So instead of presenting any evidence you run with a bizarre conspiracy theory that Thaksin engineered a situation where his own supporters would be shot? For what possible purpose?
If there was any truth in this, at all, why wouldn’t every single Dem government minister, Army & media stooge be triumphantly celebrating this fact ad infinitum?
Really, Les, you’re going to have to do better than decidedly paranoid and odd theories.
Let’s face it, all Thaksin and his supporters need is a proper democratic election to take power.
They have proved that time and time again.
And given the recent polling figures that’s all their going to need now.
What you have here are two power groups – one that attained power via the ballot box and the other by killing people, time and time again.
As for the MiB being “connected to the Red Shirts” argument, well, apart from HRW’s own witnesses saying there was “no direct link” there isn’t much to go on.
Of course, you could turn the “connected” argument on its head and then ask if the Thai Army were connected to the Bangkok middle classes who came out and supported the murder of their fellow citizens.
And why did the Red Shirts hand back all the weapons they took at Kok Wua?
Pretty extraordinary thing to do for a group supposedly drenched in apocalyptic anarchic blood, no?
Why did the Thai Army shoot and kill obviously unarmed kids, women and nurses with snipers? For fun? For sport? To teach the Red Shirts a lesson? Or is this notoriously murderous rabble so poorly trained and psychotic they can’t tell the difference between a nurse handing out bandages and a man armed with an M16? (Spooner #96)
Again the HRW report suggested an answer, see excerpt below:
“The whole operation was staggering in its incompetence. You had scared young conscripts blazing away at the tents in Lumphini Park without any fire control. There wasn’t the command and control that you would expect during such an operation … When I was with the troops in the park along the fence, they were opening fire at people in the park … The park was used essentially as a free-fire zone, the soldiers moved and took shots along Wireless and Rama IV Road.” – A foreign military analyst, who accompanied the soldiers during the dispersal operations on May 19, 2010.
But of course the Red Shirts leaders (Thaksin and Gen. Khattiya in particular) knew that the military will employ ‘scared conscripts’ and they took this into account in their well planned and organized (and thus included Gen. Khattiya’s Black Shirts well armed brigade) peaceful-cum-violence protests. Gen. Anupong and PM Abhisit knew too that both the police and the army are ill-trained at the task of dispersing thousands of Red Shirts. Accordingly Gen. Anupon had vocally expressed his position that the military will not be used; both Abhisit govt. and Red Shirts leaders should negotiate in good faith to avoid a bloody showdown.
Good faith. That was what was missing from the Red Shirt leaders because Thaksin’s bad faith had shadowed the violent Red Shirt protests from the very start. And when PM Abhisit agreed to hold elections within six months (‘the election’ was the main point of the Red Shirts Mar-May2010 protest, people be reminded), the Red Shirt leaders too signalled agreement but backed down later on. Backed down because: (a) the violent elements of the Red Shirt leadership had asserted their supremacy in the Red Shirt movement, and (b) Supreme Leader Thaksin won’t back down because he gained nothing and Abhisit had offerred him nothing.
Spooner’s argument that the HRW report is not neutral is specifically because ‘HRW hates Thaksin and the Red Shirts’. HRW hates the Red Shirts Spooner? Why don’t you write one more article on this particular point, plus your other comparative view about ‘the equality of Abhisit’s and Thaksin’s human rights abuses’.
About HRW and Thaksin Spooner . . . are you saying that the whole Human Rights organization hates Thaksin? Maybe you should write another article also on this particular point . . . and what unconscionalbe human rights abuses could be so abominable that the whole HRW organization ‘hates’ Thaksin Spooner?
In any case, significant change is not really on the agenda anywhere. This whole farce is still only about who will get the greatest snout space in the post+succession pigtrough. Show me a set of people who can be programed to wear colored tshirts, or different color shirts on different days, and sure enough they are all very easy to fool with hollow promises. Nature of the place. It happens everywhere, so why not here
At the risk of being harangued for all kinds of sins, let me make a couple of quick comments. These are based on a read of the HRW report that included checking a lot of their sources.
I don’t think the report can be claimed to be balanced simply because it attributes blame to both sides (and there might be more than two sides). It seems quite clear that the report is about condemning violence no matter who perpetrates it. To do that for the red shirts, their claims of non-violence need to be debunked. On that score, people like Suthep should be pretty happy with the HRW report, for it spends a great deal of space recounting every element of violence that could be attributed to the red shirts.
There are some errors in the report related to footnotes that present evidence. Some of them link to YouTube videos that are said to show certain things, but don’t. That may be carelessness, but this report should not be careless.
Some important incidents are missed (e.g. the events at the Thaicom satellite where live rounds were fired at the crowd – http://www.cnn.com/video/?/video/world/2010/04/09/vo.thailand.bullets.fired.cnn). There was a heck of a lot going on, but government-inspired events and strategies don’t get much of a run in the report until the final crackdown is covered.
There are some errors of fact. To take one important one, that doesn’t directly relate to April-May: HRW continues to claim that 2800 people died in the war on drugs. It seems to me that what they do here is cite the total deaths for February-April 2003 for all murders in Thailand. The then Kanit investigation I think made it clear that this was the case, and I am sure that HRW must know this.
For me, this report would have been far more powerful if there had been some forensics involved – and I mean independent forensics. For example, in all the discussion of April 10, it is very difficult to follow who is where or even where the shooting is coming from. It is also confused as to who are police and who are army in the account of this particular event. A good forensics investigator may have been able to piece the trail of evidence in videos and statements together in a way that made more sense of the events. Timelines and maps would have been very useful.
The statements on so-called MIB mentioned above are indeed contradictory in the report. At one point HRW states that Seh Daeng was not their commander or trainer. Indeed, he is said to have been the leader of non-MIB, and is cast as the nakleng-hero of street toughs who are also claimed not to have had much connection to red shirt protesters. We are also left to think that these young men joined in for the love of a good fight, even at the risk of injury and death…. Personally, I think HRW gets lost in all of this stuff, probably because it is just so complex, murky and secretive but also because of their need to show all violence that they can attribute to red shirts.
On this confusion, look, for example, at the question of numbers of MIB. The scant reporting would have us believe that there were either hundreds of them or a handful. There is no real attempt to assess how many there were. One of the cited reports says they were rationed to 30 rounds of ammunition each per day. That hardly sounds like the fierce fire-fights that are mentioned several times.
One can draw support from some statements as Vichai has done and one can also draw the kind of questions Andrew S does. One could easily agree with Les’s two suppositions based on the HRW report, but not what comes after that. Tarrin’s question remains valid. For all the HRW statements about fierce fire-fights between MIB, “militants” and so on, we are left to assume that they were well-trained militia who were pretty awful shots because there is little in the way of a military body count (compared with the heavy civilian count) or we might conclude that the military covered-up the deaths and injuries on their side. HRW is silent on this.
I also felt that there was a lack of adequate contextualization of the red shirt activities. There are a few words about it at the beginning, but the focus is on violent events that surround the red shirt demonstrations. We learn little about the reasons for demonstrations, anger, frustrations and violence. That’s maybe okay for those who follow the events carefully over time, but it is not something that aids a broader understanding of events and motivations.
None of this is to say the report should be rejected. It should be read, debated and compared with other reports that are available and will become available.
Gillard is now the legitimate PM, yet are are yet to see what was offered to Independents in conservative seats to change sides. I suspect in what ever that was there are even more similarities to Thailand. Again as the current Australian government is the worst in living memory is it because it is a minority government or because it really just is that bad?
Thank you.
The nuances, levels and fluidity of this conflict are for me the most important. If the conflict would just be about two different political factions fighting over power, i would have hardly spent the past 5 years obsessed with it.
Many long simmering problems of Thai society (and perceptions over Thai identity) are represented by the color movements.
Issues of religion, perception over the Thai state, questioning of Thai history, empowerment, building of political consciousness, and whatever not are part of a conflict that has the potential to turn into the seminal conflict of Thai history.
I this context i find it more than interesting when you have bargirls (“sexworkers”) identifying themselves with one of the color movements – red, talk politics – both national and especially emphasizing their Isarn identity in relation to these politics, and take part in street protests after closing hours.
The most stunning aspect for me here in the context of the discussion over the conference is that these issues seem to be completely dismissed by the organizer (“a yawnner”, “not interested in the fruitless conversation”, etc). Yet the longer i follow this conflict the more fascinated i am over the levels this whole thing reaches, and that both academia and journalism has hardly breached the surface of what is going on presently in Thai society. I am not an academic, and can only do what i do – take photos and report. But i would love to read studies that breach the surface and go into the realms i just mentioned.
There is an enormous void that looks to be filled.
No change, regardless what of pathetic excuse for a party is elected. Greedy manipulative parasites and their carpet-bagging lackies will continue to monopolise everything that moves here for decades to come. The motosys will get their credit cards, just as surely as bulls get rings inserted in their noses. And I suppose the professional pundits amongst us will be forced to make enthusiastic noises about the result, just to justify their own existence as ‘experts’. Everyone else will still be scraping a living and dodging the bullets of extra-judicial goonsquads. The real kingpins of the various dodgy trades will continue to be immune from prosecution, just by alligning themselves with whatever color is in fashion. Wake up and smell the stench of local political reality!
Quite clearly, there are 2 main paths available to each of the ASEAN states:
1) the US Path leading to tension, conflicts and destruction; or
2) the China Path leading to commerce, development and prosperity.
It is a fallacy of Geoff Wade to imply that the maritime ASEAN states are necessarily excluded from the China-led commerce, development and prosperity. It is matter of choice for, not only of these maritime ASEAN states (comprising of Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines, since Malaysia and Singapore are part of the mainland states), but also for other countries worldwide including the US. In the 21st century, the US also needs partners who are importers of US goods unlike in the 20th century, when most are exporters of cheap goods to the US. This is a very important shift in global reality.
I really enjoyed reading your posting and agree with it in the main. I would also be fascinated by your finding of the singing in the bar, as an ethnographer (and keen amateur photographer) this is the micro level cultural detail that really interests me. And yes, of course you can’t entirely avoid politics in the context of Thailand (or anywhere else) and it would be foolish to try to do so. I simply become alienated when that’s ALL that is said/read into and about situations. It’s as though some people think nothing else at all matters or is a valid point of discussion. It becomes so black and white, whereas I am more interested in a nuanced view of any culture/nation.
You didn’t read my Asian Correspondent piece very well or you would have spotted two quotes that were pulled directly from HRW’s own witnesses.
“The MiB had “no interaction with the Red Shirt leaders” and that “They didn’t have any relationship with the Red Guards, and weren’t interested in dealing with the Red Shirt leaders.””
And, for the sake of repeating myself, I have never claimed that the MiB and the Red Shirts were completely unconnected. I have just stated that an investigation is needed and until such time groups like HRW should refrain from making assertions based on thin evidence. There is no substantive evidence in that report that shows, conclusively, that the MiB were under direct orders from the Red Shirt leadership. In fact, if it did exist the Thai government would’ve produced it months ago.
In my view HRW, and Brad Adams in particular, clearly hate Thaksin. Which is fine but makes them far far less than neutral.
Even hating Thaksin and the Red Shirts is ok with me – just don’t then tell me that this makes someone “neutral” when it is quite clearly a partisan position to take.
One thing to fire back at you – why did the Thai Army shoot and kill obviously unarmed kids, women and nurses with snipers? For fun? For sport? To teach the Red Shirts a lesson? Or is this notoriously murderous rabble so poorly trained and psychotic they can’t tell the difference between a nurse handing out bandages and a man armed with an M16?
Let’s make a couple of suppositions supported partly by evidence of Nick and/or HRW.
First that, let’s call them ‘men in black’, existed and were connected in some way with with the pro-Thaksin movement.
Second that these ‘men in black’ took part in the troubles of April 10th. 2010 and took part in the gun fight on that day.
What worried me from the beginning was the purpose of these armed men. I know it’s easy to say something like, “they were there to protect the red shirts”. The problem I have is my suspicion that in the Thaksin PR machine it was decided that 2010, unlike 2009, needed real bodies. Once you begin to run with that suspicion an awful lot of what happened afterwards begins to make sense.
The problem is not “Who doesn’t love the king”, since we’re all required to love him under the law. No, the trouble stems from “Who loves the King MORE”.
It would be a lot more creative had it been done in Thai. As it is, just like the “We Love the King” stickers on cars in English, it raises the question of who it’s for, and what change it can hope to achieve.
Is it possible that you can respect other opinions and perceptions without trivialising them please? Or is there only one way to consider Thailand: through a political lense? Don’t you think that underestimates what “Thainess” might be?
I beg the differ, it is the Thai who is unable to deal with problems in a logical and sensible manners. Once they got pushed to the corner the usual response was “you farang don’t know what Thai culture” or “Long live the king, I love him so much so whoes care”. With that context inmind, how do you expect people to take the “Thainess” seriously?
Could you Tarrin really say ‘with certainty’ (Spooner’s term) that none of those shot and arrested (still hundreds of Reds languishing in jail) were/are not Black Shirts.
Ofcause not since the government themselves announced long time ago that they have infact arrested members of the black-shirt clad. I’ve given a rough explaination of the case in comment 87. As things goes, you should have a rough idea of who the MiB is.
Would it be unfair to say that this was all a little ho-hum? Was there a ‘panel discussion’ as suggested above, and did the talks really help us move to a clearer understanding of ‘Thailand at the limit’ or to even work whether such a phrase was meaningful? From where I sat and listened the talks were all rather incoherent and unhelpfully ‘eclectic’ – many were only tangentially concerned with the stated topics. Moreover, there was only one thing that I found of real interest and contention, and sadly that came from an economist, a discipline I habitually regard as the bluntest of academic instruments (apologies to all the happy economists of the world out there), and was a pointed comment seeking to disregard the Thai opposition movement.
Peter Warr, a wily and someone enigmatic commentator on things Thai, seemed to suggest – though it wasn’t particularly clear, as he threw the comment in at the end of his talk, almost as a throwaway line – that the basic idea of so much of the Red Shirt movement, that Thaksin was good for rural Thailand, was simply a myth that doesn’t withstand economic scrutiny. That is, says Warr, real rural growth is based on state investment in agricultural research and extension, and that this funding was precisely what stopped under Thaksin and instead was funneled into what Warr calls ‘populist’ projects. The implication is that rather than help the rural poor, Thaksin merely misled them and ripped away the one policy pillar of real benefit. Wow. That is a major claim, potentially undermining the basis of Red Shirt politics (yes I know there is more to it than this, but this Thaksin-rural-Red connection is at the heart of the matter…). That is why I consider it truly interesting and controversial. But why, Peter, throw it in as you did? Why not elaborate, and say what you really seem to mean? What are the political, social ramifications of your analysis?
Just a shame from my perspective, that nothing so interesting was said to shine a spotlight on the frail foundations of the elite classes/movements…
Is it possible that you can respect other opinions and perceptions without trivialising them please? Or is there only one way to consider Thailand: through a political lense? Don’t you think that underestimates what “Thainess” might be?”
Of course politics is but one factor. But when there is a conflict over the identity and future of contemporary Thailand most strongly played out in the political realm, are we to ignore that?
Arts would be another factor. But can you tell me if there are art movements existing here that are not almost fully docile to the state? Is there any counter- or subculture that question the state’s version of “Thainess” outside the political realm?
I was asked by Khun Nattawut to submit a paper on Thailand’s sex workers. The only completely new aspect i came across in this world in the past ten or so years, since internet discussion and soliciting of prospective customers added new dimensions, is that i am aware of that in at least one such bar the entire staff joined every day the Rajprasong protests after closing hours, confirming that politicization in Thailand has reached previously unknown levels of society.
Families are divided along political lines, communities are divided. Even the clergy is deeply divided, monks are being seen in both color movements.
Tell me please – how can we avoid a since 5 years dominating political conflict when the topic is Thai identity and contemporary Thailand?
You leave me rather confused. At the call for papers is stated:
“Question on “Thai Identity” or “Thainess” and the way it affects social, political and organisational factors remain unanswered in contemporary Thailand. Thai Studies, thus, can be seen as a interdisciplinary-study of the particular in a world that upholds a more liberating universal values.
It is important, from the academic view, that the studies of Thailand in terms of social, political, economic and institutional development are continuously done and disseminated by scholars who are interested in Thailand from various angles.”
You can see that “social” and “political” has been pointed out twice. In your comments here though you have several times pointed out that this conference is not about politics, that you are bored with political subjects, and you have avoided to answer any question that border political subject matters.
And now you just stated that:
“I want my circle of friends who are interested in Thailand to know about our pop culture, science, management ideas of SMEs, teaching Thai languages”
Can you please tell me – if that is now an advertisement and infotainment campaign for what Thailand may have to offer to prospective foreign investors and tourists, or an academic conference that “disseminates unanswered factors on Thai identity” – including political, as stated in your calls for papers?
Very sorry for my blunt question – i am a German, and we are not known for our understanding of subtleties, as you may have seen during our conversation.
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Amnesty International and Robert Amsterdam
Les Abbey
So instead of presenting any evidence you run with a bizarre conspiracy theory that Thaksin engineered a situation where his own supporters would be shot? For what possible purpose?
If there was any truth in this, at all, why wouldn’t every single Dem government minister, Army & media stooge be triumphantly celebrating this fact ad infinitum?
Really, Les, you’re going to have to do better than decidedly paranoid and odd theories.
Let’s face it, all Thaksin and his supporters need is a proper democratic election to take power.
They have proved that time and time again.
And given the recent polling figures that’s all their going to need now.
What you have here are two power groups – one that attained power via the ballot box and the other by killing people, time and time again.
As for the MiB being “connected to the Red Shirts” argument, well, apart from HRW’s own witnesses saying there was “no direct link” there isn’t much to go on.
Of course, you could turn the “connected” argument on its head and then ask if the Thai Army were connected to the Bangkok middle classes who came out and supported the murder of their fellow citizens.
And why did the Red Shirts hand back all the weapons they took at Kok Wua?
Pretty extraordinary thing to do for a group supposedly drenched in apocalyptic anarchic blood, no?
Amnesty International and Robert Amsterdam
Why did the Thai Army shoot and kill obviously unarmed kids, women and nurses with snipers? For fun? For sport? To teach the Red Shirts a lesson? Or is this notoriously murderous rabble so poorly trained and psychotic they can’t tell the difference between a nurse handing out bandages and a man armed with an M16? (Spooner #96)
Again the HRW report suggested an answer, see excerpt below:
“The whole operation was staggering in its incompetence. You had scared young conscripts blazing away at the tents in Lumphini Park without any fire control. There wasn’t the command and control that you would expect during such an operation … When I was with the troops in the park along the fence, they were opening fire at people in the park … The park was used essentially as a free-fire zone, the soldiers moved and took shots along Wireless and Rama IV Road.” – A foreign military analyst, who accompanied the soldiers during the dispersal operations on May 19, 2010.
But of course the Red Shirts leaders (Thaksin and Gen. Khattiya in particular) knew that the military will employ ‘scared conscripts’ and they took this into account in their well planned and organized (and thus included Gen. Khattiya’s Black Shirts well armed brigade) peaceful-cum-violence protests. Gen. Anupong and PM Abhisit knew too that both the police and the army are ill-trained at the task of dispersing thousands of Red Shirts. Accordingly Gen. Anupon had vocally expressed his position that the military will not be used; both Abhisit govt. and Red Shirts leaders should negotiate in good faith to avoid a bloody showdown.
Good faith. That was what was missing from the Red Shirt leaders because Thaksin’s bad faith had shadowed the violent Red Shirt protests from the very start. And when PM Abhisit agreed to hold elections within six months (‘the election’ was the main point of the Red Shirts Mar-May2010 protest, people be reminded), the Red Shirt leaders too signalled agreement but backed down later on. Backed down because: (a) the violent elements of the Red Shirt leadership had asserted their supremacy in the Red Shirt movement, and (b) Supreme Leader Thaksin won’t back down because he gained nothing and Abhisit had offerred him nothing.
Spooner’s argument that the HRW report is not neutral is specifically because ‘HRW hates Thaksin and the Red Shirts’. HRW hates the Red Shirts Spooner? Why don’t you write one more article on this particular point, plus your other comparative view about ‘the equality of Abhisit’s and Thaksin’s human rights abuses’.
About HRW and Thaksin Spooner . . . are you saying that the whole Human Rights organization hates Thaksin? Maybe you should write another article also on this particular point . . . and what unconscionalbe human rights abuses could be so abominable that the whole HRW organization ‘hates’ Thaksin Spooner?
Anti-lese majeste flash mob
#1 It’s for YouTube.
In any case, significant change is not really on the agenda anywhere. This whole farce is still only about who will get the greatest snout space in the post+succession pigtrough. Show me a set of people who can be programed to wear colored tshirts, or different color shirts on different days, and sure enough they are all very easy to fool with hollow promises. Nature of the place. It happens everywhere, so why not here
Amnesty International and Robert Amsterdam
At the risk of being harangued for all kinds of sins, let me make a couple of quick comments. These are based on a read of the HRW report that included checking a lot of their sources.
I don’t think the report can be claimed to be balanced simply because it attributes blame to both sides (and there might be more than two sides). It seems quite clear that the report is about condemning violence no matter who perpetrates it. To do that for the red shirts, their claims of non-violence need to be debunked. On that score, people like Suthep should be pretty happy with the HRW report, for it spends a great deal of space recounting every element of violence that could be attributed to the red shirts.
There are some errors in the report related to footnotes that present evidence. Some of them link to YouTube videos that are said to show certain things, but don’t. That may be carelessness, but this report should not be careless.
Some important incidents are missed (e.g. the events at the Thaicom satellite where live rounds were fired at the crowd – http://www.cnn.com/video/?/video/world/2010/04/09/vo.thailand.bullets.fired.cnn). There was a heck of a lot going on, but government-inspired events and strategies don’t get much of a run in the report until the final crackdown is covered.
There are some errors of fact. To take one important one, that doesn’t directly relate to April-May: HRW continues to claim that 2800 people died in the war on drugs. It seems to me that what they do here is cite the total deaths for February-April 2003 for all murders in Thailand. The then Kanit investigation I think made it clear that this was the case, and I am sure that HRW must know this.
For me, this report would have been far more powerful if there had been some forensics involved – and I mean independent forensics. For example, in all the discussion of April 10, it is very difficult to follow who is where or even where the shooting is coming from. It is also confused as to who are police and who are army in the account of this particular event. A good forensics investigator may have been able to piece the trail of evidence in videos and statements together in a way that made more sense of the events. Timelines and maps would have been very useful.
The statements on so-called MIB mentioned above are indeed contradictory in the report. At one point HRW states that Seh Daeng was not their commander or trainer. Indeed, he is said to have been the leader of non-MIB, and is cast as the nakleng-hero of street toughs who are also claimed not to have had much connection to red shirt protesters. We are also left to think that these young men joined in for the love of a good fight, even at the risk of injury and death…. Personally, I think HRW gets lost in all of this stuff, probably because it is just so complex, murky and secretive but also because of their need to show all violence that they can attribute to red shirts.
On this confusion, look, for example, at the question of numbers of MIB. The scant reporting would have us believe that there were either hundreds of them or a handful. There is no real attempt to assess how many there were. One of the cited reports says they were rationed to 30 rounds of ammunition each per day. That hardly sounds like the fierce fire-fights that are mentioned several times.
One can draw support from some statements as Vichai has done and one can also draw the kind of questions Andrew S does. One could easily agree with Les’s two suppositions based on the HRW report, but not what comes after that. Tarrin’s question remains valid. For all the HRW statements about fierce fire-fights between MIB, “militants” and so on, we are left to assume that they were well-trained militia who were pretty awful shots because there is little in the way of a military body count (compared with the heavy civilian count) or we might conclude that the military covered-up the deaths and injuries on their side. HRW is silent on this.
I also felt that there was a lack of adequate contextualization of the red shirt activities. There are a few words about it at the beginning, but the focus is on violent events that surround the red shirt demonstrations. We learn little about the reasons for demonstrations, anger, frustrations and violence. That’s maybe okay for those who follow the events carefully over time, but it is not something that aids a broader understanding of events and motivations.
None of this is to say the report should be rejected. It should be read, debated and compared with other reports that are available and will become available.
Coalition government: Aussie exemplar
Gillard is now the legitimate PM, yet are are yet to see what was offered to Independents in conservative seats to change sides. I suspect in what ever that was there are even more similarities to Thailand. Again as the current Australian government is the worst in living memory is it because it is a minority government or because it really just is that bad?
Thai Studies conference in Melbourne
“Nobody much”:
Thank you.
The nuances, levels and fluidity of this conflict are for me the most important. If the conflict would just be about two different political factions fighting over power, i would have hardly spent the past 5 years obsessed with it.
Many long simmering problems of Thai society (and perceptions over Thai identity) are represented by the color movements.
Issues of religion, perception over the Thai state, questioning of Thai history, empowerment, building of political consciousness, and whatever not are part of a conflict that has the potential to turn into the seminal conflict of Thai history.
I this context i find it more than interesting when you have bargirls (“sexworkers”) identifying themselves with one of the color movements – red, talk politics – both national and especially emphasizing their Isarn identity in relation to these politics, and take part in street protests after closing hours.
The most stunning aspect for me here in the context of the discussion over the conference is that these issues seem to be completely dismissed by the organizer (“a yawnner”, “not interested in the fruitless conversation”, etc). Yet the longer i follow this conflict the more fascinated i am over the levels this whole thing reaches, and that both academia and journalism has hardly breached the surface of what is going on presently in Thai society. I am not an academic, and can only do what i do – take photos and report. But i would love to read studies that breach the surface and go into the realms i just mentioned.
There is an enormous void that looks to be filled.
Speculation on Thai election outcomes
No change, regardless what of pathetic excuse for a party is elected. Greedy manipulative parasites and their carpet-bagging lackies will continue to monopolise everything that moves here for decades to come. The motosys will get their credit cards, just as surely as bulls get rings inserted in their noses. And I suppose the professional pundits amongst us will be forced to make enthusiastic noises about the result, just to justify their own existence as ‘experts’. Everyone else will still be scraping a living and dodging the bullets of extra-judicial goonsquads. The real kingpins of the various dodgy trades will continue to be immune from prosecution, just by alligning themselves with whatever color is in fashion. Wake up and smell the stench of local political reality!
ASEAN Divides
Quite clearly, there are 2 main paths available to each of the ASEAN states:
1) the US Path leading to tension, conflicts and destruction; or
2) the China Path leading to commerce, development and prosperity.
It is a fallacy of Geoff Wade to imply that the maritime ASEAN states are necessarily excluded from the China-led commerce, development and prosperity. It is matter of choice for, not only of these maritime ASEAN states (comprising of Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines, since Malaysia and Singapore are part of the mainland states), but also for other countries worldwide including the US. In the 21st century, the US also needs partners who are importers of US goods unlike in the 20th century, when most are exporters of cheap goods to the US. This is a very important shift in global reality.
Thai Studies conference in Melbourne
Hey Nick
I really enjoyed reading your posting and agree with it in the main. I would also be fascinated by your finding of the singing in the bar, as an ethnographer (and keen amateur photographer) this is the micro level cultural detail that really interests me. And yes, of course you can’t entirely avoid politics in the context of Thailand (or anywhere else) and it would be foolish to try to do so. I simply become alienated when that’s ALL that is said/read into and about situations. It’s as though some people think nothing else at all matters or is a valid point of discussion. It becomes so black and white, whereas I am more interested in a nuanced view of any culture/nation.
Amnesty International and Robert Amsterdam
Vichai N.
You didn’t read my Asian Correspondent piece very well or you would have spotted two quotes that were pulled directly from HRW’s own witnesses.
“The MiB had “no interaction with the Red Shirt leaders” and that “They didn’t have any relationship with the Red Guards, and weren’t interested in dealing with the Red Shirt leaders.””
And, for the sake of repeating myself, I have never claimed that the MiB and the Red Shirts were completely unconnected. I have just stated that an investigation is needed and until such time groups like HRW should refrain from making assertions based on thin evidence. There is no substantive evidence in that report that shows, conclusively, that the MiB were under direct orders from the Red Shirt leadership. In fact, if it did exist the Thai government would’ve produced it months ago.
In my view HRW, and Brad Adams in particular, clearly hate Thaksin. Which is fine but makes them far far less than neutral.
Even hating Thaksin and the Red Shirts is ok with me – just don’t then tell me that this makes someone “neutral” when it is quite clearly a partisan position to take.
One thing to fire back at you – why did the Thai Army shoot and kill obviously unarmed kids, women and nurses with snipers? For fun? For sport? To teach the Red Shirts a lesson? Or is this notoriously murderous rabble so poorly trained and psychotic they can’t tell the difference between a nurse handing out bandages and a man armed with an M16?
Amnesty International and Robert Amsterdam
Let’s make a couple of suppositions supported partly by evidence of Nick and/or HRW.
First that, let’s call them ‘men in black’, existed and were connected in some way with with the pro-Thaksin movement.
Second that these ‘men in black’ took part in the troubles of April 10th. 2010 and took part in the gun fight on that day.
What worried me from the beginning was the purpose of these armed men. I know it’s easy to say something like, “they were there to protect the red shirts”. The problem I have is my suspicion that in the Thaksin PR machine it was decided that 2010, unlike 2009, needed real bodies. Once you begin to run with that suspicion an awful lot of what happened afterwards begins to make sense.
2 per cent don’t love monarchy
The problem is not “Who doesn’t love the king”, since we’re all required to love him under the law. No, the trouble stems from “Who loves the King MORE”.
Anti-lese majeste flash mob
It would be a lot more creative had it been done in Thai. As it is, just like the “We Love the King” stickers on cars in English, it raises the question of who it’s for, and what change it can hope to achieve.
Thai Studies conference in Melbourne
Nobody much – 58
Is it possible that you can respect other opinions and perceptions without trivialising them please? Or is there only one way to consider Thailand: through a political lense? Don’t you think that underestimates what “Thainess” might be?
I beg the differ, it is the Thai who is unable to deal with problems in a logical and sensible manners. Once they got pushed to the corner the usual response was “you farang don’t know what Thai culture” or “Long live the king, I love him so much so whoes care”. With that context inmind, how do you expect people to take the “Thainess” seriously?
Amnesty International and Robert Amsterdam
Vichi N – 93
Could you Tarrin really say ‘with certainty’ (Spooner’s term) that none of those shot and arrested (still hundreds of Reds languishing in jail) were/are not Black Shirts.
Ofcause not since the government themselves announced long time ago that they have infact arrested members of the black-shirt clad. I’ve given a rough explaination of the case in comment 87. As things goes, you should have a rough idea of who the MiB is.
2 per cent don’t love monarchy
How to estimate the number of “very loyal real monarchists”:
One can expect that they show their reverence off in public, usually wearing a yellow wristband and a yellow flag flown at their premises .
Another popular sign is a “We love the King” – sticker in Thai on the car.
From this public shown “signs of affection” I would estimate the figure ist anywhere between 5 to 10%
2 per cent don’t love monarchy
Some context: Why I don’t Love the King?
Thailand at the Limit podcast and vodcast
Would it be unfair to say that this was all a little ho-hum? Was there a ‘panel discussion’ as suggested above, and did the talks really help us move to a clearer understanding of ‘Thailand at the limit’ or to even work whether such a phrase was meaningful? From where I sat and listened the talks were all rather incoherent and unhelpfully ‘eclectic’ – many were only tangentially concerned with the stated topics. Moreover, there was only one thing that I found of real interest and contention, and sadly that came from an economist, a discipline I habitually regard as the bluntest of academic instruments (apologies to all the happy economists of the world out there), and was a pointed comment seeking to disregard the Thai opposition movement.
Peter Warr, a wily and someone enigmatic commentator on things Thai, seemed to suggest – though it wasn’t particularly clear, as he threw the comment in at the end of his talk, almost as a throwaway line – that the basic idea of so much of the Red Shirt movement, that Thaksin was good for rural Thailand, was simply a myth that doesn’t withstand economic scrutiny. That is, says Warr, real rural growth is based on state investment in agricultural research and extension, and that this funding was precisely what stopped under Thaksin and instead was funneled into what Warr calls ‘populist’ projects. The implication is that rather than help the rural poor, Thaksin merely misled them and ripped away the one policy pillar of real benefit. Wow. That is a major claim, potentially undermining the basis of Red Shirt politics (yes I know there is more to it than this, but this Thaksin-rural-Red connection is at the heart of the matter…). That is why I consider it truly interesting and controversial. But why, Peter, throw it in as you did? Why not elaborate, and say what you really seem to mean? What are the political, social ramifications of your analysis?
Just a shame from my perspective, that nothing so interesting was said to shine a spotlight on the frail foundations of the elite classes/movements…
Thai Studies conference in Melbourne
“Nobody much”:
Is it possible that you can respect other opinions and perceptions without trivialising them please? Or is there only one way to consider Thailand: through a political lense? Don’t you think that underestimates what “Thainess” might be?”
Of course politics is but one factor. But when there is a conflict over the identity and future of contemporary Thailand most strongly played out in the political realm, are we to ignore that?
Arts would be another factor. But can you tell me if there are art movements existing here that are not almost fully docile to the state? Is there any counter- or subculture that question the state’s version of “Thainess” outside the political realm?
I was asked by Khun Nattawut to submit a paper on Thailand’s sex workers. The only completely new aspect i came across in this world in the past ten or so years, since internet discussion and soliciting of prospective customers added new dimensions, is that i am aware of that in at least one such bar the entire staff joined every day the Rajprasong protests after closing hours, confirming that politicization in Thailand has reached previously unknown levels of society.
Families are divided along political lines, communities are divided. Even the clergy is deeply divided, monks are being seen in both color movements.
Tell me please – how can we avoid a since 5 years dominating political conflict when the topic is Thai identity and contemporary Thailand?
Thai Studies conference in Melbourne
“Nattavud Pimpa”:
You leave me rather confused. At the call for papers is stated:
“Question on “Thai Identity” or “Thainess” and the way it affects social, political and organisational factors remain unanswered in contemporary Thailand. Thai Studies, thus, can be seen as a interdisciplinary-study of the particular in a world that upholds a more liberating universal values.
It is important, from the academic view, that the studies of Thailand in terms of social, political, economic and institutional development are continuously done and disseminated by scholars who are interested in Thailand from various angles.”
You can see that “social” and “political” has been pointed out twice. In your comments here though you have several times pointed out that this conference is not about politics, that you are bored with political subjects, and you have avoided to answer any question that border political subject matters.
And now you just stated that:
“I want my circle of friends who are interested in Thailand to know about our pop culture, science, management ideas of SMEs, teaching Thai languages”
Can you please tell me – if that is now an advertisement and infotainment campaign for what Thailand may have to offer to prospective foreign investors and tourists, or an academic conference that “disseminates unanswered factors on Thai identity” – including political, as stated in your calls for papers?
Very sorry for my blunt question – i am a German, and we are not known for our understanding of subtleties, as you may have seen during our conversation.