons.
1. The 10th April incident was at best a debacle. Any professionals would have tried to avoid being in such place at night (small in number and encircled by sea of protesters). They should have knowed too well that armed element within the protesters existed (there had been misterious bombings 2 weeks before the incident in various places. Positioned themselves there was highly susceptible to attacks.
2 during the period of tightening the noose at various checkpoints(Bon Ki, Samheim Din Dang, Soi Ngam Du Plee etc), many innocents protesters and bystanders had been shot dead. All of them appeared to possess nothing more than slingshots and fire works. Vedio footages of various news agencies, pictures including that of Nick Nostitz seem to confirm that the soldiers had been given ordered to shoot whatever moving into the soldier line or behind the tires barricades. This is careless not professional dealing with protesters.
3 The killing at temple Pratum Vanaram was the clearest example against the case that the army had acted professionally. I don’t think that the top level army echelon order that. But it doesn’t seem to be a difficult job to give stick instrutions that civilians mustn’t be killed.
4. Last point, now evidence have emerged that on the army side, they also employed/worked with Men in Black as well. http://bit.ly/apzJUc show two sets of picutures both see gun men who didnot wear uniforms or wear black head scarf. They were obiviously in the same operation with the soldier. Are these things repersent professionalism?
It’s true that number of casualties could have risen much higher very easily. But this should not be taken to exonerate the reckless use of force at various points, much less appropiate to credit them with professionalism. In orther words, the number could have been even lower had they really acted professionally.
Thailand in crisis – Episode 2
Maratjp, interesting post.
Where’s the evidence that the people being referred to under the label Ronin really ‘have no lord or master’? Or is the term being used in the far broader sense implying no loyalty to the King? Maybe that’s just what we’d like to see? From what I saw, they didn’t strike me as a loose group of Thai James Deans – but that’s just what I saw. Is the terms use justified? Wouldn’t want to be applying false labels/descriptors to people. That’s the job of the government!
Thailand in crisis – Episode 2
thank you for Dr Maesers (sp ?) comments
v interesting summary of the Indonesian situation and extremely important observations regarding the out of control Thai military
as he said the Thai military are used by the elites in Thailand to maintain their power
an important art of Democracy is to keep the military forces accountable to the civilian elected government and to maintain their external role
in Thailand the military are not only a tool for forceful intervention but they are also embedded in the elites, major players in politics and legal and illegal businesses
the military are significant reasons for the unrest in the south of Thailand which to my mind really reflects the same dissatisfactions as expressed by the redshirts
remove the military from Thai internal affairs, the elites, politicians and the people will have to sit down and sort out their issues like human beings rather than some animals with guns and bombs repressing more civilised people attempting to live in normal human equality with each other
Thailand in crisis – Episode 2
Thanks ANU for this new series of commentaries.
I found resonance with Andrew’s comments in No.1 when he pointed out that 90% of Thais are not poor but then his analysis that the the main motivator of the Red Shirt movement is that apparently overwhelming Thai trait of ” I Char ” – jealousy, did surprise.
Considering the sickening TV culture it is no wonder.
However Andrew’s characterisation of Bangkok Thais having higher living standards of the rural folk makes me shudder.
Yes by Bangkok Post standards, when they celebrated a return to normal life in the metropolis with a picture of traffic jam, Andrew may be right.
But compared with lovely Canberra, with its easy bike riding, parks galore, fresh air and fair access to cultural activities, or rural Issan, Bangkok is plain Hell. Why does Andrew uphold Bangkok Post values?
Show No.2 Does raise some questions about how much one should believe when academics speak.
Des Ball appears to have many friends in the military in Thailand and his comments seem much less forthright than Marcus who works on Indonesian issues.
Des seems to think that 88 dead during the protests was not a problem. Certainly compared with one would expect from the Israeli military one would agree. But why did Nick the interviewer, not refer Des to the many New Mandala comments and reports about the military shooting, when it had not even tried conventional crowd control measures?
During the Suharto dictatorship I heard criticism of Australian academics who went soft on his human rights abuses and it seems to me we are seeing the same from Des. Only today a group of Thai lawyers filed a complaint, reported in the Bangkok Post believe it or not, about the heavy handedness of the military crackdown.
I found it interesting that Marcus, who not having to protect his cosy relationship with the Thai military, could be so forthright as to point out the similar effect the Thai King has on the polity with that of the former Indonesian dictator, and wishing for his early disappearance. No Long Live the King remark from Marcus.
On the other hand I would have found it interesting if Marcus had compared the ethnic make-up of the political elites in Thailand and Indonesia. To what extent has Indonesia benefited from the great massacres of Chinese after Suharto’s coup and how does the Chinese Thai political and commercial elite relate to the military & Royal elite factions ?
Maybe it is still not safe for an academic to raise these matters if his field is Indonesian politics?
Thailand in crisis – Episode 2
I find Des Ball’s comments very interesting, & it’s valuable to have analysis from someone who has done in-depth study of the military, militias and police over many years. Is there any chance of a more expansive post from him on NM?
Thailand in crisis – Episode 2
couple of points and questions regarding Des Balls commentary
firstly:
Des placed the Thai Border Patrol Police as an agency of the Thai Police whereas I had the impression that they are under the military command hierarchy. Notable on the Thai websites the BPP appears on both the military and police structures
Historically I understand (from the King Never Smiles and Vasit’s ? book the BPP owed their allegiance and perhaps were commanded by the Palace, perhaps this is still true and overrides any overt line of command
in much reporting and seems even in reality where now the Police are issuing arrest warrants and arresting redshirts that are being held by the army seems to me there is a deliberate obfuscation of military and police roles managed by the military for maintaining their action with impunity
secondly:
the CRES announced that snipers would be deployed with the troops for the purpose of “taking out terrorist elements”, and we assume these snipers would be from Lopburi.
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5g3j-vAVG1fg3kEfnogTiH8_4EXvwD9FLS0M00
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-security/2010/0513/Thai-PM-preps-snipers-police-to-seal-off-red-shirt-protest-site
also I have yet to see any evidence that the government/CRES/military command actually issued the snipers with rules of engagement that included how to identify terrorists, which explains why they seemed to free fire
and only two soldiers (1 airforce + Sae Daeng)) were killed, all the rest of the 80+ (growing because more are dying in hospital) were medicos, journalists, redshirt and non-redshirt civilians
so why does Des suggest the the snipers were likely associated with Sae Daeng (who was shot by a sniper) and the redshirts?
I have ordered a copy of Des book on the Ronins through the library service but think Des should research more deeply and justify his remarks in this case
Sondhi – return parliamentary powers to the king
Yes I understand what both of you are saying, Tarrin and Steve. It’s just so bloody infuriating to be forced into such infantile behaviors.
Thailand in crisis – ANU video series
Andrew Walker has some good points, but mere analysis of the events like a ‘play-by-play commentator’ rather than a ‘colour man’ doesn’t really educate or offer deeper insight into the political intrigue of Thaksin and The Monarchy.
I repeatedly read how Thaksin played the political game well, but nothing about the actual crippling effects of his policies on the rural people. The million baht village fund was essentially easy money for all the needy to access, but the program was administered without oversight. Of course micro-loan programs in Africa and India have been successful, but only when properly administered. This critical fact was, I believe, intentionally omitted by Thaksin for his own gain.
First, it bought a bunch of loyal followers who now knew about having money (read: Thaksin good) but little about unmanageable debt (read: Thaksin bad). In the end the Thai ‘s simply borrowed the money which the majority of them spent, unfortunately but highly predictably, quite foolishly.
For example, aside from a new scooter, almost all purchased a new cell phone. And the cellular industry was Thaksin’s forte, so it naturally worked most favourably for Thaksin’s personal interests in the communications business.
In the end, instead of the money going into proper development of farms or small/medium business ventures, the money was pissed away and left the majority of the rural borrowers twice as indebted today as when Thaksin became PM in 2001.
In short, Thaksin took the country out of the IMF crisis, which works to invite stable foreign investment, and put the Thai people into debt. He now has his cheap and compliant labour pool for his soon to appear, industry capitalist friends. This was evidenced by his opening the door via his ‘free trade’ negotiations with America and the Asean community, and his development of the transportation routes through Northern Thailand into Laos and China. And once one appreciates a Free Trade Agreement is no more than a ‘International Corporate Rights Agreement, Thaksinomics becomes astonishingly clear. Indebt the workers to spawn a docile labour pool which will work to enrich himself and his international, global cohorts.
Thaksin always left the people thinking there was hope, but hope doesn’t feed your children. And when Thaksin was ousted, Abhisit was the fall-guy for the demise of ‘hope’. Intriguingly, which Thaksin under-estimated, was the mere threat of ‘hope’ for the underclass butted heads with the Monarchy’s promotion of a ‘sufficiency economy’. In short, the people must know their place; ‘hope’ simply undercut the long-established political order and something had to be done. And it was.
So how about we get some ‘colour analysis’ of the politics rather than simply play-by-play?