I just saw this exciting new series of interviews on New Mandala, in collaboration with Prachatai, the first part already published in September, a very interesting interview with Puangthong R. Pawakapan, with a very accurate analyses.
There is however one point I somewhat disagree, or would like to expand on. In the interview Ajarn Puangthong states that the conspiracy that led to the coup started with the PDRC and that the military laid plans with the start of martial law, and that immediately soldiers entered villages.
I would maintain that the idea of this particular coup, including the period of 5 years of absolute rule with a careful managed opening of the political space under tight military control was born out of the 2009 Red Shirt uprising where the military realised that their previous strategy of having Abhisit as a compliant Prime Minister heading a Democrat Party government did not work out, in particular in terms of weakening TRT/PPP/PT support.
2010 only strengthened this resolve, and already immediately after the 2010 crackdown the military and ISOC has entered the villages to draw up blacklists of every single grassroots Red Shirt group and organisation.
Immediately after the 2011 elections the military/traditional elites began rebuilding their proxy street presence, since in the period after the 2010 crackdown their Yellow Shirt organisations collapsed in infighting, culminating in the rump PAD protesting against their erstwhile partners of the Democrat Party government.
The period of 2012/2013 saw the Democrat Party building a street movement, with clear military support, culminating in the logical conclusion of the PDRC, again with very clear military support (the majority of the leader’s body guards were active soldiers with special forces training, Navy Seals were in open support, etc, ISOC officers were not just in support of the PDRC, but already in the 2008 PAD protests ISOC officers were deeply involved).
The PDRC was not the beginning, it was just the start of the final execution stage of a plan hatched years in advance, a plan in which the street level was just one part, but in which so-called civil society, the bureaucracy and big business was elementary to be in line as well.
The seamless execution of the final coup – which actually the military wanted to avoid by forcing the elected government to step down itself – was only possible of this meticulous planning over years. Entering every village, and neutralising immediately every Red Shirt opposition and threat did not just happen in the few days of martial law, but was prepared for a long period.
But other than that, I really liked the interview, and find that it is well worth reading and watching.
Provocative, but we need to move along from the middle class reverberations of ’76 to the 2010 massacre of commoner protestors, not acknowledged (because, unlike middle class students, peasants obviously do not really matter.)
This is the heart of the matter:
“Since then a number of things have happened. Post-election analyses have indicated that unlike heady declarations in the immediate aftermath of GE14, Malay voters overall did not actually vote beyond their ethnic and religious boxes. Instead, while the non-Malay vote swung almost completely to the new regime, the Malays spread their support between the PAS and UMNO, with a number in the south accepting pro-Pakatan Harapan PAS offshoot Amanah and others in Kedah, for example, opting for Mahathir’s explicitly Malay-based Bersatu.”
And this too:
“Where can this disgruntlement go? I have seen that instead of embracing a new and openly inclusive Malaysia (notwithstanding constitutional statutes on the special position of Malays and Islam), the rural Malay poor are regressing deeper into ethno-religious boxes …
The picture I draw here may seem to be the polar opposite of the hope that still bubbles in urban centres post GE14. But the reality on rural Malay grounds is harsh. These voters just want to see that they get some kind of assistance, that their lives improve, and that they too can access the benefits marketed by the new government. As these continue to be seemingly out of their reach, the extent of the schisms that can grow out of fear and despair vary.”
I don’t see how these two new parties could collaborate, FF’s Thanathorn believes in the fully debunked ‘trickle down economics’ model and, when asked about corporate backers and their influence on FF’s policies, he said ‘They only have ONE vote, same as everyone else’. Seriously? The only thing these two parties have in common is that they are both anti military interventionism.
As has been noted elsewhere, the English “commoner” refers to anyone who is not royalty regardless of socio-economic status. Thanathorn is a commoner, as is, e.g. Gen. Prayut. “Samanchon”, สามัญชน, would better be translated “the common people”, and the party might be calld “The Common People’s Party” or “Party of the Common People”. Translating with either the adjectival “Commoner Party” or plural possessive “Commoners’ Party” may have unwanted connotations.
Nothing against this article generally, but I thought that New Mandala dealt with Southeast Asia, not South Asia as well. Therefore, it is a surprise to see this article on New Mandala. I hope New Mandala is not expanding to cover all of Asia.
I think that Rap Against Dictatorship may have made a mistake by closing the Comments forum. The song had gained enough publicity that it would have been very difficult for the government to arrest the singers. Since closing the Comments, the pace of viewing the song has slowed and I highly doubt that it will reach 400 million views now (despite what I wrote in the article). For Thailand’s democratic future it is imperative that the Computer Crimes Act is abolished and this song and its Comments forum were the best chance so far to make that happen. I only managed to save one of the comments which I reproduce here:
As you can see in this video, a man hung on the tree hit by another man and surrounding with smiling crowded, it was a real situation that happened in Thailand in the past. And, the lyrics that are sang in the song are the real situations that have been happening in Thailand for 4 years that are said about how suffered we have been through all these years.
We, the young generations of Thailand, have to admit that we don’t have any ways to fight with the military government except the social media. We have been facing to this shit for almost 5 years now. Actually, these kinds of situations has happened to Thailand for 13 times until now. And in my lifetime, a 23-year-old guy, I have been as a witness of these kinds of situations for 2 times in 2006 and in 2014. And I also have been a witness for seeing Thai red shirts and yellow shirts fought to each other for many times. What’s more is that I have seen Thai protesters protested for tons of times. We are tired of all these stupid things. We want to move on and make our country better in our generations. The rappers are the brave men, heroes, and representatives of us all. We all need to speak all those shitty things out loud, but we can’t. We speak the truths, we get busted. This is my country nowadays.
And, you know what? The government said all the rapper in the video might be busted. Moreover, they said that anyone who shares or posts this song on facebook might be busted too. What a tragic life! It is funny, isn’t it?
This video has no transcript or subtitles, even auto generated ones. Neither is it enabled for community contribution so anyone who wanted to provide subtitles is presumably blocked. In addition there is an annoying and misleading whine at the start accompanied by colored bars which can lead viewers to presume the video is unavailable.
This video is undoubtedly important and S E Asian audiences would benefit from viewing it. If these audiences cannot have their own language subtitles then at least English subtitles would be helpful. So it begs the question, who is it for? It is not enough to produce a video. The needs of the potential audience must be factored in to the production process.
Excellent article! It is a welcome change of perspectives in Thai academia and I look forward to reading Part 2…
As I have written elsewhere, Suvarnabhumi, just like the fabled Camelot, is located nowhere and therefore it can be found anywhere in the collective psyche…
A very interesting discussion. When do we get part 2? Perhaps two notes: ‘Eurocentric’ here includes Indian and Chinese narratives? And – for the Early Modern European ‘explorers’, the numinous lands of Gold and Silver constantly moved beyond the sphere of their discoveries … Mendana and Quiros constantly hoped to find them on the next shore visible from the masts of their ships in the Solomons; the Dutch eventually moved them into the sea East of Japan, and apparently gave them up after Quast/Tasman’s and de Vries’ voyages in the first half of 17th century … . The very expiration of the attempts to locate those fabled lands thus becomes an early marker of the rise of the idea of an Age of Enlightenment – and hence one of the sources for the ‘European’ claim for a monopoly on ‘scientific’ approaches … … …. .
One of the odd features of Jokowi’s approach to government is that his former chief of staff, Luhut Pandjaitan, seems empowered to talk on all kinds of issues unrelated to maritime affairs, which is the portfolio for which he is ostensibly the coordinating minister. It is therefore entirely forgivable that the distinguished author of this post should identify the ubiquitous Luhut as coordinating minister for politics, law and security, whereas it is the far less energetic Wiranto who occupies this post.
While it may be true that Indonesia’s democracy has shown its ‘resilience’, there have been some undemocratic trends for which Jokowi cannot be held responsible. One of these is the form of big party tyranny by which thresholds of either electoral votes received or parliamentary seats gained have worked effectively to restrict presidential elections to two candidates. This has been accentuated by the perhaps globally unique innovation that allows the results of parliamentary elections held four or five years earlier to be the base for measuring those thresholds. These trends have culminated in the Tweedledum versus Tweedledee contest now approaching.
That Wiranto should occupy any post in Jokowi’s government at all points to the likelihood that the president is indeed, as the author notes, ‘pro-military’ but not just because he has learned that state instruments are more effective in meeting political challenges. His appointment of former TNI commander Moeldoko as chief of staff suggests a strong urge in Jokowi, as yet unexplained, to be surrounded by people either in uniform or freshly out of one. Whereas General MacArthur thought that old soldiers ‘just fade away’, they have a more enviable lot in Jokowi’s Indonesia. His two oldest cabinet members, Luhut and Wiranto, are both septuagenarians.
[…] invoking widespread suspicion of election skullduggery. Accusations that Cambodia is now “a party with a country”, appear more apposite than ever, helped in part by continued irrigational mindsets by those […]
In Buddhist’s term he who encourages someone to kill someone is called ‘Alijji monk’ who is unashamed to do the forbidden things, that is against the principles laid down by the Buddha.
Most of our people don’t know much about true teachings of the Buddha and most monks hid or covered up the critical principles of the monks. For example, they are discouraged to meddle in mundane peoples’ affair; they are supposed to meditate most of their free time, but they don’t; they are forbidden to be prostrated by men unless they are already fully enlightened monks; they are forbidden to accept alms from people who are not their closed relatives unless they are fully enlightened; they are forbidden to keep or use money, but most of them have now credit cards and several amount of cash; they are forbidden to preach any sermon to mundane people unless they are fully enlightened and so on and so forth.
If a monk committed killing some one or ask some one to kill him, or to cause killed someone, then he is no longer regarded as a monk and must leave the Sangha or Buddhist Order immediately. This is one of the four most severe law, Parajica Vinaya. Therefore, Thitagu, if he said so as the article was written, then he, too, was no longer a monk and all the other monks duty is to dispel him from the Buddhist Order immediately. There is no exception at all.
Hari Kecik’s enhanced English Diary of a Student Soldier (in Indonesia, sold under Student Soldiers, in Monash U edition titled Revolution in the City of Heroes) will add to Chapter Seven of this ambitious book, taking readers into his life as a medical student first in Surabaya (Japanese closed the School) then Bogor (Vet School) and finally the strange, precarious existence as a privileged class of indentured body collectors for the Japanese as starvation and work-to-death practices increased.
Another reason that elite constitutionalism is unnecessary is that elites can accomplish the “constitutional” transformation by exercising their ordinary (legislative) power as elites. The difference is that they might think that doing it via constitutional changes will entrench the changes in the event they are displaced as legislatively dominant elites (but might remain able to thwart constitutional changes). But, the more significant the changes they entrench, the more likely it is that when they are displaced it will be through one or the other forms of popular constitution-making, and in the process of making a new constitution the things that were entrenched will be de-entrenched.
The first point to make about New Mandala podcasts which appear with increasing frequency is: please can transcripts be made available? Apologies if they are already there and I can’t find them.
The second point is that mention of the Lisu brings to mind that fantastic book by Hjorleifur Jonsson “Mien Relations – Mountain People and State Control in Thailand”
Interestingly this was a largely unsuccessful ploy as Umbu Neka did not succeed in becoming a candidate for the Central Sumba regent election. The election was won instead by a group rumoured to have paid sizeable sums to households in order to stay home on voting day and not attend the polls.
It is always so important to hold political leaders to account internationally for what they have said, as well as to stress the importance of the rule of law. In this case, it would clearly be helpful if Daw Aung San Suu Kyi could confirm publicly what General Ne Win said in 1982 about the transitional nature of “associate” citizenship, what Thein Sein said in July 2012 about the right to citizenship of the descendants of British era migrants, and Immigration Minister Khin Yi’s unconditional repetition in September 2012 of the “three generations” principle concerning the right to citizenship – see RFA report at https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/citizenship-09122012184130.html .
I have already made it crystal clear in my Chapter on citizenship in the recently published collection of essays by Ashley Smith and Marie Lall that problems have arisen not because of the 1982 Law, but because of the lamentable failure to apply its provisions e.g. by confirming under Article 6 the citizenship of all those in Rakhine State who held citizenship prior to the Law.
I am delighted that Mr Galache seems to share my views in this context. I am at the same time grateful for his solicitous concern about my mental and physical well-being, and would assure him that our lively exchanges are most therapeutic.
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Thailand Unsettled #1: The Military (with Puangthong Pawakapan)
A post i just made on my Facebook page:
I just saw this exciting new series of interviews on New Mandala, in collaboration with Prachatai, the first part already published in September, a very interesting interview with Puangthong R. Pawakapan, with a very accurate analyses.
There is however one point I somewhat disagree, or would like to expand on. In the interview Ajarn Puangthong states that the conspiracy that led to the coup started with the PDRC and that the military laid plans with the start of martial law, and that immediately soldiers entered villages.
I would maintain that the idea of this particular coup, including the period of 5 years of absolute rule with a careful managed opening of the political space under tight military control was born out of the 2009 Red Shirt uprising where the military realised that their previous strategy of having Abhisit as a compliant Prime Minister heading a Democrat Party government did not work out, in particular in terms of weakening TRT/PPP/PT support.
2010 only strengthened this resolve, and already immediately after the 2010 crackdown the military and ISOC has entered the villages to draw up blacklists of every single grassroots Red Shirt group and organisation.
Immediately after the 2011 elections the military/traditional elites began rebuilding their proxy street presence, since in the period after the 2010 crackdown their Yellow Shirt organisations collapsed in infighting, culminating in the rump PAD protesting against their erstwhile partners of the Democrat Party government.
The period of 2012/2013 saw the Democrat Party building a street movement, with clear military support, culminating in the logical conclusion of the PDRC, again with very clear military support (the majority of the leader’s body guards were active soldiers with special forces training, Navy Seals were in open support, etc, ISOC officers were not just in support of the PDRC, but already in the 2008 PAD protests ISOC officers were deeply involved).
The PDRC was not the beginning, it was just the start of the final execution stage of a plan hatched years in advance, a plan in which the street level was just one part, but in which so-called civil society, the bureaucracy and big business was elementary to be in line as well.
The seamless execution of the final coup – which actually the military wanted to avoid by forcing the elected government to step down itself – was only possible of this meticulous planning over years. Entering every village, and neutralising immediately every Red Shirt opposition and threat did not just happen in the few days of martial law, but was prepared for a long period.
But other than that, I really liked the interview, and find that it is well worth reading and watching.
Death by sewage: clean-ups, caste and contracts in India
Hi Ian—as we mentioned here (https://www.newmandala.org/welcoming-near-west-to-new-mandala/), NM will be guest hosting Near West during India’s election year. Certainly no plans at all to go Asia-wide. Best, Liam (the editor)
Thai political rap before it went viral
Provocative, but we need to move along from the middle class reverberations of ’76 to the 2010 massacre of commoner protestors, not acknowledged (because, unlike middle class students, peasants obviously do not really matter.)
Rebellion and regret: talking to rural voters after GE14
A very astute analysis!
This is the heart of the matter:
“Since then a number of things have happened. Post-election analyses have indicated that unlike heady declarations in the immediate aftermath of GE14, Malay voters overall did not actually vote beyond their ethnic and religious boxes. Instead, while the non-Malay vote swung almost completely to the new regime, the Malays spread their support between the PAS and UMNO, with a number in the south accepting pro-Pakatan Harapan PAS offshoot Amanah and others in Kedah, for example, opting for Mahathir’s explicitly Malay-based Bersatu.”
And this too:
“Where can this disgruntlement go? I have seen that instead of embracing a new and openly inclusive Malaysia (notwithstanding constitutional statutes on the special position of Malays and Islam), the rural Malay poor are regressing deeper into ethno-religious boxes …
The picture I draw here may seem to be the polar opposite of the hope that still bubbles in urban centres post GE14. But the reality on rural Malay grounds is harsh. These voters just want to see that they get some kind of assistance, that their lives improve, and that they too can access the benefits marketed by the new government. As these continue to be seemingly out of their reach, the extent of the schisms that can grow out of fear and despair vary.”
Thailand’s new left-wing political parties: rivals or allies?
I don’t see how these two new parties could collaborate, FF’s Thanathorn believes in the fully debunked ‘trickle down economics’ model and, when asked about corporate backers and their influence on FF’s policies, he said ‘They only have ONE vote, same as everyone else’. Seriously? The only thing these two parties have in common is that they are both anti military interventionism.
Thailand’s new left-wing political parties: rivals or allies?
As has been noted elsewhere, the English “commoner” refers to anyone who is not royalty regardless of socio-economic status. Thanathorn is a commoner, as is, e.g. Gen. Prayut. “Samanchon”, สามัญชน, would better be translated “the common people”, and the party might be calld “The Common People’s Party” or “Party of the Common People”. Translating with either the adjectival “Commoner Party” or plural possessive “Commoners’ Party” may have unwanted connotations.
Death by sewage: clean-ups, caste and contracts in India
Nothing against this article generally, but I thought that New Mandala dealt with Southeast Asia, not South Asia as well. Therefore, it is a surprise to see this article on New Mandala. I hope New Mandala is not expanding to cover all of Asia.
Thailand’s Rap Against Dictatorship
I think that Rap Against Dictatorship may have made a mistake by closing the Comments forum. The song had gained enough publicity that it would have been very difficult for the government to arrest the singers. Since closing the Comments, the pace of viewing the song has slowed and I highly doubt that it will reach 400 million views now (despite what I wrote in the article). For Thailand’s democratic future it is imperative that the Computer Crimes Act is abolished and this song and its Comments forum were the best chance so far to make that happen. I only managed to save one of the comments which I reproduce here:
สารถึงชาวต่างชาติเกี่ยวกับบทเพลงและสิ่งที่เป็นอยู่ของประเทศ
Dear, foreigners
As you can see in this video, a man hung on the tree hit by another man and surrounding with smiling crowded, it was a real situation that happened in Thailand in the past. And, the lyrics that are sang in the song are the real situations that have been happening in Thailand for 4 years that are said about how suffered we have been through all these years.
We, the young generations of Thailand, have to admit that we don’t have any ways to fight with the military government except the social media. We have been facing to this shit for almost 5 years now. Actually, these kinds of situations has happened to Thailand for 13 times until now. And in my lifetime, a 23-year-old guy, I have been as a witness of these kinds of situations for 2 times in 2006 and in 2014. And I also have been a witness for seeing Thai red shirts and yellow shirts fought to each other for many times. What’s more is that I have seen Thai protesters protested for tons of times. We are tired of all these stupid things. We want to move on and make our country better in our generations. The rappers are the brave men, heroes, and representatives of us all. We all need to speak all those shitty things out loud, but we can’t. We speak the truths, we get busted. This is my country nowadays.
And, you know what? The government said all the rapper in the video might be busted. Moreover, they said that anyone who shares or posts this song on facebook might be busted too. What a tragic life! It is funny, isn’t it?
Film review: ‘Asimetris’
This video has no transcript or subtitles, even auto generated ones. Neither is it enabled for community contribution so anyone who wanted to provide subtitles is presumably blocked. In addition there is an annoying and misleading whine at the start accompanied by colored bars which can lead viewers to presume the video is unavailable.
This video is undoubtedly important and S E Asian audiences would benefit from viewing it. If these audiences cannot have their own language subtitles then at least English subtitles would be helpful. So it begs the question, who is it for? It is not enough to produce a video. The needs of the potential audience must be factored in to the production process.
Lost in literature: why we need to stop the quest for Suvarnabhumi [Part 1]
Excellent article! It is a welcome change of perspectives in Thai academia and I look forward to reading Part 2…
As I have written elsewhere, Suvarnabhumi, just like the fabled Camelot, is located nowhere and therefore it can be found anywhere in the collective psyche…
See also:
https://www.academia.edu/37344187/Facts_and_Fiction_The_Myth_of_Suvannabhumi_through_the_Thai_and_Burmese_Looking_Glass
Lost in literature: why we need to stop the quest for Suvarnabhumi [Part 1]
A very interesting discussion. When do we get part 2? Perhaps two notes: ‘Eurocentric’ here includes Indian and Chinese narratives? And – for the Early Modern European ‘explorers’, the numinous lands of Gold and Silver constantly moved beyond the sphere of their discoveries … Mendana and Quiros constantly hoped to find them on the next shore visible from the masts of their ships in the Solomons; the Dutch eventually moved them into the sea East of Japan, and apparently gave them up after Quast/Tasman’s and de Vries’ voyages in the first half of 17th century … . The very expiration of the attempts to locate those fabled lands thus becomes an early marker of the rise of the idea of an Age of Enlightenment – and hence one of the sources for the ‘European’ claim for a monopoly on ‘scientific’ approaches … … …. .
Jokowi’s authoritarian turn
One of the odd features of Jokowi’s approach to government is that his former chief of staff, Luhut Pandjaitan, seems empowered to talk on all kinds of issues unrelated to maritime affairs, which is the portfolio for which he is ostensibly the coordinating minister. It is therefore entirely forgivable that the distinguished author of this post should identify the ubiquitous Luhut as coordinating minister for politics, law and security, whereas it is the far less energetic Wiranto who occupies this post.
While it may be true that Indonesia’s democracy has shown its ‘resilience’, there have been some undemocratic trends for which Jokowi cannot be held responsible. One of these is the form of big party tyranny by which thresholds of either electoral votes received or parliamentary seats gained have worked effectively to restrict presidential elections to two candidates. This has been accentuated by the perhaps globally unique innovation that allows the results of parliamentary elections held four or five years earlier to be the base for measuring those thresholds. These trends have culminated in the Tweedledum versus Tweedledee contest now approaching.
That Wiranto should occupy any post in Jokowi’s government at all points to the likelihood that the president is indeed, as the author notes, ‘pro-military’ but not just because he has learned that state instruments are more effective in meeting political challenges. His appointment of former TNI commander Moeldoko as chief of staff suggests a strong urge in Jokowi, as yet unexplained, to be surrounded by people either in uniform or freshly out of one. Whereas General MacArthur thought that old soldiers ‘just fade away’, they have a more enviable lot in Jokowi’s Indonesia. His two oldest cabinet members, Luhut and Wiranto, are both septuagenarians.
Cambodia, a party with a country
[…] invoking widespread suspicion of election skullduggery. Accusations that Cambodia is now “a party with a country”, appear more apposite than ever, helped in part by continued irrigational mindsets by those […]
Sitagu Sayadaw and justifiable evils in Buddhism
Dear Hart,
In Buddhist’s term he who encourages someone to kill someone is called ‘Alijji monk’ who is unashamed to do the forbidden things, that is against the principles laid down by the Buddha.
Most of our people don’t know much about true teachings of the Buddha and most monks hid or covered up the critical principles of the monks. For example, they are discouraged to meddle in mundane peoples’ affair; they are supposed to meditate most of their free time, but they don’t; they are forbidden to be prostrated by men unless they are already fully enlightened monks; they are forbidden to accept alms from people who are not their closed relatives unless they are fully enlightened; they are forbidden to keep or use money, but most of them have now credit cards and several amount of cash; they are forbidden to preach any sermon to mundane people unless they are fully enlightened and so on and so forth.
If a monk committed killing some one or ask some one to kill him, or to cause killed someone, then he is no longer regarded as a monk and must leave the Sangha or Buddhist Order immediately. This is one of the four most severe law, Parajica Vinaya. Therefore, Thitagu, if he said so as the article was written, then he, too, was no longer a monk and all the other monks duty is to dispel him from the Buddhist Order immediately. There is no exception at all.
Review of ‘Nurturing Indonesia: Medicine and Decolonisation in the Dutch East Indies’
Hari Kecik’s enhanced English Diary of a Student Soldier (in Indonesia, sold under Student Soldiers, in Monash U edition titled Revolution in the City of Heroes) will add to Chapter Seven of this ambitious book, taking readers into his life as a medical student first in Surabaya (Japanese closed the School) then Bogor (Vet School) and finally the strange, precarious existence as a privileged class of indentured body collectors for the Japanese as starvation and work-to-death practices increased.
Wielding the purse strings of Southeast Asian civil society
Thank you very much and for sure look forward to discuss further with you on NGO practices and related topics.
The worst kind of charter change
Professor Mark Tushnet’s response to my essay:
Another reason that elite constitutionalism is unnecessary is that elites can accomplish the “constitutional” transformation by exercising their ordinary (legislative) power as elites. The difference is that they might think that doing it via constitutional changes will entrench the changes in the event they are displaced as legislatively dominant elites (but might remain able to thwart constitutional changes). But, the more significant the changes they entrench, the more likely it is that when they are displaced it will be through one or the other forms of popular constitution-making, and in the process of making a new constitution the things that were entrenched will be de-entrenched.
The Lisu: Far from the Ruler
The first point to make about New Mandala podcasts which appear with increasing frequency is: please can transcripts be made available? Apologies if they are already there and I can’t find them.
The second point is that mention of the Lisu brings to mind that fantastic book by Hjorleifur Jonsson “Mien Relations – Mountain People and State Control in Thailand”
Stone dragging and politics in Sumba
Interestingly this was a largely unsuccessful ploy as Umbu Neka did not succeed in becoming a candidate for the Central Sumba regent election. The election was won instead by a group rumoured to have paid sizeable sums to households in order to stay home on voting day and not attend the polls.
‘Illegal migration’ in Arakan: myths and numbers
It is always so important to hold political leaders to account internationally for what they have said, as well as to stress the importance of the rule of law. In this case, it would clearly be helpful if Daw Aung San Suu Kyi could confirm publicly what General Ne Win said in 1982 about the transitional nature of “associate” citizenship, what Thein Sein said in July 2012 about the right to citizenship of the descendants of British era migrants, and Immigration Minister Khin Yi’s unconditional repetition in September 2012 of the “three generations” principle concerning the right to citizenship – see RFA report at https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/citizenship-09122012184130.html .
I have already made it crystal clear in my Chapter on citizenship in the recently published collection of essays by Ashley Smith and Marie Lall that problems have arisen not because of the 1982 Law, but because of the lamentable failure to apply its provisions e.g. by confirming under Article 6 the citizenship of all those in Rakhine State who held citizenship prior to the Law.
I am delighted that Mr Galache seems to share my views in this context. I am at the same time grateful for his solicitous concern about my mental and physical well-being, and would assure him that our lively exchanges are most therapeutic.