As the author of this article I would like to advise that that in its original form it contained factual errors regarding the specific size of QAGOMA’s holdings of Indonesian contemporary art and the total number of Indonesian artists represented in Australian public galleries. These errors arose from the good-faith use of third-party data that I did not properly verify. I apologise for any confusion created and the editors have removed the incorrect information from the article.
You should re-check again your data. I think TGB was already in the horizon of KPK investigation on 2012, and then strengthened by CSO’s campaign in NTB on 2017. TGB’s closeness to Jokowi was started in 2016 during Jokowi’s visit to Mataram. TGB himself claimed, since then he supported Jokowi for second round. This is also reported by local media in Mataram. But you seem to pick and choose the information as you claimed TGB announced his political support to Jokowi on the mid-2018. The investigation to go after the corruption case of newmont divestment was massively run after mid-2018, where TGB was investigated by KPK. My question is why would the investigation take place after TGB announce his support to Jokowi. It seems to me you are on a contradiction in your own claim that legal instruments are being used by Jokowi to suppress opposition.
Grealy makes excellent points about the CVE-isation of development programs in Indonesia. Reducing poverty and countering violent extremism and critically important and not directly linked. I have been exploring links between religion and violence in Indonesia for more than a decade. Over the years several points have become clear.
The first is that there is not a causal relationship between theology and violence. There are pacifist as well as violent Salafis. There are violent sectarian groups, including the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), that are rooted in traditionalist, Sufi theologies. This is true not only in Indonesia, but also in West Africa and Europe.
The second is that notion that increased piety can be associated with violent tendencies proposed by some western analysts is nonsense.
The third is that therein no doubt that Saudi Arabia promotes sectarian hatred, especially of Shia and Ahmadiyah Muslims. Saudi supported schools and publications spread lies about the Shia, including that the have a different Qur’an from Sunni Muslims, that Shia Islam was founded by Jews to sow seeds of discord among Muslims and that the Shia value temporary marriage more than prayer and fasting.
The prominent Saudi cleric Nasser al-Omar who has nearly two million followers on Twitter has called for genocide and sexual violence against the Shia. He writes:
“Shia have only two options, they can convert to ‘Islam’ or be killed if they decided to keep their beliefs…First slaughter all their men. Slaughter Shia until there are rivers of their blood. Second, capture their females. If they are virgins let the best Mujahedeen (jihad fighters) enjoy them [sexually]. If they are not virgins but are beautiful, reserve for the rest of the mujahedeen. The rest of the females can be given to the rest of the men. The last group are Shia children. Capture them and teach them true Islam and train them to be soldiers so we can use them in wars. Burn all of their shrines and mosques to the ground.”
The Saudi Kingdom, individual donors and NGOs have spent untold sums to spread this sort of hatred. I have seen them arrive at conferences in Indonesia with suitcases filled with US $100 bills to dispense to those with “special projects.” Most Indonesian Salafis do not share these views. Many find them to be repulsive. Still, “money talks.” Saudi money and hate speech have clearly contributed to the rise of sectarianism in Indonesia.
I’ve worked for over three decades as a Wellsite geologist. There is NO need for Orient to site their drilling rig in that location. For a comparatively modest additional outlay they can site elsewhere and drill directionally to their desired target.
If that is too much for their miserly fingers to handle they can adjust to lesser preferred targets. Every drilling project will have a portfolio of feasible objectives (and locations) for ‘unforeseen’ factors such as this.
Come on Orient, show a bit of community spirit and cultural patriotism to the country you’re operating in.
Fair enough! I think of “royalists” as a loose bunch of interconnected groups—”good people” like Prawase, Anand, Meechai, etc., radical fringe groups (the “trash collectors”), Sirindhorn loyalists, etc. But it’s unclear what a figure like Prawase, for instance, would say about a figure like Ubolratana. I agree that one should not assume that Meechai, for instance, would be pro-Ubolratana just because she’s royal. I hope I didn’t give that impression too much…Indeed, we can see in the enthusiasm for Sirindhorn (as opposed to others) just such an inconsistency!
I wonder if the author mistakenly conflates “monarchy” and “monarchists”. Thongchai, for example, is always very careful to distinguish royalists or monarchists (those whose livelihoods, status, ideologies depend on the monarchy) from the royals/monarch themselves. If this is correct, then it’s not clear that “fragmentation” among the royals (which of course is nothing new at all—new perhaps is simply its public airing) corresponds to fragmentation or weakening of those who depend on them.
I’d thought the PAP was organised as a Leninist party. In that sense, it may well be the political success of a Leninist party that held the interest of China. Singaporeans do like the notion that it was their state that Deng used as an example. They lap up Vogel’s lectures every time he shows up and PAP leaders bask in his praise. This seems to say more about Singapore than China.
The most worrying, in the short term is that which Leloy in this article, and other Filipino scholars such as Cleve Arguelles have argued the battles of EDSA/People Power 1 (1986) continue. The sad part of this is the cleavage between a part of the middle class, liberal and progressive, remains divorced from the lower middle class and underclass support base of Duterte. The language of human rights and democracy may resonate with the former, but I am not sure with those in the slums of Manila even if Duterte is literally having them killed in his “War on Drugs” – (Question at what point does Drugs announce it has accepted to surrender?).
Given that the EDSA revolution made in the name of the people – but not by the people – has not led to a degree of economic democracy and improved their lot, what alternative exists for them to turn to?
The survey this article is based on does not measure religious tolerance. It measures responses to statements about Christians. It is not surprising that provinces with large Christian populations emerged as more tolerant than others. The survey do not assess attitudes about Muslims among Hindus, Buddhist, Christians and other. Nor does it measure attitudes about Hindus. It does not ask for responses to generic statements such as: “I would be opposed if people of another faith built a house of worship in my neighbourhood.”
Assuming a majority of Muslim respondents, it reveals nothing about intra-Islamic tolerance.
The research design problems are such that it actually reveals very little about religious tolerance in Indonesia.
Very interesting pair of articles (including part 1). This part in particular gets a lot of value out of some quantitative methodological approaches.
A couple of questions, which result in a comment:
In the word category table, how can it be that “Islam” is not one of the categories if this is what is being investigated?
In part 1 the Tunisian Ghannouchi is mentioned, and here the concept of wasatiyyah — is there any evidence of the MILF themselves citing these?
the comment is a hermeneutical one — that it is best to be very clear in tracing the links between the observer/analyst frame of meaning and that of the subject of study. How are the concepts of the actor/group connected to our concepts?
Thanks for the correction and insightful comments. For anyone who wants to read more about Patiwat, the activist and artist mentioned above, there is an excellent feature article on him in The Isaan Record.
I think there would be benefit in a deeper review/analysis just of Apichatpong’s contribution to Ten Years Thailand alone, saying as it’s so packed with meaning and references (which aren’t always clear to the average viewer).
A few comments on Apichatpong’s contribution: He was actually born in Bangkok but grew up in Khon Kaen. The background sound is most likely coming from the Anuban Khon Kaen School located next to the park, the morning salute to the national flag. The actor playing the mo lam singer is Patiwat Saraiyaem, a Khon Kaen-based activist and artist who was imprisoned for lése-majesté in 2015. The sleeping machine seems like reference to Apichatpong’s last feature film Cemetery of Splendour (รักที่ขอนแก่น) which also shows scenes of construction work in Khon Kaen.
Thank you so much for your kind words and very helpful suggestions to our study. As you can probably tell, this project is still in its early stages and had difficulty finding data sets. We will definitely consider these sources in updating our study. Would it be alright to ask for your email so we may keep in touch regarding this project?
Thank you for your comment. While we appreciate your remark on nuance and recognize the greater complexity of both Thai and Burmese societies, would you please elaborate on the basis of your statistics of your counterpoint?
Thank you very much for your clarifications on the Thailand case. We did find this misrepresentation initially curious in our data but could not find a more definitive source on Thailand’s ethnic demography. Perhaps it is a part of the politically motivated state discourse, as you have pointed out. Mark Woodward already kindly provided some alternative sources. Would you know other data sets or books that can more accurately characterize ethnicity in Thai Society. This is merely a summarized version of our work and did not have a lot of room for more nuance. Rest assured, we will definitely take your comments into account. Thank you again for your attention to our work
Thank you very much for your clarifications on the Thailand case. We did find this misrepresentation initially curious in our data but could not find a more definitive source on Thailand’s ethnic demography. Perhaps it is a part of the politically motivated state discourse, as you have pointed out. Mark Woodward already kindly provided some alternative sources. Would you know other data sets or books that can more accurately characterize ethnicity in Thai Society. This is merely a summarized version of our full work and did not have alot of room for more nuance. Rest assured, we will definitely take your comments into account. Thank you again for your attention to our work.
Generally speaking this is a solid analysis. It is, however, not without problems. It understates ethnic diversity in most all countries. The CIA World Fact Book is not a very good source. While compiled decades ago, Lebar, Hickey and Musgrave Ethnic Groups of Mainland Southeast Asia and Lebar, Ethnic Groups of Insular Southeast Asia, both Yale, Human Relations Area Files Press, are much more accurate and complete. The authors also conflate religious and ethnic minorities. They understate the range of discriminatory policies and the groups victimised by them in nearly all countries. The authors should consult the Minorities at Risk data set http://www.mar.umd.edu/mar_data.asp If the authors fix these data problems and rerun the analysis the results should be more interesting and more accurate.
This article lacks credibility when the table of ethnicities is published. Firstly, it’s incorrect to suggest that Thailand is 97.5% ethnically Thai. There are large minorities of Chinese, Khmer, Mon – and of course Malay – the latter usually estimated at around 4% of the population and dominant in the deep south. (Ironically the second table talks about conflict with the Malay minority, even though they’re not mentioned in the first table.) Secondly, it seems very odd that 24% of Brunei’s population are lumped together as ‘other’.
(I should add that I live in Thailand, and am studying Muslim minorities in SEA so I have some basis for this comment.)
Anyone familiar with Thailand should know that there are a great many ethnic minorities here, each with a distinct language. Ethnic “Thais” constitute far less than 97.5% of the population–depending, of course on how ethnicity is defined. The Thai state simply lumps most everyone under the “Thai” label–which itself may support forms of discrimination.
In other words, the data on which this study is based is seriously flawed in at least this one case, and its conclusions likely skewed overall. Take this as a first stab at introducing an important topic in need of a more fine-grained treatment.
I just made following comment on my facebook page:
In Part 2 of New Mandala’s/Prachatai’s series of Thailand Unsettled is a very interesting interview with UDD chairman Jaruporn Prompan and ex-PAD leader Suriyasai Katasila.
Jatuporn is correct in saying that reconciliation needs justice, and on that issue we are far away from it.
Suriyasai is taking the talk. But part of his talk smells of dishonesty. He says that he thinks constantly about the history. But he does not mention the clear military involvement in PAD and PDRC on all levels.
He also talks about the difficulties in maintaining control over protesters, propagating the myth of the suppsed “Great Mass of the People”.
One example he cites is that the PDRC protests could have gotten out of hand with rioting in case Suthep would have given himself up to the authorties. Reality is, that apart from a few single days in which the PDRC brought a truly impressive mass of people to the streets, most of the time a very small number of PDRC protesters maintained their positions, especially during the so-called Bangkok shutdown, and any rioting would have been able to be contained by the authorities, especially if the active soldiers under their guards and protesters would have been ordered to withdraw their support. But obviously that is not exactly what all this was about…
He cites another exampe, of the 2008 airport occupation, that this was supposedly somehow unplanned, and a reaction by the masses.
This is plain wrong, simple as that. Maybe he was not informed, which I very much doubt, given his high rank in the PAD at the time.
Very shortly after the judicial overthrow of the elected government, I have had the opportunity to speak with a deep cover Special Branch operative (not simply a source, but a Special Branch officer) who was assigned to infiltrate the PAD’s Naclop Srivichai (which in itself had many active military officers under its ranks), and who got the intel that the airport occupation was planned. He relayed this intel to his superiors, who relayed it further. But somewhere along the lines this intel was lost/ignored, and nothing was done to prevent the occupation.
Furthermore, the elected government ordered to disperse the PAD protests at the airport, and combined police/military forces were already preparing. However, somewhere and somehow that order was interfered with at the last minute, and nothing happened.
All this information has been corroborated to me independently by several sources.
This was clearly not “a case of the masses rebelling on their own accord”, but part of the same old strategy of military and traditional elites destabilising an elected government through orchestrated street protest movements, in order to justify taking over power.
Reconciliation does not just need justice, it also needs honesty.
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A looming Australian boom in Indonesian contemporary art?
As the author of this article I would like to advise that that in its original form it contained factual errors regarding the specific size of QAGOMA’s holdings of Indonesian contemporary art and the total number of Indonesian artists represented in Australian public galleries. These errors arose from the good-faith use of third-party data that I did not properly verify. I apologise for any confusion created and the editors have removed the incorrect information from the article.
Jokowi’s authoritarian turn
You should re-check again your data. I think TGB was already in the horizon of KPK investigation on 2012, and then strengthened by CSO’s campaign in NTB on 2017. TGB’s closeness to Jokowi was started in 2016 during Jokowi’s visit to Mataram. TGB himself claimed, since then he supported Jokowi for second round. This is also reported by local media in Mataram. But you seem to pick and choose the information as you claimed TGB announced his political support to Jokowi on the mid-2018. The investigation to go after the corruption case of newmont divestment was massively run after mid-2018, where TGB was investigated by KPK. My question is why would the investigation take place after TGB announce his support to Jokowi. It seems to me you are on a contradiction in your own claim that legal instruments are being used by Jokowi to suppress opposition.
Challenges to Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia
Grealy makes excellent points about the CVE-isation of development programs in Indonesia. Reducing poverty and countering violent extremism and critically important and not directly linked. I have been exploring links between religion and violence in Indonesia for more than a decade. Over the years several points have become clear.
The first is that there is not a causal relationship between theology and violence. There are pacifist as well as violent Salafis. There are violent sectarian groups, including the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), that are rooted in traditionalist, Sufi theologies. This is true not only in Indonesia, but also in West Africa and Europe.
The second is that notion that increased piety can be associated with violent tendencies proposed by some western analysts is nonsense.
The third is that therein no doubt that Saudi Arabia promotes sectarian hatred, especially of Shia and Ahmadiyah Muslims. Saudi supported schools and publications spread lies about the Shia, including that the have a different Qur’an from Sunni Muslims, that Shia Islam was founded by Jews to sow seeds of discord among Muslims and that the Shia value temporary marriage more than prayer and fasting.
The prominent Saudi cleric Nasser al-Omar who has nearly two million followers on Twitter has called for genocide and sexual violence against the Shia. He writes:
“Shia have only two options, they can convert to ‘Islam’ or be killed if they decided to keep their beliefs…First slaughter all their men. Slaughter Shia until there are rivers of their blood. Second, capture their females. If they are virgins let the best Mujahedeen (jihad fighters) enjoy them [sexually]. If they are not virgins but are beautiful, reserve for the rest of the mujahedeen. The rest of the females can be given to the rest of the men. The last group are Shia children. Capture them and teach them true Islam and train them to be soldiers so we can use them in wars. Burn all of their shrines and mosques to the ground.”
The Saudi Kingdom, individual donors and NGOs have spent untold sums to spread this sort of hatred. I have seen them arrive at conferences in Indonesia with suitcases filled with US $100 bills to dispense to those with “special projects.” Most Indonesian Salafis do not share these views. Many find them to be repulsive. Still, “money talks.” Saudi money and hate speech have clearly contributed to the rise of sectarianism in Indonesia.
Will oil hunters destroy Thailand’s biggest ancient city?
I’ve worked for over three decades as a Wellsite geologist. There is NO need for Orient to site their drilling rig in that location. For a comparatively modest additional outlay they can site elsewhere and drill directionally to their desired target.
If that is too much for their miserly fingers to handle they can adjust to lesser preferred targets. Every drilling project will have a portfolio of feasible objectives (and locations) for ‘unforeseen’ factors such as this.
Come on Orient, show a bit of community spirit and cultural patriotism to the country you’re operating in.
New networks in Thai royal politics
Fair enough! I think of “royalists” as a loose bunch of interconnected groups—”good people” like Prawase, Anand, Meechai, etc., radical fringe groups (the “trash collectors”), Sirindhorn loyalists, etc. But it’s unclear what a figure like Prawase, for instance, would say about a figure like Ubolratana. I agree that one should not assume that Meechai, for instance, would be pro-Ubolratana just because she’s royal. I hope I didn’t give that impression too much…Indeed, we can see in the enthusiasm for Sirindhorn (as opposed to others) just such an inconsistency!
Thanks for the comment!
New networks in Thai royal politics
I wonder if the author mistakenly conflates “monarchy” and “monarchists”. Thongchai, for example, is always very careful to distinguish royalists or monarchists (those whose livelihoods, status, ideologies depend on the monarchy) from the royals/monarch themselves. If this is correct, then it’s not clear that “fragmentation” among the royals (which of course is nothing new at all—new perhaps is simply its public airing) corresponds to fragmentation or weakening of those who depend on them.
How Deng and his heirs misunderstood Singapore
I’d thought the PAP was organised as a Leninist party. In that sense, it may well be the political success of a Leninist party that held the interest of China. Singaporeans do like the notion that it was their state that Deng used as an example. They lap up Vogel’s lectures every time he shows up and PAP leaders bask in his praise. This seems to say more about Singapore than China.
Did Duterte change the rules of Philippine elections?
Thanks for this nuanced appreciation of the situation in the Philippines.
It is certainly less optimistic that my own hasty interpretation of the subject:
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/01/16/the-beginning-of-the-end-for-duterte/#more-164903
(Caveat: Sometimes one takes desires for reality.
The most worrying, in the short term is that which Leloy in this article, and other Filipino scholars such as Cleve Arguelles have argued the battles of EDSA/People Power 1 (1986) continue. The sad part of this is the cleavage between a part of the middle class, liberal and progressive, remains divorced from the lower middle class and underclass support base of Duterte. The language of human rights and democracy may resonate with the former, but I am not sure with those in the slums of Manila even if Duterte is literally having them killed in his “War on Drugs” – (Question at what point does Drugs announce it has accepted to surrender?).
Given that the EDSA revolution made in the name of the people – but not by the people – has not led to a degree of economic democracy and improved their lot, what alternative exists for them to turn to?
Measuring religious intolerance across Indonesian provinces
The survey this article is based on does not measure religious tolerance. It measures responses to statements about Christians. It is not surprising that provinces with large Christian populations emerged as more tolerant than others. The survey do not assess attitudes about Muslims among Hindus, Buddhist, Christians and other. Nor does it measure attitudes about Hindus. It does not ask for responses to generic statements such as: “I would be opposed if people of another faith built a house of worship in my neighbourhood.”
Assuming a majority of Muslim respondents, it reveals nothing about intra-Islamic tolerance.
The research design problems are such that it actually reveals very little about religious tolerance in Indonesia.
Enjoining moderation: the online self-presentations of the MILF [Part II]
Very interesting pair of articles (including part 1). This part in particular gets a lot of value out of some quantitative methodological approaches.
A couple of questions, which result in a comment:
In the word category table, how can it be that “Islam” is not one of the categories if this is what is being investigated?
In part 1 the Tunisian Ghannouchi is mentioned, and here the concept of wasatiyyah — is there any evidence of the MILF themselves citing these?
the comment is a hermeneutical one — that it is best to be very clear in tracing the links between the observer/analyst frame of meaning and that of the subject of study. How are the concepts of the actor/group connected to our concepts?
Film Review: Ten Years Thailand
Thanks for the correction and insightful comments. For anyone who wants to read more about Patiwat, the activist and artist mentioned above, there is an excellent feature article on him in The Isaan Record.
I think there would be benefit in a deeper review/analysis just of Apichatpong’s contribution to Ten Years Thailand alone, saying as it’s so packed with meaning and references (which aren’t always clear to the average viewer).
Film Review: Ten Years Thailand
Thank you for this interesting read, James.
A few comments on Apichatpong’s contribution: He was actually born in Bangkok but grew up in Khon Kaen. The background sound is most likely coming from the Anuban Khon Kaen School located next to the park, the morning salute to the national flag. The actor playing the mo lam singer is Patiwat Saraiyaem, a Khon Kaen-based activist and artist who was imprisoned for lése-majesté in 2015. The sleeping machine seems like reference to Apichatpong’s last feature film Cemetery of Splendour (รักที่ขอนแก่น) which also shows scenes of construction work in Khon Kaen.
Southeast Asia’s ethnic crises in modernity
Thank you so much for your kind words and very helpful suggestions to our study. As you can probably tell, this project is still in its early stages and had difficulty finding data sets. We will definitely consider these sources in updating our study. Would it be alright to ask for your email so we may keep in touch regarding this project?
Southeast Asia’s ethnic crises in modernity
Thank you for your comment. While we appreciate your remark on nuance and recognize the greater complexity of both Thai and Burmese societies, would you please elaborate on the basis of your statistics of your counterpoint?
Southeast Asia’s ethnic crises in modernity
Thank you very much for your clarifications on the Thailand case. We did find this misrepresentation initially curious in our data but could not find a more definitive source on Thailand’s ethnic demography. Perhaps it is a part of the politically motivated state discourse, as you have pointed out. Mark Woodward already kindly provided some alternative sources. Would you know other data sets or books that can more accurately characterize ethnicity in Thai Society. This is merely a summarized version of our work and did not have a lot of room for more nuance. Rest assured, we will definitely take your comments into account. Thank you again for your attention to our work
Southeast Asia’s ethnic crises in modernity
Thank you very much for your clarifications on the Thailand case. We did find this misrepresentation initially curious in our data but could not find a more definitive source on Thailand’s ethnic demography. Perhaps it is a part of the politically motivated state discourse, as you have pointed out. Mark Woodward already kindly provided some alternative sources. Would you know other data sets or books that can more accurately characterize ethnicity in Thai Society. This is merely a summarized version of our full work and did not have alot of room for more nuance. Rest assured, we will definitely take your comments into account. Thank you again for your attention to our work.
Southeast Asia’s ethnic crises in modernity
Generally speaking this is a solid analysis. It is, however, not without problems. It understates ethnic diversity in most all countries. The CIA World Fact Book is not a very good source. While compiled decades ago, Lebar, Hickey and Musgrave Ethnic Groups of Mainland Southeast Asia and Lebar, Ethnic Groups of Insular Southeast Asia, both Yale, Human Relations Area Files Press, are much more accurate and complete. The authors also conflate religious and ethnic minorities. They understate the range of discriminatory policies and the groups victimised by them in nearly all countries. The authors should consult the Minorities at Risk data set http://www.mar.umd.edu/mar_data.asp If the authors fix these data problems and rerun the analysis the results should be more interesting and more accurate.
Southeast Asia’s ethnic crises in modernity
This article lacks credibility when the table of ethnicities is published. Firstly, it’s incorrect to suggest that Thailand is 97.5% ethnically Thai. There are large minorities of Chinese, Khmer, Mon – and of course Malay – the latter usually estimated at around 4% of the population and dominant in the deep south. (Ironically the second table talks about conflict with the Malay minority, even though they’re not mentioned in the first table.) Secondly, it seems very odd that 24% of Brunei’s population are lumped together as ‘other’.
(I should add that I live in Thailand, and am studying Muslim minorities in SEA so I have some basis for this comment.)
Southeast Asia’s ethnic crises in modernity
Anyone familiar with Thailand should know that there are a great many ethnic minorities here, each with a distinct language. Ethnic “Thais” constitute far less than 97.5% of the population–depending, of course on how ethnicity is defined. The Thai state simply lumps most everyone under the “Thai” label–which itself may support forms of discrimination.
In other words, the data on which this study is based is seriously flawed in at least this one case, and its conclusions likely skewed overall. Take this as a first stab at introducing an important topic in need of a more fine-grained treatment.
Thailand Unsettled #2: Reconciliation (with Jatuporn Prompan and Suriyasai Katasila)—Part 1
I just made following comment on my facebook page:
In Part 2 of New Mandala’s/Prachatai’s series of Thailand Unsettled is a very interesting interview with UDD chairman Jaruporn Prompan and ex-PAD leader Suriyasai Katasila.
Jatuporn is correct in saying that reconciliation needs justice, and on that issue we are far away from it.
Suriyasai is taking the talk. But part of his talk smells of dishonesty. He says that he thinks constantly about the history. But he does not mention the clear military involvement in PAD and PDRC on all levels.
He also talks about the difficulties in maintaining control over protesters, propagating the myth of the suppsed “Great Mass of the People”.
One example he cites is that the PDRC protests could have gotten out of hand with rioting in case Suthep would have given himself up to the authorties. Reality is, that apart from a few single days in which the PDRC brought a truly impressive mass of people to the streets, most of the time a very small number of PDRC protesters maintained their positions, especially during the so-called Bangkok shutdown, and any rioting would have been able to be contained by the authorities, especially if the active soldiers under their guards and protesters would have been ordered to withdraw their support. But obviously that is not exactly what all this was about…
He cites another exampe, of the 2008 airport occupation, that this was supposedly somehow unplanned, and a reaction by the masses.
This is plain wrong, simple as that. Maybe he was not informed, which I very much doubt, given his high rank in the PAD at the time.
Very shortly after the judicial overthrow of the elected government, I have had the opportunity to speak with a deep cover Special Branch operative (not simply a source, but a Special Branch officer) who was assigned to infiltrate the PAD’s Naclop Srivichai (which in itself had many active military officers under its ranks), and who got the intel that the airport occupation was planned. He relayed this intel to his superiors, who relayed it further. But somewhere along the lines this intel was lost/ignored, and nothing was done to prevent the occupation.
Furthermore, the elected government ordered to disperse the PAD protests at the airport, and combined police/military forces were already preparing. However, somewhere and somehow that order was interfered with at the last minute, and nothing happened.
All this information has been corroborated to me independently by several sources.
This was clearly not “a case of the masses rebelling on their own accord”, but part of the same old strategy of military and traditional elites destabilising an elected government through orchestrated street protest movements, in order to justify taking over power.
Reconciliation does not just need justice, it also needs honesty.