Comments

I would dearly like to know (anyone in the New Mandala community with such a comment to make?) how Vietnam views Du30 and Najib’s approaches to China. I would also ask NM readers a couple of questions: aside from his overall dislike of all things American (something shared with many other Filipinos- despite surface appearances), Du30 was irked to say the least by HR criticism of his war against drugs; similarly, Najib didn’t much like being roasted over his style of governance. Do NM readers think that the turning of both these leaders towards China was in part occasioned by their distaste for being constantly lectured by the ‘west’ on HR and governance issues?… and a belief that China isn’t too much concerned with such matters? And if so, should the ‘west’ abandon what others seemingly consider its pious – if not hypocritical – preachifying on such matters?

The special parliamentary session has confirmed that the prince is the new King of Thailand.

US policy toward Asia has been a historical, socioeconomic and military continuum marked by a consistent desire for geopolitical and socioeconomic primacy in the region stretching back for over a century. This is a continuum that has transcended presidential administrations and congressional shifts of power for decades. To believe that the recent victory by Donald Trump amid America’s 2016 presidential election will suddenly change this decades-long continuum is naive and folly.

Maybe the Trump Administration will take a less confrontational approach with the Chinese in the South China Sea than the Obama Administration. Maybe not. Who knows? I don’t think even Trump knows. He has a hard time putting together his cabinet at the moment. But continuing staying in Asia I know America will do.

I do see the focus of the American geopolitical game in China’s periphery is shifting from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean. After the opening of the Gwadar Port in Pakistan, the Chinese can ship their importation of oil through that port and the American can no longer put too much of a choke-hold on them through the Straits of Malacca. The focus is shifting to the Indian Ocean.

Recently, Richard Verma, US ambassador to India, visited the disputed area between China and India, in what is known in India as Arunachal Pradesh and in China as Southern Tibet. China and India have disputed the sovereignty of the area for more than half a century and the two sides have been working hard to solve their disputed claims by peaceful negotiation. The American envoy’s visit to the area obviously suggests a different intention. The visit is no accidental arrangement. Not long ago, the American consul general in Kolkata claimed that the US official recognized Arunachal (Southern Tibet) as part of India.

The US, as a third party on this issue, seems once again to be seeking leverage for the game on China’s periphery, just like in the South China Sea. The US clearly sees a benefit in making China irritate and uncomfortable as much as possible. By touching China’s sensitivities, the US tries to put more pressure on China and consolidate dominance in Asia.

In any case, I agree that the pressure in the South China Sea may be lessen. But the game in the Indian Ocean is more dangerous and may be disastrous. Unlike the situation in South East Asia where China’s neighbors are relatively smaller and weaker, war is unlikely to happen. The American geopolitical game in the Indian Ocean would dramatically reduce India’s and China’s desire to look for peaceful solutions. A war between India and China can go nuclear. Is this what the US wants?

Thank you all for the time to comment.
@Frank – That’s quite a compliment coming from a long-time journalist of Indonesia!

@Ken – Thanks for providing the details. You are right, I should have worded that sentence slightly more accurately in terms of the timing of the occupation of the parliament building (e.g. change it to ‘as the students continued to demonstrate’).

As for him leaving ‘nonchalantly’, I stand by that description in that this piece is about how we remember 1998 and how that memory affects our response to 4/11. The student demonstrations had been going on for months by then and I remember, as a teenager, being dumbfounded that he could even conceive of leaving, it felt like he was ignoring the protests (in fact we wondered for months how long he’d ignore them for). I also remember wondering whether he was going to return on May 12 he didn’t. And we waited for him to return on the evening of May 13. He didn’t. Then we waited to see if he would return by the morning of May 14. He didn’t. These two to three days may seem short on paper, but for those of us watching the familiar streets of our childhood burn and hearing our friends and relatives finding themselves 60 seconds away from death and having to hide in attics or flee the country/city, those 48+ hours felt like eternity.

As for Jokowi – he is from Solo, which was also ravaged by riots. And I think there were clashes, casualty and gun shots fired in Solo as early as May 8. Clashes had also already occurred in Medan by the time Suharto left. So him leaving ‘nonchalantly’ is an accurate description, I think, especially from the perspective of those left behind.

@Sqwuaky Cockatoo – As Frank says, some of these questions are quite personal. 1) I’m talking about the symbolic imagery of the parliament building. 2) Yes, of course. Months later, people close to me held a prayer gathering for Muslims, Christians and Buddhists alike – the trauma of May was still palpable as people from all three faiths broke down in tears together in one room. 3) This particular circle of ‘friends’ were actually one family, but I didn’t want to mention such details in the main text because it’s too personal. Changing details that don’t matter too much is an editorial technique for protecting privacy. 4) Do you mean the 1998 rioters or the 4/11 protestors? Either way, you would have to ask them, for an accurate answer. But in 1998, anyone who looked Chinese was scared. e.g. There were stories going around about how the mobs were stopping motorcycles to check under the helmet to see if people had Chinese-looking eyes (and other similar stories, some of which have been verified). Whether this particular story was true or not is beside the point in situations like this since, social science would know, perceptions greatly affect actual behaviour.

Luke

The article was not about Cambodian ganja users but about how Cambodia can or could leverage a relaxation in the use of this wonderful herbal substance ingested in a variety of ways. My aging Mum (now deceased) used to add it to her chocolate cakes and wow I enjoyed this on visiting her. Likewise some of Cambodia’s pizzas are zestful to say the least. However, you are correct with the use of the Khmer script and the approximate translation. But my suggestion is to stay off the ice and enjoy the weed.

Raise your glass or light up a “bong”? Notice the purveyors of post-modernism that spend their time intellectually masturbating themselves over Thailand do not appear to even look at postings on Cambodia. I think they are very provincial and lack the intellectual temerity to take a holistic approach to Thailand, Lao PDR and Cambodia but I suppose many of them did not cut their teeth on war, revolution and reaction in the region or rather sub-region.

In Khmer Ganja is កញ្ឆា, not ថ្នាំញៀន.
ថ្នាំញៀន​​ directly translates as medicine (ថ្នាំ)​ addictive (ញៀន) -​ a narcotic drug.

Most, perhaps all, Khmer drug addicts are using ‘ice’: methamphetamine. Ganja wouldn’t be considered by many Cambodians as a heavy drug, perhaps comparable to beetle nut and smoked only by very few elderly Khmer farmers mixed with tobacco. It’s use as a recreational drug by the youth is extremely rare, infact I read Cambodian papers daily and can not remember an report of anyone being caught for its use.
Furthermore, its use as a herb in Khmer dishes is still quite common in the provinces.

thank you, Andrew. Those were enot rumours. There is video evidence of Red Shirts paying money to people who were arriving to attend a pro-Thaksin in rally, in BKK. So many posts here about how we should forget Thaksin. Every action he has taken, says otherwise; since running away from his responsibilities, I call it fleeing; you call it self-imposed exile) He does not want to be forgotten! He wants his good deeds (some amazing) to be remembered and his bad deeds forgotten. If he would man up, pay the taxes he cheated on – Thailand would learn to move on. But he cannot admit to any fault. Im not pro-coup. But it will take 10,20 ? years to recover what T. stole. Ignore the small stuff, like the people lottery. The big stuff was Thailand’s allocated satellite band, which he leased (lawfully) put into SHIN Corp and then sold (illegally) to a consortium controlled by a Singaporean entity. To cap that level of thievery, he evaded the tax on it. and , while I have the chance, some will accuse me of continuing to hound after T. Did you not see the huge signs all over the country, before the most recent ”democtatic” election… ”Thaksin Thinks – Pua Thai Acts” . Tell me, who finances these junkets and conferences?

Soeharto left for a G-15 meeting in Cairo on 9 May 1998. If his departure was ‘nonchalant’, as this author asserts, he at least left behind him a warning that the security forces would deal severely with his opponents. Four Trisakti students were killed on 12 May. Rioting occurred on 13 and 14 May in which Chinese-Indonesians in particular were targeted.

Because of the riots, Soeharto left Cairo precipitately and arrived back in Jakarta on 15 May. Students didn’t occupy the parliamentary building until 18 May. Soeharto resigned three days later.

What Jokowi remembers of these events is anybody’s guess. Presumably he was nowhere near Jakarta at the time. He might have asked Wiranto, of course, his politics, law and security coordinating minister, who has interesting stories to tell about those events.